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ON BHAVYA'S MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADĪPA

1. The study of the works of the Buddhist philosopher Bhavya, or Bhāvaviveka (c. 490-570), is still largely in its infancy, particularly outside the somewhat impenetrable world of Japanese scholarship. This neglect on the part of Indologists and philosophers is perhaps mainly due to the fact that the major part of his writings is only accessible in Tibetan and Chinese versions of lost Sanskrit originals, but nevertheless a matter of regret, because the extant works of Bhavya not only permit us to form a good idea of an independent logician, a foremost and very influential doxographer and, behind it all, a staunch religious personality, but also opens a door to the forum of Indian philosophical debate in the sixth century A.D., perhaps its most flourishing period¹.

The purpose of the present paper will be to call attention to what is probably his latest and, in a sense, most comprehensive and mature work, the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (MRP), which, according to its colophon, proposes to elucidate the truth about the essentials of all the doctrines (**sakalaśāsanasārasaṃgrahatattvaprakāśa-*)². I do not think I have to apologize for doing so, for not only has this text been even more neglected than any of his other works, but several scholars, such as S. Schayer, S. Yamaguchi, Y. Ejima and D. Seyfort Rugg, have even gone so far as to impeach its authenticity, mainly, as it were, on the grounds of alleged chronological difficulties arising from the fact that Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti, generally held to have lived later than

1. For a bibliography see H. NAKAMURA, *Indian Buddhism*, Osaka, 1980, pp. 284-86; S. IIDA, *Reason and Emptiness. A Study in Logic and Mysticism*, Tōkyō, 1980, pp. 12-9; D. SEYFORT RUEGG, *The literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, Wiesbaden, 1981, pp. 61-6.

2. ... *bka' ma lus pa'i sññ po bsdus pa de kho na ñid gsal por ston pa...* A critical edition of the Tibetan version of MRP is in the course of preparation.

Bhavya, are quoted in the MRP³. As I hope to have shown elsewhere there is not a single sound argument to be advanced against the traditional attribution of this text — on the contrary, numerous pieces of external and internal evidence speak unanimously in support of Bhavya's authorship⁴.

2. Before focusing on MRP itself I propose briefly to survey Bhavya's other works, not so much on their own merits as independent texts but primarily to the extent they serve to place MRP in its proper perspective. In doing so I merely wish to stress two circumstances decisive for an adequate assessment of the achievements of this philosopher: On the one hand the mutual relationship and continuity in the development of his writings, on the other the underlying unity of thought I find to be discernible from the beginning to the end.

Apart from MRP Bhavya is the author of i) *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (MHK), the only work still extant (but not yet published in its entirety) in Sanskrit, with the auto-commentary *Tarkajvālā* (TJ); ii) **Karatalaratna* (KTR), or *Zhāng-zhēn lùn* (only in Chinese); iii) *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* (MAS) and iv) *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP), a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, the basic and most commented upon work of the Madhyamaka school in India⁵.

MHK (III), or TJ, its commentary, are referred to in KTR, PP and MRP and may for this and various internal reasons be regarded as his earliest work. MHK, IV seqq. often refer to MHK, III, the most important chapter in MHK from a philosophical point of view (see below)⁶.

i) MHK

The first two chapters, entitled *Bodhicittāparityāga* (33 verses) and *Munivratasamāśraya* (12 verses), afford a brief but condensed and sometimes even poetical account of Madhyamaka ethics⁷. The third chapter,

3. In AO, 40 (1979), pp. 90-1, I have proposed the date c. 530-600 for Candrakīrti. Approximately the same date is suggested for Dharmakīrti, see AO, 41 (1980), pp. 27-37. Professor Seyfort Ruegg, on the other hand, seems inclined to ascribe MRP to « a second Bhavya who lived later than the middle of the seventh century », but, for various reasons, such an assumption is quite unfounded. See n. 4 (*infra*) and my paper *Bhavya's Critique of Yogācāra in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, chapter IV, to appear in B. K. Matilal (ed.), « Buddhist Logic and Epistemology » (n. 1).

4. Cf. my *Adversaria Buddhica*, in WZKS, 26 (1982), pp. 172-84. The external and internal evidence presented in that paper is here corroborated from a new angle by showing that MRP forms an integral part of Bhavya's writings as a whole.

5. Cf. recently my *Nāgārjunas filosofiske Vaerker*, København, 1982, which contains, *inter alia*, an edition and a translation of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. On the commentaries see also JIP, 9 (1981), p. 211.

6. See WZKS, 26 (1982), pp. 173-74. Internal references to the third chapter, *Tattvajñānaisaṃgraha*, are found TJ, 157b5, 249b6, 253b4, 258a8 (Peking edition, no. 5256).

7. The second chapter was edited by V. V. Gokhale in IJ, 14 (1972), pp. 40-2. The first will appear in my *Indiske Studier*, V, Copenhagen, 1985 (also by V. V. Gokhale).

entitled *Tattvajñānaisaṅgā* (360 verses) and together with which they form a unit called *Tattvāmṛtāvātāra*⁸, is our earliest and richest source for Bhavya's own contribution to Indian logic, viz. his celebrated application of *svatantrānumāna* to verify Buddhist *āgama* and to refute heterodox *vipakṣas*⁹. For this reason, as known, he was several centuries later, and somewhat misleadingly, classified as a « Svātantrika » in contradistinction to Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, the main protagonists of the « Prāsaṅgika » branch of Madhyamaka¹⁰.

