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ON PĀṆINĪYAS' CATEGORY 'SAMBANDHA'  
AND THE CORRESPONDING SYNTACTIC PHENOMENA  
IN OLD AND NEW INDO-ARYAN

There is no formal definition (*saṃjñā*) of concept 'sambandha' in Pāṇini's 'Aṣṭādhyāyī' as the 6-th triplet of case affixes (*ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti*), according to Pāṇini, does not imply any specific deep structure case (*kāraka*) and thus can not be considered as a factor contributing to the accomplishment of the action, presented by the main verb of a sentence or clause (Patañjali directly connects Pāṇini's term *kāraka* with the verbal root *kar-* 'to do', stressing the fact that *kārakas* - bound different NPs of a sentence signify real 'doers' of the action: *karotīti kārakam*, that is, 'does' (and due to this is) 'doer' <sup>1</sup>). But when characterizing functions of different case affixes Pāṇini (in his *sūtra* 2.3.50) states: *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe* 'the 6-th triplet of case-endings (should be used in relation to) the residuary (meanings)' <sup>2</sup>.- This statement by Pāṇini has resulted in controversy among the later Sanskrit grammarians as some of them (Bhaṭṭhari including) have started attempts to prove that Pāṇini's *śeṣe* also means a *kāraka* and, thus, some '*śeṣa-kāraka*' might be postulated for structures of the type

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1. *Mahābhāṣyam of Patañjali*, Chowkhamba book depot, Varanasi, year unmentioned, p. 685.

2. S.M. KATRE (ed. & transl.), *Pāṇini. Aṣṭādhyāyī*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989.

*rājñah puruṣaḥ* 'the servant of the king' where the concrete semantic relation of the possessor and the possessed (*svasvāmibhāva*) might be seen <sup>3</sup>.

Meanwhile, the number of the concrete relations can easily increase in case we take the other structures into account also – e.g., in *vrkṣasya śākhā* 'the branch of the tree' we might state the relation of the whole and its part; in, e.g., *hiranyasya kuṇḍalam* 'an ear-ring of gold' we'll see the relation of the material and the product; in, e.g., *aśvasya ghāsaḥ* 'fodder for the horse' we should state the relation of purpose, etc. <sup>4</sup>, or, as Patanjali concluded in his '*Mahābhāṣyam*', '*ekaśataṃ ṣaṣṭhyarthāḥ*' 'a (whole) hundred of meanings of the 6-th (triplet of affixes) <sup>5</sup>.

The understanding of this fact has, no doubt, forced Bhartṛhari to state that the 'residuary meanings (*śeṣa*- of Pāṇini)' are nothing else than the 'relation as such' (*saṃbandha*): *saṃbandhaḥ kārakebhyo 'nyaḥ kriyākārapūrvakaḥ / śrutāyāmaśrutāyāṃ vā kriyāyāṃ so 'bhidhīyate //* 'saṃbandha' (is) preceded by other *kārakas* (and irrespectively of the fact, if) the action (is) expressed or not, it is manifested' <sup>6</sup>. Bhartṛhari has also pointed out that among many concrete modifications of 'relation proper' two are the basic – those, found in complementary distribution, relations of 'contact' (*saṃyoga*) and of 'inherence' (*samavāya*) <sup>7</sup>. These two will be further analyzed here.

As for the noun *samavāya* itself, it first appears in Pāṇini's rule 4.4.43: *samavāyān samavaiti* 'becomes an integral member of gatherings'. *Sūtra* 4.4.43 is an *arthādhikāra* <sup>8</sup>, and it prescribes a certain special sense for the *taddhita* suffix *ṭha*, already introduced in 4.4.1;

3. K.A.S. IYER, *Bhartṛhari*, Deccan College, Pune, 1992, p. 529, reference n. 145.

4. CHARU DEVA SHASTRI, *Pāṇini : Re-Interpreted*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1990, p. 67.

5. S. JHA, *Sanskrit Grammar. Linguistic and Philosophical Analysis*, Arun Publishing House, Chandigarh, 1995, pp. 80, 93.

