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ARISTOTLE AND PRAŚASTAPĀDA
ON THE GENESIS OF THE *UNIVERSALS*

Introduction

The Vaiśeṣika School or system is one of the six orthodox principal philosophical systems of India together with the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, associated to the Sāṃkhya, the Vedānta, and the Nyāya associated to the Vaiśeṣika. Principal theories of the Vaiśeṣika School are the theory of categories of reality (ontology) and the theory of atoms.

Praśastapāda (circa second half of 6th century A.D. ¹) wrote “an independent, concise, systematic and comprehensive treatise on the Vaiśeṣika School, the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* ... [that] soon eclipsed the glory of all previous works on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* ... It became later on the focal point of the Vaiśeṣika literature”².

In this article we present an instance of *thematic* coincidence between Vaiśeṣika’s and Aristotle’s philosophy related to the genesis of universals and of the *principia prima*.

In our books *On the Myth of the Opposition between Indian Thought and Western Philosophy*, Hildesheim: Olms Verlag, 2004

1. According to Erich Frauwallner, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, II Band, Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag, 1956, p. 16.

2. Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977, pp. 62-63.

(reviewed by Ernst Steinkellner in WZKS Band XLVIII 2004, 224-225), *Yoga. Una Camino Místico Universal*, Barcelona: Editorial Kairós, 2006, and *Sobre el mito de la oposición entre pensamiento de la India y filosofía de Occidente* (soon to appear in Spain) we have studied a good number of instances of thematic and methodological coincidences between Indian and Western philosophies with the aim to establish that the opposition of Indian thought as characterized by irrationality to Western thought as characterized by rationality constitutes only a myth to be rejected; that Philosophy indeed did exist in India as it did in the West, with the same expectations, with the same weaknesses; and that the comparison of the philosophical themes as developed in India and in the West contributes to a better understanding and appreciation of both of them. The idea that has guided us in this research is that all peoples that have reached in their evolution a similar cultural and intellectual level, give similar answers to questions, which are posed to them, whatever be their nature, practical, religious or philosophical.

Definition of sāmānya / universal

Praśastapāda, in Chapter *Sāmānyapadārthanirūpaṇam*, or “Description of the category ‘universal’ (*sāmānya*)”, of his work, *Praśastapādabhāṣya (Padhārthadharmasaṅgraha)*, pp. 741-742 Gaṅgānāthajhā-Granthamālā edition, Varanasi, 1977, and p. 668 in *Nyāyakandalī being a commentary on Praśastapādabhāṣya, with three sub-commentaries*, Vadodara (India): Oriental Institute, 1991, begins giving the definition of *sāmānya*, “universal”:

*sāmānyaṃ dvividham – paramaparaṃ ca / svaviśayasarvagatam abhinātmakam anekavṛtti ekadvibahuṣv ātmasvarūpānugamapratyayakāri*³
*svarūpābhedenādhāreṣu prabandhena vartamānam anuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam*⁴

“‘Universal’ is of two kinds: ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’. It is

3. Vadodara’s edition has: *ātmasvarūpānuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam*.

4. Vadodara’s edition has: *anuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam*.

omnipresent in its own objects⁵, it resides in many (objects or individuals) with its identity unbroken, it produces the idea of the sameness⁶ of its own form in one, two or many things, it simultaneously exists in [each of] its substrates [or subjects] with non fracture [or difference] in its own form, it is the cause of the idea of sameness.”

Praśastapāda in his definition of “universals”, *sāmānya*, has recourse to the *idea of sameness: anugamapratyaya*.

Sāmānya: similarity, commonness

Let us say some words on the semantic value of the term *sāmānya*, because this semantic value has an important presence in the process of genesis of universals we are going to deal with.

Sāmānya, according to *Monier-Williams Dictionary*, means as an adjective “equal, alike, similar”, and also “shared by others, ... common to”, and as a substantive “equality, similarity, identity”, “common or generic property.” Thus, when the word *sāmānya* is used in its technical meaning (“universal”) it points to the fact that two or more objects that fall under the same *sāmānya* are *similar*, because they *possess common elements* (as for instance: qualities) or, what is the same, that they *possess common elements*, because they are *similar*. The notions of *similarity* and *commonness* are thus interchangeable.