It will be worth one's while to give an analytic summary of this fundamental chapter in which MRP is, so to speak, to be found *in ovo*:

- I) 1-6: The value of *prajñā*. A bodhisattva should strive for *tattvajñāna* by means of *jñāna* or *prajñācakṣus* (= *matī*, *dhī*, *buddhi*) which enables him to ascertain the way to *svarga*, viz. *daśakuśalākarmapatha*, and the *āryaṣṭāṅgamārga* to *apavarga* (= *nirvāṇa*, *mokṣa*)¹¹.
- II) 7-11: *Prajñā* is twofold. The first kind conforms to *tathya-saṃvṛtisatya* (~ *śuddhalaukikajñāna*) and is concerned with *dānasam̐bhāra* resulting in *rūpakāya*, *puṇyasam̐bhāra* resulting in *dharmakāya*, and *jñānasam̐bhāra* culminating in an instantaneous *prajñā*¹². This kind of *prajñā* (or *matī*, etc.), also called *tathya-saṃvṛtijñāna*, is, moreover, concerned with the *sva-* and *sāmānyalak-ṣaṇa* of *dharmas* (7-9). The *paramārthaprajñā*, on the other hand, is concerned with the *dharmatathatā*, or *tattva*. It removes *kalpanā*, it is *śānta*, *pratyātmasaṃvedya*, *nirvikalpa*, *nirakṣara* and *apracārapracāra*, as it were (10-11).
- III) 12-13: *Saṃvṛtisatya* serves as a prerequisite for *tattvajñāna*. One should start at the level of *tathya-saṃvṛtisatya* by a thorough study of Buddhist dogma (i.e. Abhidharma) as well as various kinds of secular lore such as gram-

8. Sanskrit text edited by Y. EJIMA, *Chūgan-shisō no tenkai: Bhāvaviveka kenkyū*, Tōkyō, 1980, pp. 268-361. Cf. also, for the title, n. 20, *infra*.

9. See, in general, the works of Seyfort Ruegg, Iida, Kajiyama, etc. (n. 1, *supra*).

10. On this distinction and its background see my forthcoming paper *Bhavya, the logician*.

11. Compare Nāgārjuna's treatment of *abhyudaya* and *naiḥśreyasa* in the *Ratnāvalī* (known to Bhavya). See my *Nagarjuniana*, Copenhagen, 1982, pp. 163-67, and M. Hahn (ed.), *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī*, Bonn, 1982.

12. For *jñānasam̐bhāra* see TJ ad MHK, III, 9: ... ye śes kyi tshogs ni thos pa dañ bsam pa dañ bsgom pa goms pa'i śes pa'o...

mar, medicine, mantras, *vidyā*, etc.¹³, and then determine the *sva-* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇas* of things¹⁴.

- IV) 14-23b: Before, however, one can exert *prajñā* one must attain mental peace, or concentration, by practising yoga, abandoning the *nīvaraṇas*, etc.¹⁵. One must also study the four *vidyāsthānas* since *śrutamayī jñāna* is the cause of *cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayī jñāna*¹⁶. In this way only *prajñā* is enabled to see that dharmas only exist *vyavahārataḥ*, not *paramārthataḥ*. (All this is, we may add, Bhavya's way of presenting *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*¹⁷).
- V) 23c-136: All dharmas, *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta*, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist, are denied in syllogistic form (i.e. *prayogavākya*), by way of *prasajyapratīṣedha*, but only *paramārthataḥ* (thus evading *bādhās* in regard to *pratyakṣa*, *abhyupagata* and *prasiddha*). The neganda are: *skandha* (25-70), *dhātu* and *āyatana* (71), *lakṣaṇa* (72-76), *gamana* (77-85ab), *mokṣa* and *bandhana* (85cd-99), *rāga* and *rakta* (100-108), *nirvāṇa* (109-116), *viparyāsa*, *dveṣa* and *moha* (117-119), *svabhāva* (120-128). Finally *asaṃskṛta* (129cd-136)¹⁸.
- VI) 137-266: Proof of *anutpāda* (137-214). Refutation of *īśvara* (215-223) and *dr̥ṣṭi* (224-229). On the unorigination of *duḥkha* (230-233) and *buddha* (234-239). Conclusion: *utpāda* is like an illusion. This is *tattva* which is not *cittacaita-sagocara*, etc. (240-256). It is tantamount to *niḥsvabhāvatā* and *sūnyatā*. Here the quest for *tattvajñāna* (cf. 1, *supra*) finally ends and one becomes a Buddha (266):

13. TJ ad MHK, III, 13: ... yig 'bru dan bstan bcos dan lag rtsis dan śod thabs dan nor brgyud pa'i rgyud dan sman dpyad dan dan rig śnagsrtsis dan gsañ śnags la sogs pa gañ dag 'jig rten na grags pa dag... Bhavya discusses the importance of *dhāraṇīs*, *mantras*, *vidyās* etc. in Mahāyāna TJ, 199b2-201a4, q.v. (Among other sources he quotes from the well-known *Anantamukhanirhāradhāraṇī* to which a *ṭīkā* was later composed by Jñānagarbha). Cf. also the list of secular sciences given ad Nāgārjuna's *Bodhisatṣabhāraṇa*, 79 (*Nagarjuniana*, p. 237).