6. K.A.S. IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 529.

7. SAMBAŚIVA ŚASTRI (ed.), *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, 3d *kaṇḍa*. With the commentary *Prakāraṇakaprakāśa of Helārāja, son of Bhūtirāja*, Trivandrum Government Press, 1935, vol. III, chap. 3, pt. 1.

8. The term, describing a particular semo-syntactic set of the affixes *taddhita*, was introduced by Saroja Bhate: S. BHATE, *Pāṇini's Taddhita Rules*, University of Poona, Pune, 1989, pp. 2-3.

thus, *samavāya*, being not a term, still implies a meaning of 'integrity' or, as Pāṇini speaks about the connection between one of the *taddhita* affixes, the most 'integral' inside the whole set of derivational affixes, and the sema of 'integrity', we might also treat this word as meaning something like 'inherence'. The same noun *samavāya* is again used by Pāṇini in *sūtra* 6.1.138, but there absolutely no terminological implications are present.

The terminological status, though with rather a diffuse meaning, the noun *samavāya* first acquires in Patañjali's '*maḥābhāṣyam*': in answer to the opponent's question 'And what is the meaning of the expression 'instruction in the phonemes'?' Patañjali cites Kātyāyana's *vārttikā* '*vṛttisamavāyārtha upadeśaḥ*' 'the instruction (in the phonemes is meant) for the arrangement (of the phonemes) in (a certain) order'. In order to make the *vārttikā* more understandable Patañjali later adds an accurate interpretation: *varṇānāmānupūrvyeṇa saṃniveśaḥ* 'arrangement of phonemes in regular succession'. Still later Kaiyaṭa, the author of the commentary '*Pradīpa*' on Patañjali's work, gives a more detailed explanation: *vṛttisamavāyārtha*, according to him, means '*lāghavena śāstrapravṛttyārtha*', that is, 'for using rules with brevity', and also adds: *śāstrapravṛttipratyāsannatvaṃ samavāyasya darśayati* '(Patañjali) demonstrates direct correspondence of (the notion) '*samavāya*' with the arrangement (of rules) of the treatise' <sup>9</sup>. Thus, the term *samavāya*, used first by Kātyāyana and later by Patañjali and Kaiyaṭa, signifies something like 'internal potency of the phonemic set towards ordering/ structuration of the latter'.

In other parts of his commentary Patañjali suggests also some other meanings for the noun *samavāya*. Thus, in connection with *kāraka*-frames for sentence structures he discusses the problems of 'subjectivalization' (to put it in Fillmore's terms), namely, the following one: can an NP representing a semantic Locus or Instrument occupy a subject slot of the sentence? Giving a positive answer and illustrating it by a sample *sthāli pacati* 'a caldron cooks', Patañjali suggests an explanation using a term *samavāya* in the sense 'integral

9. Śrīmat Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya. Paspasāhnikā with Pradīpa of Kaiyaṭa and edited with 'Bhava-Bodhini' Hindi exposition by Dr. J.S.L. TRIPATHI, Krishnadas Sanskrit Series 115, Varanasi, 1989, p. 93.

unity/ conjunction' (with the Agent, *karṭṛ*, of the sentence). The term in this meaning is opposed to antonymous *vyavāya* 'disjunction' (from the Agent): *samavāye sthāli paratantrā vyavāye svatantrā* 'in case of (relation) *samavāya*, (NP) 'sthāli' (is) a dependent factor, in case of (relation) *vyavāya*, (it is) an independent (*svatantrā*) factor'. This statement by Patañjali demonstrates a clear difference between him and – much later commentator – Bhartṛhari, according to whom all the *kāraṅkas*, being only means (*sādhana*) of invariant *śakti*, are able to have the role of sentence subject.