The Vaiśeṣika authors prefer to use the word *sāmānya* leaning in a general way towards its meaning of “similarity”. When dealing with the theory of categories, they use as the criterion of classification and distribution the similarities and dissimilarities that exist among existents, i.e. *the common and uncommon characteristics* of what is to be classified. Praśastapāda, p. 15, Varanasi ed. (p. 23, Vadodara ed.), says:

5. *Nyāyakandalī* comments: *yat sāmānyaṃ yatra piṇḍe praṭīyate sa tasya svo viṣayaḥ*: “Whenever a universal is perceived in a thing, this [thing] is the own object of that [universal].”

6. The word *anugama*, which is used by both editions as a synonym of *anuvṛtti* has the meaning of “uniformity, commonness, sameness”, *Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit*, Pune: Deccan College, 1997, p. 2692.

*dravyaguṇakarmmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānām ṣaṇṇām padārthānām
sadharmyavaidharmyatattvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasahetuḥ:*

“The knowledge of the true nature of the six categories – substance, quality, movement, the universal, the particular, and inherence – through their similarities and dissimilarities is the means of accomplishing the Supreme Good.”

And the commentator Śrīdhāra in his *Nyāyakandalī*, *ad locum* glosses:

*yasya vastuno yo bhāvas⁷ tat tasya tattvam / sādharmaṇo dharmmaḥ sād-
harmyam, asādharmaṇo dharmmo vaidharmyam / sādarmyavaidharmye eva
tattvam ..., tasya jñānaṃ niḥśreyasahetuḥ /*

“True nature of a thing is its form of being. *Similarity* is a common property. *Dissimilarity* is an uncommon property. *Similarity and dissimilarity* [with and from other things] are the *true nature* [of a thing], ... its knowledge is the means of accomplishing the Supreme Good.”

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda, and in general all the authors of the Vaiśeṣika system, all along their treatises enumerate the categories and the component elements of each one of them, and point out the similarities and dissimilarities among all the categories and elements that are included in all of them. As for instance, Praśastapāda in the text just quoted of p. 15, Varanasi ed. (p. 23, Vadodara ed.), enumerates the six *padārthas*, “categories”, doing a reference to their similarities and dissimilarities, and in p. 54, Varanasi ed. (p. 67, Vadodara ed.), he enumerates the similarities among the nine kinds of substances (*dravya*), “earth” (*ṛṥthivī*), “water” (*apas*), “fire” (*tejas*), “air” (*vāyu*), “ether” (*ākāśa*), “time” (*kāla*), “space” (*dig*), “soul” (*ātman*), “mind” (*manas*):

7. The reading *bhāvas* corresponds to Varanasi edition (Manuscript K). Vadodara edition has: *bhāvo yat svarūpas*.

*prthivyādīnāṃ navānām api dravyatvayogaḥ svātmany ārambhakatvaṃ
guṇavattvaṃ kāryyakāraṇāvirodhītvam antyaviśēāvattvaṃ /*

“The nine [substances], earth and the rest, possess [the following characteristics:] the partaking of ‘substanceness’, the capacity of bringing about [the effects that are] in their own nature, the fact of having qualities, the fact of not being destructible by their causes and effects, and the fact of being endowed with ultimate individualities [= the atoms].”

Similarity and commonness in Aristotle and Hobbes

Aristotle gives in *Topica* I, 102 a, lines 31-35, the definition of *γένος*, *genus* (that can be equated to the notion of ‘universal’), which seems to have more present the notion of *commonness* than that of similarity:

*Γένος δ’ἔστι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῶ τί εἶδει ἐν τῶ
τί ἔστι κατηγορούμενον. ἐν τῶ τί ἔστι δὲ κατηγορεῖσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα
λεγέσθω, ὅσα ἀρμόττει ἀποδοῦναι ἐρωτηθέντας τί ἔστι τὸ προκει-
μενον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρμόττει, ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἔστι τὸ
προκειμενον, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ζῶον.*

“Genus is that which is predicated in the [category of] essence of several things that differ in kind. Let it be said that to predicate in the [category of] essence [is to predicate] such things that are fit to be answered by him who is asked ‘What is that before you?’, as for instance in the case of man it is fit to be said ‘It is a living being’ by him who is asked ‘What is that before you?’.”

“*Living being*” (τὸ ζῶον) is the *genus* of man and ox, because if one is asked, in reference to a man and an ox, ‘What is that?’, one answers ‘A living being’, applying a *common* epithet to both: *possession of life*.