14. These terms are not necessarily borrowed from Dignāga, cf. my paper referred to in n. 10.

15. Cf. MRP, VII, *infra*. *Dharmadhātustava*, 18-19, etc.

16. The four *vidyāsthānas* (viz. *śabda-*, *hetu-*, *cikitsā-* and *adhyātma-vidyā*) are also referred to MRP, III (which has, however, *śilpavidyā* for *adhyātma-vidyā*). Cf. *Nagarjuniana*, p. 250, n. 199, for the canonical background.

17. Bhavya does not use these well-known terms here, but see MRP, VII.

18. The parallels to the corresponding chapters in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyama-kārikā* are obvious and instructive.

*jñeyasya sarvathāsiddher nirvikalpāpi yatra dhīḥ /
notpadyate tad atulyaṃ tattvaṃ tattvavido
viduḥ //*¹⁹

VII) 267-360: On the three bodies of a Buddha. On *dharmakāya* (267-355), *saṃbhoga-* and *nirmāṇakāya* (356-360).

The *Tattvāmṛtāvatāra* (i.e. MHK, I-III?) was later, *perhaps* even later than the composition of KTR²⁰, enlarged to its present form by the addition of eight chapters affording a critique of rival Buddhist and non-Buddhist *tattvas*: IV and V treat the principles of Śrāvakas and Yogācāras (cf. MRP, III-IV); VI-IX deal with those of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā (cf. MRP, II). While these eight chapters do not bring any innovations from the ethical and logical point of view, they are, on the other hand, an almost unexploited mine of information from the doxographical viewpoint²¹.

As is also the case with MRP, VIII-IX, the final chapters of MHK (TJ), entitled *Sarvajñātāsiddhīrdeśa* (X) and *Stutilakṣaṇānirdeśa* (XI), fall somewhat outside the general structure and scope of MHK (TJ), I-IX taken as a whole.

The fundamental notion around which the entire MHK (TJ) is structured is that of the two kinds of *prajñā*. On the level of *saṃvṛtisatya* it determines what is right and wrong in an ethical and rational sense, on the level of *paramārthasatya* it serves to abolish all *kalpanās* and thus reveal *tattva* which is beyond *prapañca*. We shall revert to all this later as it is summarized very clearly in MRP, I, V and VI.

ii) KTR

This treatise has three main sections, the first and second being a refutation of all dharmas, i.e. the various kinds of *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃ-*

19. Also quoted as MHK, V, « 114 » and in MRP, V (cf. WZKS, 26 [1982], p. 180).

20. This was originally suggested by V. V. Gokhale in IJ, 2 (1958), p. 165 (cf. IJ, 14 [1972], p. 41) and followed by SEYFORTH RUEGG, *op. cit.*, p. 63. It is certainly true that MHK (TJ), I-III, form an independent whole in itself. The two references in the Chinese version of KTR (272a13 and 275a13) do *not*, however, refer to the title *Tattvajñānāmṛtāvatāra* (as Gokhale and Seyforth Ruegg assume) but only to *Tattvāmṛtāvatāra*. Moreover in both cases KTR gives references to further arguments against the Yogācāras which can only be to the *fifth* chapter of MHK (TJ). It would therefore seem certain that the title *Tattvāmṛtāvatāra* has a wider application than *Tattvajñānāmṛtāvatāra* (if the Sanskrit MS really has this reading as reported by Gokhale. It is not given in Ejima's edition, p. 360!). In the appendix to PP, XXV (as pointed out WZKS, 26 [1982], p. 173. q.v.), Bhavya refers to the fifth chapter of MHK (TJ) simply as *Tattvāvatāra* which again seems to indicate that the title *Tattva-(jñānāmṛta-)avatāra* was not confined to the first three chapters of MHK (TJ) only.

21. Especially the Mīmāṃsā chapter. Cf. the two papers by S. Kawasaki (IDA, *op. cit.*, p. 16).

skṛta advocated by those Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools already met with in MHK (TJ). Though mainly a reshuffled summary of MHK (TJ) it occasionally offers some new arguments and also contains Bhavya's rather extensive replies to charges of having committed various *doṣas* in regard to *pratiññā*, *hetu* and *dr̥ṣṭānta*. Let us note that these are later summarized in MRP, V. As in all his major works particular attention is given to the prevailing controversy with Yogācāra, the major rival school of Mādhyamika²².