In 'Introduction' (*Paspaśāhnika*) to his commentary Patañjali touches also some problems of the relation between word and its meaning, associated with the notion '*samavāya*'. Quoting sympathetically Kātyāyana's *vārttikā* No. 3 <sup>10</sup> (*siddhe śabde arthasambandhe ...* 'when the relation of the word and (its) meaning (is) permanent...'), Patañjali not only demonstrates solidarity with Kātyāyana's opinion concerning the eternal type of connection between word and its meaning, but actually describes the concrete relation in question – it is 'inherence' (*samavāya*) that is present here. These assumptions by Kātyāyana and Patañjali would be backed by later grammarian Bhartṛhari who states (supplying the corresponding examples) that though in pairs of related objects the nature of each of them may vary as to permanency or non-permanency, the concrete relation '*samavāya*' in any particular case remains only permanent. In the same way, concludes Bhartṛhari, the relation between permanent word (*śabda*) and impermanent (due to non-permanency of the 'thing' referred to) meaning (*artha*) should still remain permanent <sup>11</sup>. A large portion of this work by Bhartṛhari is dedicated to polemics with the Vaisheshikas, in whose treatises *samavāya* was considered as one of the main categories (though the notion itself, contrary to opinions of some philosophers <sup>12</sup>, had been first elaborated much earlier by linguists, as is

10. The numeration of *vārttikas* follows one suggested by Kielhorn: L.F. KIELHORN (ed.), *The Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*, vols. I-III, Government Central Press, Bombay, 1880-1885.

11. S.K.A. IYER (ed.), *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari* with the commentary of *Helārāja*, *kaṇḍa* 3, Deccan College Monograph Series 21, Deccan College, Pune, 1994, vol. III, chap. 3, pt. 8.

12. See, for example: V.G. LYSENKO, "Diskretnoe i kontinualnoe v istorii indij-



evident). Probably, to demonstrate his difference with the Vaisheshikas, Bhartṛhari in further portions of his treatise (namely, in 3.3.31) changes the terminology: while talking on word – meaning relation he starts using the term 'fitness' (*yogyatā*) instead of *samavāya*, though the essence of the matter is not modified much by this.

It is in verse No. 9 of chapter 7, part 1, kāṇḍa 3 of his '*Vākyapadīya*' that Bhartṛhari states explicitly the relation of complementary distribution between 'surface contact' (*saṃyoga*) and 'inherence' (*samavāya*) marking that both are varieties of 'relation in general' (*saṃbandha*). Further on (in verses 17-18) he also shows clearly the difference between these two types of 'relation', and by doing this he provides foundation for differentiation between the primary and the secondary meanings of words. He says: *bhinnavastvāśrayā buddhiḥ saṃyogiṣvanuvārtate / samavāyiṣu bhedasya grahaṇaṃ vinivartate // ataḥ saṃyogideśānāṃ gauṇatvaṃ parikalpyate / avivekātpradeśebhyo mukhyatvaṃ samavāyinām //* '(In case) objects are characterized (by contacts of the type) '*saṃyoga*', an idea following (this appears as) based on objects' differentiation. (But in case of) objects characterized by '*samavāya*', the perception of differentiation does not take place. That is why in objects, characterized by *saṃyoga*, potency towards 'secondariness' (of the corresponding meaning-)divisions is found. (While) in objects, characterized by '*samavāya*', due to absence of subdivisions (of meaning), potency towards 'primariness' (shows itself)'. Still further (in verse No.149) Bhartṛhari states: *upaśleṣasya cābhedas tilākāśakatādiṣu / upakārāstu bhidyante saṃyogisamavāyinām //* 'Absence of differentiation (takes place in case of general type of) contact'<sup>13</sup> (be it in case of) sesam-seed, space (or) mat, and the like. (But) the subsidiary actions differentiate (in accordance with) differences between objects having *saṃyoga*-type relations (and objects having) *samavāya*-type relations'. When commenting on this, Bhartṛhari's later commentator Helārāja clarifies: *upaśleṣa ādhāra-sthādhyāyena saṃbandhaḥ ... kaṭe āste devadatta iti saṃyoginaḥ ... tileṣu tailamiti tu samavāyin-*... '(The term) *upaśleṣa* (signifies:) the

skoj mysli: lingvisticheskaja traditsija i vaisheshika". – Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchenoj stepeni doktora filosofskikh nauk, Moskva, 1998, s. 55.