Porphyrus in his *Isagogé* § 6, p. 3, Vrin ed., Paris, 1998, explains Aristotle’s definition:

*Τῶν γὰρ κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν καθ’ἐνὸς λέγεται μόνου, ... οἷον
Σωκράτης ... τὰ δὲ κατὰ πλειόνων, ὡς τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ... κοινῶς
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἰδίως τινί.*

“Among the predicates some are said only of one [being or thing], ... as for instance ‘Socrates’ ...; others, as the genera and the classes, [are said] of several things, ... *in common* but not in an individual manner of one [being or thing].”

From these texts it is clear that for Aristotle beings or things are of the same *genus* when to all of them can be given the *same* predicate belonging to the category of “essence” (*οὐσία*), i.e. when all of them possess a *common* (*κοινός*) attribute belonging to that category. Aristotle himself defines what are the predicates belonging to the essence category.

But in his classification of the animal species Aristotle seems to indistinctly adopt both criteria of *similarity* and *commonness* to carry out his task⁸.

Let us say that Hobbes, in *Leviathan*, First Part, 4, p. 26 (R. Tuck ed., Cambridge University Press, 2004) connects ‘*Universall*’ with the notion of “*similarity*” (more in accordance with our Indian author):

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

Genesis of the universals according to Praśastapāda

After his definition of *sāmānya* Praśastapāda, pp. 742-743, Varanasi ed. (p. 669, Vadodara ed.) describes in an abstract, concise, but notwithstanding clear form the process of arising of any *sāmānya*, “universal”:

*katham ? pratipiṇḍaṃ sāmānyāpekṣaṃ prabandhena jñānotpattāv
abhyāsapratyayaajanitāc ca saṃskārād atītajñānaprabandhapratyavekṣaṇād
yad anugatam asti tat sāmānyam iti /*

We give the translation of Praśastapāda’s text putting between brackets some explanations taken from the commentator Śrīdhāra, whose text is quoted below, or ours:

8. Cf. Sir David Ross, *Aristotle*, London-New York: Methuen-Barnes & Noble, 1966, pp. 114-115, and the texts he quotes from *De partibus animalium* and *Historia animalium*.

“How [is it that one comes to know the existence of the universal in many things]? [The answer is:] There is the arising of a **cognitive act** [*jñāna*], which has as a correlate something similar (*sāmānya*) [existing] in each one of the objects [that one perceives], simultaneously [existing in all these objects]⁹;

from the **subliminal impression[s]** [*saṃskāra*]¹⁰ originated by the mental representation [once and again produced] by the **reiteration** [*abhyāsa*] [of the cognitive act before described]

[comes forth] the **remembrance** [*pratyavekṣaṇa*] of the simultaneous existence [in all the perceived objects of that something similar, which was the correlate] of the previous cognitive act[s];

[and] what follows – [i.e. the intellectual product, cognition or notion born from the previous process: **reiterate similar cognitive acts, similar subliminal impressions** and **remembrance**] and is congruent¹¹ [with the similarity simultaneously existing in all the objects perceived in the previous reiterate cognitive acts] – that is the *sāmānya*¹² [universal].

Śrīdhāra’s commentary, *Nyāyakandaḷī, ad locum*, says:

katham iti parasya praśnaḥ / katham anekeāu piṇḍeṣu sāmānyasya vṛttir avagamyata ity arthaḥ / uttaram āha – pratipiṇḍam iti / piṇḍam piṇḍam prati sāmānyāpekṣam yathā bhavati, tathā jñānotpattau satyaṃ yo ’bhyāsapratyayas tena yaḥ saṃskāro janitaḥ, tasmād aūtasya jñānaprabandhasya jñānapravāhasya pratyavekṣaṇāt smaraṇād yad anuḡatam asti tat sāmānyam / kim uktaṃ syāt ? ekasmin piṇḍe sāmānyam upalabhya piṇḍāntare tasya pratyabhijñānād ekasyānekavṛttitvam avagamyate /

Then Praśastapāda, pp. 743-745, Varanasi ed. (p. 670, Vadodara ed.) expresses that the superior (*param*) universal (*sāmānya*) is *sattā*

9. The presence of that ‘something similar’ does not hinder its presence in others.

10. Every experience leaves in the mind a mark, a trail, a subliminal impression (*saṃskāra*) that, under the appropriate circumstances, is reactivated, giving rise to remembrance; in this way the experience **remains** in the mind.