While the first two sections of KTR thus deal with the *śrutamayī* and *cintāmayī* aspects of *prajñā*, the third deals with *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. Most of this third part, to which there are only very few close parallels in MHK (TJ) — and almost none in PP — is dealt with much more systematically and detailed in MRP, VII, entitled *Bhāvanākrama*.

iii) PP

Prajñāpradīpa, Bhavya's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, I-XXVII, was composed later than and to some extent as a critique of the commentaries of Buddhapālita, Guṇamati and Devaśarman²³. Just as his objections to the shortcomings of Buddhapālita's *prasaṅgavākya* were, as known, later repudiated by Candrakīrti, thus his critique of Yogācāra was answered by Sthiramati from Valabhī (in his commentary on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, I) and by Dharmapāla from Nālandā (in his commentaries on *Catuḥśataka*, *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, etc.)²⁴. The most conspicuous feature of PP (and Avalokitavrata's huge *ṭīkā* to this) in comparison with the other extant commentaries is its extremely elaborate use of *prayogavākya* to prove Nāgārjuna's assertion that all things are empty of *svabhāva*.

Another remarkable feature of PP is that it contains two independent essays, the first being a critique of the Yogācāra theory of *svabhāvavātraya*, etc. (appendix to XXV), the second being a reply to charges levelled against the validity of his use of *sādhana* and *dūṣaṇa* (appendix to XXVII). Having already dealt with the former appendix elsewhere²⁵, I may here be permitted to dwell briefly on the appendix to XXVII, not only because it shows Bhavya's own attitude towards the role of logic in Madhyamaka, but also because it clearly testifies to the conti-

22. Cf. my paper referred to in n. 3 and my edition of the appendix to PP, XXV, to appear in the Csoma de Kőrös Memorial Volume, Budapest, 1984.

23. Cf. EJIMA, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-200.

24. I intend to deal with these texts elsewhere, but cf. Y. Kajiyama in WZKSO, 12-13 (1968-69), pp. 193-203.

25. See n. 22. The appendix to PP, XXVII, will be treated in my paper referred to in n. 10. A Japanese translation is given by EJIMA, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-88 (with useful notes).

nunity and development of Madhyamaka logic since its earliest known stage as found in Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (VV) and *Vaidalya-prakarāṇa* (VP) ²⁶.

First Bhavya is faced with a dilemma (cf. VV, 1 seqq.). If all *bhāvas*, as maintained, lack *svabhāva*, his *sādhana*- and *dūṣaṇapramāṇas* cannot as such be valid. If, alternatively, these two *pramāṇas* are held to possess *svabhāva*, the value of *anumāna* to prove lack of *svabhāva* remains uncertain (1).

No, if the opponent denies the *hetvartha* (viz. *niḥsvabhāva*), he forgets that not *he*, but only Bhavya, can regard it as established (and thus deny it). Moreover, if the opponent denies the validity of the *pramāṇas paramārthataḥ* he commits a superfluous *siddhasādhana*, but if he denies them *vyavahārataḥ* he commits an *abhyupagatabādḥā* (2).

In general it is, of course, true that *paramārthataḥ* the *pramāṇas* fail to make us believe in and understand any positive reality (*pratīpatavya*), but *anumāna* can, nevertheless, by various *hetus*, as already amply demonstrated in PP, I seqq. deny *utpāda*, etc. (3).

More specifically it can be proved by *prayogavākya* that *paramārthataḥ* neither *pratyakṣa* nor *anumāna* exist (4).

Similarly the concept of *sādhana* is not tenable *paramārthataḥ*. First of all there is no *sādhya* (cf. Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*, Icd). Moreover, the three members of proof, viz. *pratiññā*, *hetu* and *drṣṭānta*, whether we take them individually or together as a whole (cf. VP, 32-48), can easily be logically refuted (5).

In the same way it can be proved that *dūṣaṇa* also lacks *svabhāva paramārthataḥ* (6).

Since, as shown, the *pramāṇas* cannot be established, there cannot, of course, be any *prameyas* (cf. VV, 30-51; VP, 1-19). The purpose then of PP — the *pradīpa* of *prajñā* — is to demonstrate the *drṣṭiśūnyatā* by refuting the dogmas of opponents, or according to *āgama*: « ... na hi Suvikrāntavikramin, rūpaṃ drṣṭigataṃ na drṣṭigataprahāṇam; evaṃ na vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskārā, na vijñānam drṣṭigataṃ na drṣṭigataprahāṇam. Yac ca rūpavedanāsaṃjñāsaṃskāravijñānānam na drṣṭigataṃ na drṣṭigataprahāṇam, iyaṃ prajñāpāramitā... » (7) ²⁷.

iv) MAS

Finally we have Bhavya's *saṃgraha* of *Madhyamakārtha*. There are two kinds of *satya*: *paramārtha*- and *saṃvṛti*-. The first, again, is of two

26. I have given an analysis of these texts in *Nagarjuniana*, pp. 70-93, q.v.

27. R. Hikata (ed.), *Suvikrāntavikramī-paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, Fukuoka, 1958, p. 33 (Bhavya frequently quotes from this sūtra).

kinds: *paryāya*-, which is *saprapañca* (be it *yuktiparyāya* or *utpādapra-
tiṣedha*), and *aparyāya*-, which is *prapañcaśūnya*. The second *satya* is
also of two kinds: *mithyāsaṃvṛti*- (be it *sakalpa* or *akalpa*), and *tathya-
saṃvṛti*-, which alone is *arthakriyāsamartha*. All dharmas are embodied
in these two kinds of *satya* ²⁸.