13. Here *upaśleṣa* is actually synonymous with *saṃbandha* 'relation in general'.

relation between the container and the contained ... (in expressions of the type) 'on the mat sits Devadatta' objects (characterized by the relation) *saṃyoga* are implied, but (expressions of the type) '(there is) oil in sesam-seeds' (implies) objects (characterized by the relation) *samavāya*'.

While Vaisheshikas have stated that *samavāya* neutralizes the difference between the cause and the result and, thus, there should be no real difference between Pāṇini's *kāraḥ* and *vibhaktis*, the grammarians have strongly opposed to this idea. In 3.1.9. of *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari has stressed the need for maintaining the difference, and Helārāja while commenting on this verse by Bhartṛhari, expressed similar views with even more clarity: ... *prātipadikena dravye 'bhihite śaktau kṛtabandhā vibhaktiḥ pravartate* 'when substance happens to be expressed (in the meaning of) a stem, case-inflections, being not-bound to (the meaning of the derivational) affixes 'kṛt', turn to exist in 'potency' (*śakti*) (in other words, in *kāraḥ* – B. Z.)'.

Still later grammarians, such as Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa of 17-th century, agree with these ideas of predecessors and try to elaborate them. While discussing, for example, Patient (*karman*) as one of the *kāraḥ*, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa shows that *karman* (as well as the other *kāraḥ*) maintains a relation of 'inherence' (*samavāya*) with such permanent components of any verbal root as 'activity' (*vyāpāra*) and 'result' (*phala*). Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa clearly shows that, contrary to the opinion of the adherents of Nyāya and Vaisheshika, 'result' is not directly expressed through 2-nd triplet of case-affixes (as those latter only reveal it) but is inherently present (*samaveta*) in the meaning-structure of a verb. Otherwise, says Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, such verbs as *gam-* 'to go' and *tyaj-* 'to leave' must be considered as synonymous, as both may combine with the 2-nd triplet of case-affixes (*dvitīyā vibhakti*) – e.g., *nagara-m gacchati/tyajati* 'goes to the town/ leaves the town'. Only if *kāraḥ*' distinctions (namely, *karman* and *apādāna*) are taken into account, the correct semo-syntactic structure will be construed. The number of such 'synonyms' may become great, and if it happened, it would contradict the general communicative practice <sup>14</sup>.

14. H.G. COWARD and KUNJUNNI RAJA, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. V, 'The Philosophy of the Grammarians', Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1990, p. 259.

Following Bhartṛhari, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's famous uncle and predecessor in grammatical studies Bhaṭṭoji Dīkshita of the middle of 17-th century has showed that whenever a speaker has no intention to express any specific type of relation between action and accessories (*kāraḥ*) and desires only to state the existence of relation as such, of 'pure relationship', the 6-th triplet of case-affixes must be used: *karmādīnāmapī saṃbandhamātravivakṣāyām śaṣṭhyeva* 'also it is the 6-th triplet (that should be used in case) of the desire to express the relation as such, (characterizing such *kāraḥ* as) *karman* and the like'<sup>15</sup>. This was illustrated by examples of the type *mātuh* (with Genitive and not Accusative) *smarati* 'remembrance about mother comes to him', contrasting with *mātaram* (with Accusative) *smarati* 'he remembers (his) mother': while the first sentence implies the sense of 'general relation' (that is correspondingly expressed by 6-th triplet), it is the semantically required *karma-kāraḥ* (Patient) of the second sentence that demands expression by the 2-nd triplet (Accusative). Agreeing in this with Bhaṭṭoji (and with the tradition in general as many representatives of it have been analyzing thoroughly the same pair of sentences), Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa makes a step further and actually anticipates the modern linguistics' idea of the arbitrary character of relation between form and meaning of a language sign: while discussing the problem of case-inflections, he specifies two different types of 'restrictions' (*niyamā*). One of them determines the selection of a proper meaning under the condition that the necessary form has already been selected (that is *śabdaniyama* 'restriction (referred to) word-forms' or *pratyayaniyama* 'restriction (referred to) affixes'); the other one determines the selection of a proper form in case the necessary meaning or function has already been established (*arthaniyama* 'restriction (referred to) meanings'). The corresponding illustrations are: *dvitīyā karmanyeva* 'the 2-nd (triplet of case-affixes should be used) only in case *karma-kāraḥ* (is to be expressed)' and *karmani dvitīyaiva* 'in case *karma-kāraḥ* (is to be expressed, it is) only the 2-nd triplet (that should be used)'<sup>16</sup>.