11. We have translated *anuḡatam* of the text by “what follows” and “congruent”, because both express two meanings of the Sanskrit word which are adequate to the described process.

12. *Sāmānya* in the first paragraph hints to the simple similarity that exists in each of the objects under consideration, and in the last paragraph, to the intellectual product constituted by the ‘universal’, and resulting from a complex process of genesis.

(“the fact of being”, “existence”) and indicates how the superior universal arises, giving a concrete example referred to a case of an inferior universal (“the fact of being blue”) and comparing it with the case of the superior universal (“existence”). This description of the arising of the superior universal complements thus the previous explanation of pages 742-743, Varanasi ed. (p. 669, Vadodara ed.):

tatra sattāsāmānyam param anuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam eva / yathā parasparaviśiṣṭeṣu carmavastrakambalādiṣv ekasmān niladravyābhisambandhān nilam nilam iti pratyayānuvṛttiḥ, tathā parasparaviśiṣṭeṣu dravyaguṇakarmasv aviśiṣṭā sat sad iti pratyayānuvṛttiḥ / sā cārthāntarād bhavitum arhaṭi yat tad arthāntaram sā satteti siddhā / sattānusambandhāt sat sad iti pratyayānuvṛttiḥ, tasmāt sā sāmānyam eva /

“Therein the universal ‘existence’ is superior, and is only cause of the idea of identity¹³. In the same way as in relation to a piece of leather, of cloth, of blanket, etc., which are different among them, because of their connection with a [same] blue substance there is an identity in the cognition they produce: ‘[This is] blue’, ‘[That is] blue’, so in relation to substance, quality and motion, which are different among them, there is an absolute [= beyond any differentiation] identity in the cognition they produce: ‘[This is] existent’, ‘[That is] existent’. And this [identity in the cognition] must be due to something apart from [them, i.e. the three categories themselves], and this something apart from them is established as ‘existence’. Because of the connection with existence there is the identity of cognition: ‘[This is] existent’, ‘[That is] existent’; for this reason it [= ‘the fact of being’, “existence”] is a universal.”

The mental operation of the genesis of universals described by Praśastapāda could be said to be an inductive operation, since from the consideration of ‘particulars’ (*pratipiṇḍam*) one ascends to the ‘universal’ (*sāmānyā*). Aristotle defines induction in *Topica* 105 a, lines 13-14: *ἐπαγωγὴ δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου*

13. The “superior universal”, *sattā*, reunites all the things that exist, but does not differentiate them from anything, since, for the Vaiśeṣika, apart from the existing things nothing else exists. The “inferior universals” (substance, quality, action) reunite all the things that fall under each of them and, besides that, each of them differentiates the things that fall under it from the things that fall under each of the other two.

ἔφοδος: “Induction is from the particulars to universals”. Keśava Mīśra, in his *Tarkabhāṣa*, p. 58, Chaukhambha Orientalia edition, Varanasi, 1970, referring to the *inductive inference* describes it as the establishment of a general fact on the basis of the repeated perception of similar particular facts: *bhūyo darśanena dhūmāgnyoḥ svābhāvikaṃ sambandham avadhārayati, yatra dhūmas tratrāgnir iti*.

The genesis of the principia prima and universals in Aristotle

In *Analytica Posteriora*, Book II, Chapter XIX, 99 b, line 15-100 b, line 17, Aristotle expresses that he will deal with the manner in which are apprehended the *first principles* or *premises of the demonstration*, i.e. the *principia prima* (πρώται ἀρχαί). They are the foundation of demonstrations with which are established the knowledges of each science. In fact what Aristotle does is to explain how the *universal concepts* are formed. But Aristotle’s description is equally valid for the *genesis of the principia prima* as well as for the *genesis of the universals* as it results clear from his explanation of 100 b, lines 1-5, where he equates the process of acquiring the knowledge of the primary premises by induction and that of the general concepts conveyed by sense-perception.

Aristotle’s description of the *genesis of the first principles* is very interesting for our comparative purpose, because of its points of coincidence with Praśastapāda’s description of the *genesis of the universals*.