Obviously this is merely an epitome of the ideas underlying all his
other works also (see especially MHK, III, 1-13; PP, XXIV, 8-11; MRP,
I, V and VI), though it may be noted that it contains a few new technical
terms not met with elsewhere. I certainly see no reason for impeaching
its authenticity on that ground ²⁹.

After this survey of Bhavya's other works we may now turn our
attention to MRP, his last work.

3. MRP consists of nine chapters the titles of which may be recon-
structed as follows: *Satyadvaya*- (I); *Samvṛtibhrāntaprajñā*- (II); *Neyār-
thatathyaṣaṃvṛtiprajñā*- (III); same title, part two (IV); *Nītārthatathya-
saṃvṛtiprajñā*- (V); *Paramārthaprajñā*- (VI); *Bhāvanākrama*- (VII); *Ācā-
ryapādamaḥātmyābhīdhāna*- (VIII) and *Anuśaṃsa*- (IX).

I provides an introduction to the system of *satyadvaya*, a theme
developed further in V. Then follows a critique of various heretics (II),
and the major rival Buddhist schools, Śrāvaka (III) and Yogācāra (IV).
II-IV thus correspond to the two kinds of *saṃvṛtisatya*. Madhyamaka
alone represents the two kinds of *paramārthasatya*, be it *saprapañca*-
(V~*nītārthatathyaṣaṃvṛtisatya*) or *prapañcaśūnya* (VI~*paramārtha-
prajñā*). Whereas II-VI correspond to the *śrutamayī* and *cintāmayī*
aspects of *prajñā* VII naturally deals with its *bhāvanāmayī* phase. The
concluding chapters extol the merits of Nāgārjuna (VIII) and the pur-
pose of his philosophy (IX).

We may now consider each of the nine chapters in turn ³⁰.

Chapter I. The MRP opens with an exposition of the basic concept
of Mādhyamika, the theory of *satyadvaya*. The distinction between *two*
truths (or kinds of reality) is, according to *āgama*, not valid at the
level of *dharmadhātu* but only as long as one's *buddhicakṣus* is obscured
by *avidyāpaṭala*.

Though *saṃvṛtisatya* is thus really false and delusive one may never-
theless with *pūrvācāryas* distinguish between a *mithyāsaṃvṛti* which is
ābhāsamātra and a *tathyaṣaṃvṛti* at the level of which all external and

28. Cf. S. IIDA, in M. Sprung (ed.), *Two truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, Dor-
recht, 1973, pp. 64-77. For a translation of MAS see JIP, 9 (1981), p. 200.

29. As done e.g. by Ejima (cf. WZKS, 26 [1982], p. 183), but cf. also SEYFORD
RUEGG, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

30. See notes 2, 3 and 5, for the text of MRP and for translations of I and IV.

internal dharmas are characterized by being *avicārarāmaṇīya*, *hetujāta* and *arthakriyāsamartha*³¹.

Paramārthasatya is simply *sūnyatā* of which there are eighteen kinds³². Or, in the words of Nāgārjuna:

*anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāsvatam /
anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam //
yaḥ pratīyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam /
deśayāṃ āsa saṃbuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam //*³³

Samvṛtisatya, i.e. *jñāna* of the *sva-* and *sāmānyalakṣanas* of all *jñeya-dharmas*, is a prerequisite for the attainment of *paramārthasatya* because it provides the necessary basis on which *yukti* (i.e. *cintāmayī prajñā*) unveils their inherent emptiness. The « relationship » between the two truths, then, is, to quote Candrakīrti, one of means and ends (*upāya/upeya*)³⁴.

Now Bhavya is exposed to various objections.

- (i) First of all he cannot, as it seems, claim that the dharmas exist and at the same time claim that they do not exist. But according to Bhavya there is no such *abhyupagatabādhā* behind his seemingly contradictory statements, because the former is only made *saṃvṛtitaḥ*, the latter only *paramārthataḥ*.
- (ii) Secondly he is accused of being in conflict with the evidence of perception. But Bhavya admits no *pratyakṣabādhā*, because it can be demonstrated by four basic arguments that all the facts of perception are really indeterminable (*avyākṛta*) as objects of mind (*buddhiviśaya*). So there is no *pratyakṣa* with which he can be in conflict.
- (iii) Thirdly he is accused of doing violence to *prasiddha*, or *opinio communis*. No, what is *prasiddha* solely depends on the eyes that see. The *buddhicakṣus* of the *profanum vulgus* is covered by *avidyāpātala* whereas the *sūnyatādrṣṭi* of sages enjoys a *viśuddhaviṃśalajñāna*. From their point of view, and this is what really counts, there is no *prasiddhabādhā*.