15. *The Siddhānta Kaumudī of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita*, edited and translated into English by late Śrīśa Chandra Vasu, vol. I, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi - Patna - Varanasi, p. 364.

16. The rules and the examples were analyzed, though with different interpretations provided, also in: COWARD and KUNJUNNI RAJA, *op. cit.*, p. 272, - and in: S.

It is also to be noted that the majority of later grammarians who worked after Bhartṛhari (including Kaunḍabhaṭṭa) do follow his suggestions to explain differences between *samavāya* and other variants of *sambandha* (and *saṃyoga*, first of all) as functionally determined by Time-factor: among the particular relations only *samavāya* must be characterized as a 'permanent' one (*nitya*), while *saṃyoga*, opposing to it, should be qualified as 'temporary' (*anitya*). – S. Jha even correspondingly translates the first term as 'eternal relationship' and the second as 'temporary relationship' <sup>17</sup>. This interpretation, suggested by Bhartṛhari for Sanskrit, proves to be also useful for New Indo-Aryan – in Hindi, for example, participial stative constructions with the meaning of result differentiate into subtypes on the basis of the same Time-bound semantic opposition (see below).

Bhartṛhari, as has been mentioned above, connected the notion of 'relation as such' (*sambandha*) with the 6-th triplet of case-affixes (that is, genitive); thus, the latter, being semantically motivated, may also be treated as some special variety of *kāraṅgas*. This very logic indeed allows Bhartṛhari to bestow a *kāraṅga*-status to genitive. As he explains: *kriyākāraṅgapūrvakaḥ ityanena kāraṅgatvaṃ vyācāṣṭe śeṣasya* 'The deep case (status) of 'residuary' (6-th triplet) is explained by the fact, (that this triplet semantically) is preceded by action (and) *kāraṅgas*', and the statement following this, informs: ... *śeṣaḥ kāraṅgam* '...the residuary (6-th triplet is a) deep structure case' <sup>18</sup>.

Bhartṛhari's treatment may be justified if we take into account data, provided by Old Indo-Aryan (OIA), and specially by Vedic. In Vedic the semantic opposition 'whole – part (of this whole)' is grammaticalized, and genitive – accusative surface cases are regularly used to manifest it. Compare, e.g., ṚgVeda samples: *dadāta no 'mṛta-sya* (genitive as 'partitive') 'give us some portion of *amṛta*', but *papiḥ soma-m* (accusative) 'drinking (the whole of) *soma*' <sup>19</sup>. Interestingly,

RATHORE, *Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa's Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*. An Analytical Study, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1998, p. 66.

17. S. JHA, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78. On p. 93 of his work JHA quotes the logician Viśvanātha's definition: *samavāyatvaṃ nityasaṃbandhatvaṃ* 'capacity (for) inherence (is) a capacity (for) eternal relation'.

18. IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 529.

19. W.D. WHITNEY, *Sanskrit Grammar*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi - Varanasi - Patna, 1969, pp. 91, 99.