Aristotle begins posing the question of how the *first principles* are apprehended (99 b, lines 17-19). Then he rejects the explanation that the knowledge of the *first principles*¹⁴ has always been present or latent in us (as congenital or innate ideas not perceived), because this

14. We refer *αὐτάς*, “them”, of 99 b, line 26, not to *αἱ ἔξεις*, “the faculties”, of 99 b, line 25, but to *τάς πρώτας ἀρχάς τὰς ἀμέσους*, “the first immediate principles”, of 99 b, line 21, because of the following reasons: *the first principles* are the subject of the preceding explanations of 99 b, lines 15-26; the term *γνώσεις*, “knowledges”, of 99 b, line 27, is correctly related to *αὐτάς* only if this word designates “*the first principles*”, but not if it designates “*the faculties*”, which are not “knowledges”; Aristotle himself in 99 b, line 30, remits to what he said before in sections 1, 2, and 3 (71 a, line 1-73 a, line 20) in relation to demonstration, which deal with *the first principles*, as the basis of demonstration; and, finally, Themistius in his *Paraphrasis* of this treatise of Aristotle, *ad locum*, p. 62, lines 30-35, applies this passage (99 b, lines 23-30) to *the first principles*.

would imply that they have escaped our knowledge and we have not been aware of them (99 b, lines 25-30).

The only possible explanation is that we acquire them, not having possessed them before, and in this case it is necessary to postulate the existence of some special capacity, which giving rise to an adequate process leads us to that acquisition. And this special capacity is sense-perception, which is in fact possessed by all living beings and which allows the constitution of the universals (99 b, lines 30-35):

φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐτ'ἔχειν οἶόν τε, οὐτ'ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχουσιν ἕξιν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μὲν τινα δύναμιν, ... Φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο γε πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον τοῖς ζώοις. ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν σύμφοτον κριτικῆν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἰσθησίν·

“Accordingly, it is evident that it is not possible that we [congenitally] possess [the knowledge of the *first principles*] or that they arise in us not having had the knowledge [of them before] or not possessing a[n adequate] faculty. Then it is necessary to have some [adequate] faculty... It is evident that this [faculty] belongs to all living beings, since they have an innate faculty able to discern, which is called **sense-perception**.”

In what follows Aristotle describes the process of *genesis of the principia prima* and *universals*, since both processes, as already said, are *parallel*, according to what Aristotle himself explains in 99 b, line 15-100 b, line 5, where he announces that he will deal with *first principles* (περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν), he describes next how do *universals* arise, and, finally, he ends the section pointing out that the universals and the principia prima are known by induction:

(99 b, line 36-100 a, line 1) ἐνούσης δ'αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζώων ἐγγίνεται μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, τοῖς δ'οὐκ ἐγγίνεται. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίνεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ περὶ ἃ μὴ ἐγγίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γνώσις ἕξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐν οἷς δ'ἔνεστιν αἰσθανομένοις ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. (100 a, lines 1-3) πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γινομένων ἤδη διαφορὰ τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μή. ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, (100 a, lines 4-6) ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν. (100 a, lines 6-9) ἐκ δ'ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς

ἡρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν ἐνῇ ἐκείνος τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης.

(99 b, line 36-100 a, line 1) “This **sense-perception** existing [in all living beings], in some living beings **permanence of the percepta** is produced, in others it does not. For those [living beings] in whom [permanence of the percepta] is not produced, cognition [in a complete sense] does not exist with the exception of [mere] sense-perception – [it does not exist] at all [for those in whom permanency of the percepta does not exist at all] or [it does not exist but only] in relation to those [percepta whose permanency is] not produced.

For those [living beings] in whom [permanency of the percepta] is produced, it is possible, once they have perceived something, **to retain** [the percepta] **in their soul**. (100 a, lines 1-3) When many similar processes are [repeatedly] produced, a distinction immediately arises: in some [living beings] from the **permanency** of such [similar percepta] an **intellectual product** [*logos*, in this case a **universal concept**] is produced, in others it is not.

Thus from sense-perception memory arises – as we say – (100 a, lines 4-6) and from **memory of the same thing repeatedly produced**, experience [i.e. personal knowledge or knowledge acquired through sense-perception], because the memories [though] numerically many constitute a single experience.

And when the **universal** is established in the soul (100 a, lines 6-9) out of the [mentioned] experience or out of the whole [process] – [**the universal** i.e.] **the one in face of the many**, whatever is present as **one and the same in all those** [multiple] **things** – there is the starting-point of art and science ...”

Aristotle concludes this last paragraph pointing out which is the nature of the epistemological operation that leads to the knowledge of the *universal principles*; it is evident that it is an *inductive operation*, *ἐπαγωγὴ*:¹⁵

... (100 b, lines 3-4) δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ.