31. This important verse (JIP, 9 [1981], p. 170) should be seen in relation to MAS which only speaks of *arthakriyāsamartha* as a criterion of *tathyasamvṛtisatya* (an idea which already occurs in the commentary to *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, 1 and 22, q.v.). The term *avicārarāmaṇīya* only seems to occur in MRP. Bhavya may have coined the term himself. Candrakīrti, probably quite deliberately, uses the term *avicāraprasiddha*, *passim*.

32. On these cf. E. LAMOTTE, *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna*, Louvain, 1976, pp. 202-151.

33. The *maṅgalaśloka* of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (my ed., p. 177).

34. *Madhyamakāvātāra*, VI, 80, cf. AO, 40 (1978), p. 89, note 13.

- (iv) Finally the grim charge is levelled against the Mādhyamika that he is a *nāstika* or *ucchedavādin* denying the existence of *paraloka*. Not at all! At the level of *nirvikalpajñāna*, *dharmatā* or *paramārthasatyaprajñā* (cf. VI) the world is like an illusion. Here, of course, there is really nothing to affirm or deny.

The author intends to revert to all this subsequently (V).

Chapter II affords a summary of erroneous (*bhrānta*) views held by *tārkikas* (Buddhists and non-Buddhists) who like blind people resort to *anumāna* as their main *pramāṇa*. These people are only in possession of a *viparītaprajñā*.

First of all there is a *mālā* of three hundred and sixty three *darśanas* held by a long row of heretical teachers or schools. Of these dogmas one hundred and ten may be regarded as fundamental. A comparable list, we may observe, is also known from various Jaina sources³⁵, but, *nisi fallor*, not from any earlier Buddhist source (apart from TJ, IX).

Moreover there are seven groups each of which comprises respectively sixty-two, twenty, twelve, twelve, five, three and two *dr̥ṣṭis*. Among these, all of which are known from other sources, only the sixty-two views (well known from the *Brahmajālasūtra*) receive a brief separate critique in the light of Āryadeva's *Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi*.

Then follows a brief account (based on TJ) of the twenty-five *tattvas* of Sāṃkhya, the six *padārthas* of Vaiśeṣika, the nine (!) *padārthas* of Nirgrantha and finally a summary of the tenets of Kālavāda, Puruṣavāda (including the Vātsīputriyas!), Karmavāda, Brahmāṇḍavāda as well as those of the adherents of Śiva (*īśvara*) and Viṣṇu (see TJ, IX, *passim*).

It falls outside the scope of MRP to give a detailed account and refutation of this endless series of speculations. They may all, however, be refuted in a general way by means of four basic arguments³⁶ proving respectively that i) nothing can arise from anything (*viz.* itself, something else, etc.), ii) that neither that which exists nor that which does not exist etc. can possibly arise, iii) that nothing can be conceived as *eka* or *aneka*, and iv) that all things are *pratītyasamutpanna* (as amply demonstrated in Nāgārjuna's *Vaidalya*, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, *Sūnyatāsaptati*, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, etc.)³⁷. Therefore *utpāda* only exists *saṃvṛtitaḥ*.

Chapter III, the first of three dealing with a gradually more profound and orthodox system of Buddhism (*~tathyasamvṛtiprajñā*), is first of all a refutation of the Vaibhāṣika conception of the ultimate existence of

35. See F. O. SCHRADER, *Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras und Buddhas*, Leipzig, 1902, p. 2, note 6.

36. I.e. the four *mahāhetus* mentioned in MAS (for the first time?), see JIP, 9 (1981), pp. 207-10. EJIMA, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-46.

37. Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa*, 205-208, seems to be based on this verse.

the *saṃskṛtadharmas*, viz. the *skandhas*, the *āyatanas* and the *dhātus*. These dharmas are only to be understood in a provisional sense (*neyārtha*), not in a definite sense (*nītārtha*). In other words, the system of Abhidharma only serves as a preamble to that of Madhyamaka in the sense that as a lower form of *tathyaśaṃvṛtisatyā* it is a *sopāna* to *nītārthatathyaśaṃvṛtiprajñā* (see V) and *paramārthaprajñā* (VI).

In the ultimate sense *rūpa* etc. do not exist, because the *paramāṇu* assumed to form their first cause (*ārambha*) is in fact an impossible notion (cf. e.g. *Viṃśatikā*, 12). Hence all the material dharmas supposed to be derived from these « atoms », as well as our ideas (*buddhi*) based upon them, must obviously be unsubstantial (*avastuka*). Incidentally, how could one otherwise account for the fact that accomplished yogis unhindered can rush through mountains and walls etc.? These miraculous powers can, of course, only be accounted for on the assumption that all these things are without substance. These incontestable *siddhis* cannot simply be discarded as a matter of *adhimukti* on the part of the yogis as insinuated by the Vaibhāṣikas. For further arguments to the effect that the *bhūtas* and the *bhautikas* only exist *saṃvṛtitaḥ* the reader is advised to consult Candrakīrti's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* and the author's own TJ (III and IV).

In the second part of this chapter it is argued that the system of the Śrāvaka can only be taken *neyārtha* because it fails to abolish *jñeyāvaraṇa* as it lacks perfection in *prajñā* (cf. MHK, III, 24, etc.).