the same opposition, expressed by the same device (part. gen. – acc.), exists also in Russian: *vypej vod-y* (part. gen.) '(you) drink some water' – *vypej vod-u* (acc.) '(you) drink (the whole of) water'. In Sanskrit proper the opposition gradually becomes loose and besides 'part – whole' relation implies plenty of additional meanings. For some contexts semantics based interpretations still remain possible – as, e.g., in case of *guru-m* (acc.) *smarati* he remembers the teacher: his remembering efforts are completely concentrated on one person only, the teacher, – *gur-oḥ* (gen.) *smarati* 'remembrance concerning the teacher comes (to him)': among many a remembrance he enjoys there is one (at least) connected with his teacher. Also in *viṣṇoḥ caraṇ-au* (acc.) *bhajate* '(he) worships Vishnu's feet': his act of worship is wholly directed exclusively on Vishnu's feet and on nothing else – *viṣṇoḥ caraṇa-yoḥ* (gen.) *bhajate* 'his act of worship concerns Vishnu's feet in particular (but, probably, not only them)'. But in case of *śata-m* (acc.) *dīvyati* 'gambles a hundred (? and has no more money to gamble)' – *śata-sya* (gen.) *dīvyati* 'gambles a hundred (? and it isn't his last money)' the semantic difference seems rather uncertain. In any case, it is evident that, contrary to Speijer<sup>20</sup>, not only the verb 'to remember' (*smr-*) is capable in later Sanskrit to construe object with (partitive) genitive – the number of such verbal lexemes is, no doubt, greater, though, perhaps, less than in Vedic. It is remarkable that in modern Hindi similar type of variation (but on surface level only, with no semantic implications) exists for the same lexeme 'to remember': we may use either verb *yād ānā* without the attributive postposition *k-* and agreement between the verb and an NP that is the object of remembering, or the complex verb *k-ī yād ānā* with the postposition and agreement of the verb with the nominal component of the predicate. – E.g., *pitā ji* (m. pl.) *yād* (f. sg.) *ā-e* (m.pl.) '(someone) remembered (his/her) father' – *pitā jī* (m.pl.) *k-i* (f.sg.) *yād* (f.sg.) *ā-ī* (f.sg.) 'remembrance of (his/her) father came to (someone)'.

Thus, it may be stated in connection with the notions 'saṃbandha', 'saṃyoga' and 'samavāya' that the grammatical analysis of Sanskrit data and use of the corresponding terms, started by Pāṇini and continued by his followers, has turned down to very important linguistic

20. J.S. SPEIJER, Sanskrit Syntax, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1993, p. 89.

problems of theoretical and practical value, much similar to those disputed by linguists of nowadays. Some points connected with the opposition of *saṃyoga* – *samavāya* still need clarification, and among them the question, if the opposition mentioned is significant also for other, not-discussed by the grammarians, phenomena of semo-syntactic structure of Indo-Aryan. One of the first attempts to analyze in view of the stated opposition Sanskrit syntax was undertaken by V. Arakel'an already in 1977<sup>21</sup>. The author proved the existence of semo-syntactic opposition of 'inalienable – alienable possession' in Sanskrit (the same one exists also in Hindi and in the majority of other New Indo-Aryan languages<sup>22</sup>). Let us first analyze Sanskrit sentence constructions of the type *N-1 (Gen.) - N-2 (Nom.) - bhū-/as-*. Compare, for example, sentences<sup>23</sup>: (1) *pituh (Gen.) saptāḥ putrāḥ (Nom.) santi (Cop.)* 'the father has seven sons' and (2) *pituh (Gen.) pariṇaye sandeho (Nom.) 'sti (Cop.)* 'the father has (acquired) a doubt concerning a betrothal ceremony'. The syntactic behavior of the constructions demonstrates differences, as only for (1) but not for (2) the nominalizing transformation with suffix *-va(n)t* (implying the meaning of possession) would be possible: (1a) *saptaputra-vān pitāsti* 'there is a father having seven sons', but (\*2a) \**pariṇaye sandeha-vān pitāsti* 'there is a father, having a doubt concerning a betrothal ceremony'. As is evident, the semantic structure of sentences of the type (1) implies sema of 'inalienable possession', prototypical for *samavāya*, while sentence-structures of the type (2) do not imply it and, thus, may be treated as prototypical for *saṃyoga*. Different potencies for nominalization transformation in constructions of the analyzed types have not been noticed by Pāṇini and Pāṇinians or, even if noticed, have not been explicated because of the similarities in

21. V. ARAKEL'AN, "Konstruktii obladaniia v sanskrite i znacenie genitiva v etikh konstruktisijakh" (Constructions of Possession in Sanskrit and the Meaning of Genitive in them).- In: *Vestnik obschestvennykh nauk AN Arm. SSR*, n. 5, 1977, pp. 87-94. Published in Russian, this paper, unfortunately, has remained almost unnoticed by specialists in Sanskrit. On the same theme see also much later (and too small) article: D.N. BASU, "A Case for the Genitive Case": *Proc. of the International Seminar on Pāṇini*, pp. 105-8, University of Poona, Pune, 1983.