“... (100 b, lines 3-4) It is clear that it is necessary for us to know **the first [principles or premises]** by **induction**, because sense-perception also gives rise to the universals.”

15. “Induction” is clearly defined by Aristotle in *Topica* 105 a, lines 13-14, and by Keśava Mīśra, *Tarkabhāṣa*, p. 58, already quoted.

Example of Themistius illustrating Aristotle's genesis of the principia prima

Themistius (circa 317-circa 387) in his *Paraphrasis* of the *Analytica Posteriora*, p. 62, line 35-p. 64, line 16, ed. Maximilianus Wallies, Berolini: Typis et impensis Georgii Reimeri, 1900, glosses the whole process of constitution of universals, and gives, p. 63, lines 17-23, the following example which illustrates that process: one perceives that the hellebore is a purifying substance and this act of perception is repeated several times; and, thanks to the remembrance of the numerous reiterate perceptions of this fact, that experiential knowledge (*ἐμπειρία*) consisting in it that the hellebore is purifying is constituted. Once the experiential knowledge increases and is enriched by other perceptions similar to the previous ones, with the remaining of the memory of them, the universal principle that “all hellebore purifies” is constituted and remains in the soul:

ἦς [=ἐμπειρίας] συναυξανομένης τε καὶ προσλαμβανούσης αἴσθησιν ὁμοίαν καὶ μνήμην πηγνυται ἤδη τὸ καθόλου καὶ ἐμμένει τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅτι πᾶσ ἐλλέβορος καθαίρει.

Conclusion

The texts that we have presented reveal a great coincidence between Aristotle's description of the *genesis* process of the *principia prima* and the universals and Praśastapāda's description of the *genesis* of the universals.

1. The first moment in Aristotle's description is *αἴσθησις*, which is generally understood as “sense-perception”. Sense-perception, *αἴσθησις*, is in the context of Aristotle's epistemological theory a very humble faculty, since it operates with individuals or particulars and for this reason it cannot produce knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), which requires the intervention of universals. Cf. *Analytica Posteriora* 87 b, line 28-88 a, line 8; *Topica* 114 a, lines 21-22 and 25.

Notwithstanding its humble condition *αἴσθησις* is the starting-point from which the knowledge of the *first principles* and *universals* may be developed.

In Praśastapāda's description it is "an act of cognition or knowledge", *jñāna*, that starts the process of the *genesis of universals*. This act of cognition is specifically an act of perception, *pratyakṣa*, that can be of material things through the five sense-organs, or of ideas and feelings through the mind. Cf. Vātsyāyana *ad Nyāyasūtras* I, 1, 4 (at the end). This characteristic of perception of being of external objects as well as of internal objects (ideas, etc.) opens the possibility that there can be universals of individual material things as well as universals of individual mental things, as for instance: universals of ideas of things existing *in re*, universals of ideas of things existing only *in intellectu*, and universals constituted by the categories (*padārthas*) of the Nyāya system of logic in which are included the means of correct knowledge (perception, inference, etc.), doubt, motive, example, the accepted theory, the members of inference, fallacious reason, etc.

Let us add that contrarily to Aristotle's conception of sense-perception as the humble faculty that gives rise to the whole process of the genesis of universals, Praśastapāda uses the word *jñāna* for the same moment of the same process, and *jñāna* is not at all a humble faculty since it points also to the highest knowledge, derived from meditation, of the one Universal Spirit (*Brahman*) and of the soul (*ātman*).

2. Then in Aristotle's description follows the indication that in some living beings the permanence or remaining (*μονή*) of the perceptum, grasped by the act of perception, takes place. In other words, there remains the memory (*μνήμη*) of the thing grasped by the act of perception. This is the second moment of the process.

Praśastapāda in his description uses two words that have to do, the first, with permanence or remaining in the mind of the percepta as well as with memory, and the second, with memory. He explains that from the act of cognition (*jñāna*) a *saṃskāra* (subliminal impression) is produced. On *saṃskāra* cf. the previous note 10. In the word *saṃskāra* there is an *implicit* reference to permanence and remembrance of the perceptum. Praśastapāda uses also the word *pratyavekṣaṇa* in reference to the intellectual product to which the *saṃskāra* gives rise. This word is glossed by Śrīdhāra in his commentary *ad locum* by *smaraṇa*, "remembrance, reminiscence, memory". This is an *explicit* reference to remembrance of the perceptum, and consequently of its permanence in the mind.