As far as the *asaṃskṛtadharmas* are concerned the notion of the Sautrāntikas, Tāmraśāṭīyas and Vātsīputrīyas of *nīrvāṇa* as *abhāva* can only be taken *neyārtha* also.

The following quotation from Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivarāṇa* not only sums up the foregoing and introduces the following but also reveals one of his basic authorities for the hierarchical tripartition of the Buddhist schools given in MRP, III-V:

*ātmagrahanivṛttyartham skandhadhātuvādidēśanā /
sāpi dhvastā mahābhāgaś cittaṃātravyavasthayaḥ //*³⁸

Chapter IV deals with a recurrent theme of a particular philosophical and historical interest, namely Bhavya's critique of the major rival Mahāyāna school, Yogācāra, as represented by Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, etc. Their arrogant ingenuity cannot be questioned, but their orthodoxy, as *yukti* based on *āgama* shows, certainly can³⁹.

38. *Bodhicittavivarāṇa*, 25 (edited in my *Nagarjuniana*, pp. 180-217). This text, one of Bhavya's main authorities in MRP (but not in his earlier works), is in many passages closely related to (some early recension of) the *Lañkāvatārasūtra*, also one of Bhavya's fundamental authorities, especially in the context of his controversy with Yogācāra.

39. See MHK (TJ), III, 1 and 7-9. Also note 22, *supra*.

It is, of course, true that several sūtras such as *Laṅkāvatāra* and *Daśabhūmika* contain several pronouncements to the effect that the universe is but *cittamātra*. But these *āgamas* should not, as the *Yogācāra* does, be taken to convey *nītārtha*, but only, as the *Mādhyamika* does, *neyārtha*. What they intend to communicate is merely that no *kartr* and *bhoktr* exists.

Nevertheless, there are two groups of *Yogācāra* taking the term *cittamātra* at its face value. Consequently they are merely in possession of a *tathyaśaṃvṛtiprajñā* of the *neyārtha* kind ⁴⁰.

The adherents of *sākāravāda* claiming that cognition is invested with a true « objective » image (viz. *paratantrasvabhāva*) advance three arguments to prove their vain assumption that everything is *cittamātra*: i) because cognition is void of real objects, ii) because it is only consciousness which *appears* bifurcated as cognitive process and resulting cognitum, and iii) because mind has nothing else than itself as « objective realm ». By realizing this they hope to divest mind of its unreal duality of *grāhya-grāhaka* and subsequently attain the non-dual *pratisvasaṃvedana* of a Buddha.

Bhavya then subjects these three assertions to a critical analysis and points out various incompatibilities in the *pratiññā*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*. Moreover, if everything is only mind, the existence of *other* minds cannot be established, and besides, all appearances would either have to be immaterial like mind, or mind would always have to be inert matter like the appearances. The only way to avoid all these absurdities is to accept the reality of *grāhya-grāhaka* at the level of *saṃvṛtisatya* and its unreality at the level of *paramārthasatya*.

The claim of *nirākāravāda* (represented by *Asaṅga*, *Vasubandhu*, etc.) that cognition is always true whereas the « object » is in fact false (viz. *parikalpitasvabhāva*), is briefly discarded as being in conflict with *yukti* as well as *āgama*.

The *Yogācāras* do not have a chance of obtaining *pratisvasaṃvedana*, or *bodhi*, because their idea of « self-cognition » cannot be accepted in the way it is presented. Nor is their theory of *svabhāvatraya* of much avail: it cannot be taken as conveying *nītārtha*. Finally the basic condition for obtaining *bodhi* etc., viz. *āśrayaparāvṛtti*, is, as already argued by *Nāgārjuna*, quite impossible.

To conclude this refutation of the *Yogācāra* interpretation of *āgama* we may again quote *Nāgārjuna's Bodhicittavivaraṇa* (27):

cittamātram idaṃ sarvaṃ iti yā deśanā muneh /
utrāsaparihārthaṃ bālānāṃ sā na tattvataḥ // ⁴¹

40. Here Bhavya in his own way adapts the canonical idea (*Akṣayamatīnirdeśa*, *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* etc.) that some sūtras merely convey *neyārtha*, others *nītārtha*. Cf. *Nāgārjuniana*, p. 159.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 192. The idea has support in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* itself.

Chapter V meets the promise of a further discussion of the Madhyamaka theory of *satyadvaya* made in I. Accordingly it affords a succinct restatement of his basic philosophical or religious persuasions.

The three main exponents of the Madhyamaka system are Nāgārjuna and his successors Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. It is to be considered the most orthodox school of Buddhism because its founder, Nāgārjuna, was predicted by the Buddha himself in various sūtras (cf. VIII).

To be sure, from the point of view of *dharmadhātu* there is neither *saṃvṛti-* nor *paramārthasatya*. The distinction between *two* truths is only valid as long as one's *matinayana* is obscured by *avidyāpaṭala* and all that this entails. Bound by the four kinds of *vāsanā* mankind is comparable to a *kośakāraṭṭaka*⁴².