22. BASU, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

23. The samples, slightly simplified, are taken from ARAKEL'AN's article – see above.

morphological (surface) structures. Thus, though the opposition analyzed has been worked out by the grammarians of Classical India on non-syntactic data, it proves to be syntactically valid as well. While for Sanskrit the category of possession with its opposition 'inalienable – alienable' (implying semantic contrast between *samavāya* and *saṃyoga*) may be treated as a covert one, in New Indo-Aryan it has come to the surface, and its grammemes are regularly marked by morphological devices. For example, in Hindi the constructions of inalienable possession demand that an NP having the status of Possessor should combine with the attributive postposition *k-ā* while in alienable possession constructions some other postpositions must be used. – Compare (isosemic with the above analyzed Sanskrit sentences) examples: (1'') *pitā jī k-e sāt beṭe haiṃ* 'the father has seven sons' and (2'') *pitā jī ko pariṇay ke prati sandeh hai* 'the father has (acquired) doubt concerning the betrothal ceremony'. In full similarity with Sanskrit only constructions of the type (1''), but not those of the type (2'') do allow nominalization transformations with the link-word *vāl-ā*. E.g., (1''a) *sāt beṭeṃ vāl-e pitā jī haiṃ* '(here) is the father who has (got) seven sons', but (\*2''a) *pariṇay ke prati sandeh vāl-e pitā jī haiṃ* '(here) is the father who has (acquired) doubt concerning the betrothal ceremony'. It is clear that the semantic structure of sentences (1'') and (1''a), implying 'inalienable possession', includes the notion *samavāya*, while in sentences (2''), (\*2''a) of 'alienable possession' the notion *saṃyoga* is present.

The semantic notions *samavāya* and *saṃyoga*, introduced by the grammarians of Classical India, may also be successfully used in process of analyzing New Indo-Aryan participial constructions of resultative state. These constructions denote the state – either the 'natural' one, not implying any volitional activity (qualitatives), or the one, achieved as the result of some action or process (resultatives): e.g., Hindi *khulā samundar* 'an open sea' – *khulā (huā) darwāzā* 'an opened/open door'. Here we'll deal only with resultatives proper, namely, with those, derived from intransitive stems and used attributively (but the resultatives used predicatively preserve the same features). Leaving aside the subjective resultatives (of Hindi type *bhunā (huā) gośt* 'a roasted meat'), we'll analyze briefly the other two varieties: the locational resultatives (e.g., Hindi *kalaf lagī wardī* 'a uniform

with starch added') and the 'part – whole' resultatives (e.g., Hindi *kināre ṭūṭī (huī) pyālī* 'a small cup with its brims broken')<sup>24</sup>.

Attributive constructions with locational resultatives imply participles derived from intransitive verbs with the semantics 'change of spacial state accompanied by establishing contact of some primarial substance with another substance'; the basic difference between these locational resultatives and the subjective ones is in syntax, namely, in NPs-order: 'subject – participle – location' is specific for the former, while 'location – participle – subject' for the latter. E.g., Hindi *kileṃ lagā jūtā* 'the boot that has nails in it', the paraphrase will be: *aisā jūtā jis meṃ kileṃ haiṃ* 'such boot in which there are nails' (locational), but *jūte meṃ lagī kileṃ* 'nails that came into the boot', with paraphrase *aisī kileṃ jo jūte meṃ haiṃ* 'such nails that are in the boot' (subjective). There are, at least, two semantic restrictions for producing locational resultatives. One concerns NPs, occupying the corresponding valency determined slots: they should refer to inanimate denotates only. Another one concerns the selection of verbal lexemes, among which in Hindi the main are: *lag-* 'to apply', *mil-* 'to meet' *carh-* 'to get applied upon something', *par-* 'to fall', etc. (not more than, perhaps, a dozen or so). All of these verbs have one, common for them, semantic feature: the action produced and its result imply that contact between the substances mentioned (the primarial and the secundarial ones) must necessarily be direct and observable, that is perceptible on sensorial level. – In case of Hindi *hathkārī lage hāth* 'hands with handcuffs put on them' the speaker may see hands with handcuffs on them himself; in *cīnī milā pānī* 'water with sugar added into it' he may feel the taste of water, etc. It is quite evident that in constructions of this type we deal with *saṃyoga* relation, introduced by the grammarians of Classical India and characterized above.