3. Then Aristotle passes to deal with the third stage of the genesis process. From the memories left each time by many similar things repeatedly perceived an *ἐμπειρία* is produced. *Ἐμπειρία* means an “experience, an acquaintance with”. This acquaintance is nothing else than the not at all well-defined knowledge brought about by the remembrance of the similarity existing in all the perceived objects. From this *ἐμπειρία* or from the whole genesis process just described the universal (we can add: or the *principium primum*) comes forth.

In Praśastapāda we find the description of a very similar process. For Praśastapāda the universal, *sāmānya*, is that mental product, concept or notion that comes forth from similar remembrances (*pratyavekṣaṇa*) produced by the similar impressions (*saṃskāra*) left by reiterate cognitive acts (*jñāna*) of the similarity that exists in many objects.

4. Aristotle mentions in p. 100 a, lines 7-8, already quoted, the characteristics of the universal: *ἐν παρὰ τὰ πολλά* “the one in face of the many”, *τὸ αὐτό* “the same”. The *many* are *unified* in the universal, which is present in all of them:

τοῦ ἐνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν ἐνῆ ἐκεῖνος τὸ αὐτό ...

Aristotle himself, in *De interpretatione* p. 17 a, line 38-17 b, line 1, makes reference to both characteristics of *oneness*, opposed to multiplicity, and commonness to several individuals:

λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖθαι

where the word *ὃ* in singular hints to *unity*, and what can be predicated (*κατηγορεῖθαι*) of many things is *common* to all of them.

Themistius, in page 63, lines 16-17, of his *Paraphrasis of Analytica Posteriora*, refers explicitly to sameness:

τὸ καθόλου τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ ταῦτὸν ἐν τοῖς καθ'ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς,

and implicitly to *oneness* as opposed to plurality, where *τὸ καθόλου* in singular is opposed to *τοῖς πολλοῖς*. Cf. *ibidem*, p. 64, line 1:

τὸ καθόλου τὸ ἐν τοῖς καθ'ἕκαστον ὅμοιον.

And Porphyrius in *Isagogé*, § 6, p. 3, Vrin edition, Paris, 1998, implicitly refers to both characteristics:

Τῶν γὰρ κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν καθ'ἐνὸς λέγεται μόνου, ... οἷον Σωκράτης ... τὰ δὲ κατὰ πλειόνων, ὡς τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ... κοινῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ἰδίως τινί.

“Among the predicates some are said only of one [being or thing], ... as for instance ‘Socrates’ ..., others of several things, as the genera and the classes, ... in common but not in an individual manner of one [being or thing].”

Praśastapāda, in his definition of *sāmānya*, universal, pp. 741-742, Varanasi ed. (p. 668, Vadodara ed.), of his treatise (already quoted in the previous section *Definition of sāmānya/universal*) mentions *unity* opposed to plurality and *similarity* as characteristics of *sāmānya*:

abhinnātmakam anekavṛtti, ekadvibahuṣv ātmas-varūpānugamapratyayakāri, svarūpābhedenādhāreṣu prabandhena vartamānam anuvṛtipratyayakāraṇam.

Śrīdhāra, in page 744, Varanasi ed. (page 670, Vadodara ed.), commenting Praśastapāda's text of pp. 742-743, Varanasi ed. (p. 669, Vadodara ed.) (quoted also in the previous section) makes reference to the opposition between the *unity* of the universal and the *plurality* of the objects which fall under it:

ekasmin piṇḍe sāmānyam upalabhya piṇḍāntare tasya pratyabhijñānād ekasyānekavṛtītvam avagamyate.

“Having cognized [something that constitutes] a universal in one object, on recognizing [afterwards] it in another object, one comes to know that *one* universal is perceived in *many* objects.”

It was not need for him to refer to the characteristic of *sameness* of the universal (the same in all), because this characteristic is already implicit in the Sanskrit word *sāmānya*: “similarity, universal”.

The texts quoted in this article and the remarks that accompany them make it evident that Aristotle and Praśastapāda have numerous remarkable points of coincidence in their ideas about how the universal, *one*, comes forth from *many*, as well as about which are the essential characteristics of the universal. These coincidences provide a new support to the theses we have maintained in our publications mentioned in the *Introduction* of this article concerning Indian and Western philosophies.