The 'part – whole' resultative constructions are structurally similar to the locational, but two semo-syntactic differences are important: (1) the processes signifying verbs, that are used as basis for deriving resultative participles, do not imply valency on Locus (*adhikaraṇa*) –

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24. For more information on Hindi-Urdu resultatives and their classifications see: G.M. DASHCHENKO, *Resultativnye pričastija v jazyke urdu* (Resultative Participles in Urdu), Moscow University, Moscow, 1987, pp. 3-202.



such are, e.g., intransitive Hindi verbs like *ṭūṭ-* 'to break', *nikal-* 'to come out', etc. (2) the referents of the NPs, forming the construction-core, must imply the 'part – whole' semantic relation, and the meaning of 'whole' must correspond with the NP, that syntactically is the 'head' of the participial attribute of the construction in question. The agreement pattern in resultative constructions of this type is also a specific one as the participle always has gender – number – case (GNC) concord with its 'head', which semantically represents 'the whole', irrespectively of GNC properties, characterizing another NP. Compare Hindi samples: *kon-ā* (m.sg.Nom.) *muṛ-ī* (f.sg.Nom./Obl.) *ciṭṭhī* (f.sg.Nom./Obl.) *par* 'upon the letter with the corner turned down'; *aṃkh-em* (f.pl.Nom.) *khul-e:* (m.sg.Obl.) *cehr-e* (m.sg.Obl.) *se* 'from the face with (widely) opened eyes'; *kinār-e* (m.pl.Nom.) *ṭūṭ-ī* (f.sg./pl.Nom./Obl.) *pyālī* (f.sg.Nom./Obl.) 'a small cup with brims broken', etc. It is clear from the examples cited, that in case of constructions of this type, the relation between the referents of the corresponding NPs is, no doubt, 'inherency', that is *samavāya*, analyzed above. – Any 'letter', being a 'whole', has 'corners' as its natural 'parts'; normally, any 'face' ('whole') implies necessarily on it the presence of 'eyes'(its 'parts'); any 'cup' ('whole') does not exist without 'brims', serving as 'parts', etc. The 'part – whole' relation may not be of 'naturally eternal' character, it may become established as a product of some previous (and unimportant for the situational context) activity – as is the case, e.g., with 'nails' and 'boot': originally, of course, the sole of the boot (or the material it had been prepared from) had no nails in it, and only got them at some later phase of the process of production. But all this is irrelevant for the situation, described by the sentence: nails are already in the sole, it is a *fait accompli*, and due to this, irrespectively of their 'history', they may be treated as 'parts' of the boot (that is 'whole'). And the verb *nikal-* 'to come out', implying through its semantic structure an idea of a certain destructive displacement of 'part(s)' in connection with 'whole', is appropriate for its use in the corresponding resultative construction. Thus, a *samavāya*-based attributive structure of Hindi *kileṃ niklā jūtā* 'a boot with the nails that have come out' may be estimated as well-formed grammatically and semantically.

In a kind of a brief conclusion it may be stated: linguistics of Classical India had come into existence long before there appeared linguistical schools of Europe and America. Dealing with such a complicated object as Sanskrit and relying only on itself in the sphere of methodology, this linguistic tradition has been developing uninterruptedly and made a wonderful progress in analyzing language data. Many of the achievements of this tradition are still waiting for attention from modern linguists, and, no doubt, its methods, terms, notions, etc. might be used successfully in nowadays research. A humble attempt to demonstrate this in connection with the notion *saṃbandha* and its main variants *saṃyoga* and *samavāya* has been undertaken above.