Concerning *saṃvṛtisatya* Nāgārjuna is quoted:

yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharvanagaram yathā /
*tathotpadas tathā sthānam tathā bhāṅga udāhṛtam //*⁴³
kleśāḥ karma yathā dehāḥ kartāraś ca phalaṃ ca vai /
*marīcisvapnasamkāsā gandharvanagaropamāḥ //*⁴⁴

Now *tathyaṣaṃvṛtisatya*, i.e. *pratītyasamutpāda*, has an external as well as an internal aspect. For an account of the former one must consult the *Sālistambasūtra* and its commentary by Nāgārjuna. The internal twelve-fold *pratītyasamutpāda* should in accordance with Nāgārjuna's *Pratītyasamutpādahrdayakārikā* be divided into three phases. Thus *avidyā*, *trṣṇā* and *upādāna* constitute *kleśavartman* whereas *saṃskāra* and *bhava* constitute *karmavartman*. The remaining seven factors amount to *duḥkhavartman*. This is the *bhavacakra* of *hetu* and *phala* where *karma* originates from *kleśa*, and *duḥkha* from *karma*, etc. etc. Thus all the factors of the external and internal aspect of *tathyaṣaṃvṛtisatya* are ultimately founded on *avidyā* from time without beginning. They are in fact no more real than illusions and phantoms⁴⁵.

The real *satya* then is *paramārtha*. This may be substantiated by quotations from the works of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhavya himself, Mahāsukhanātha, Kambala, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to the effect that *paramārthasatya* is *viññānaṃ prabhāsvaram, nirvāṇa, śūnyatā, dharmakāya, nirābhāsa, alakṣaṇa, sarvatathāgatālaya, catuṣkoṭivinir-*

42. Same comparison in KTR (268c4). It seems to be borrowed from *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, p. 225 (LVP). The four *vāsanās* also in MRP.

43. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, VII, 34. For the Tibetan version, cf. note 79 to my edition of the appendix to PP, XXV.

44. This verse (almost identical with *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, XVII, 33. q.v.) is from «Nāgārjuna's» *Svādhiṣṭhānakrama*, 42 (see *Pañcakrama*, p. 38). As pointed out WZKS, 26 (1982), p. 176, Bhavya has several quotations from the «Tantric» Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.

45. The commentary here ascribed to Nāgārjuna is hardly authentic, cf. *Nagarjuniana*, p. 13, n. 21. On the *Pratītyasamutpādahrdayakārikā*, *ibid.*, pp. 170-71 and WZKS, 26 (1982), 167-172.

mukta, nirodha, tathatā, etc.⁴⁶. It is not accessible through *anumāna* (= *cintāmayī prajñā*) but by means of *bhāvanā* (cf. VII) it proves to be *svasaṃvedya* (i.e. *aparapratyaya*, etc.). A Mādhyamika who realizes the eighteen kinds of *śūnyatā* through the three *vimokṣamukhas* is absorbed in *dharmadhātu*. This is the culmination of the perfection in *prajñā* where there is neither object, subject nor activity.

Here the Mādhyamika is accused of incriminating himself with eight *doṣamalas*. In general, according to Bhavya, these objections are based on sheer *avidyā* and a deplorable failure to recognize that the Madhyamaka *satyadvaya* theory conveys the *nītārtha* of the sūtras. Here, then, are the objections and Bhavya's replies⁴⁷:

- (i) First of all the Mādhyamikas are said to be simple cheaters (*śaṭha*) (i.e. *vaitaṇḍikas*) as they merely refute others without affirming an opinion of their own (*svamata*). But, according to *āgama*, *tattva* consists in not seeing anything as real, so how can one affirm or deny the existence of anything at all, everything being *anutpanna*.
- (ii) Secondly the Mādhyamika is accused of identifying *anutpāda* with pure non-existence (*abhāva*). But actually there is not a single *bhāva*, hence no *abhāva* of any *bhāva*. In fact Mādhyamikas steer a *madhyamā pratipat* « beyond » *bhāva* and *abhāva* where *buddhi* has no support⁴⁸.
- (iii) Thirdly the Mādhyamikas are once again accused of being nihilists (*ucchedavādin*) rejecting the fundamental dharmas of Buddhism such as *hetu-phala*, *satya*, *ratna*, etc. But here the (Buddhist) opponent forgets the Madhyamaka theory of *satyadvaya*: On the level of *saṃvṛti* they certainly accept *pratītyasamutpāda*, etc. and the sublime ethical ideals of *karuṇā*. Nor can they be regarded as nihilists from the point of view of *paramārtha*: Nihilists affirm the non-existence of something previously existing, but according to Madhyamaka there is no *bhāva* whatsoever *a priori*. Hence a real *abhāva* is precluded. Therefore the notion of *abhāva* or *anutpāda* is only *vyavahārasamāropamātra*, nothing else.

46. On these quotations see *ibid.*, 175-178. Among these quotations we also find five verses (342b) with unmistakable allusions to Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, I, 42, q.v.

47. Cf. I.

48. Cf. *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, 1 (ed. Nagarjuniana, pp. 100-19):

*astināstivyatīkrāntā buddhir yeṣāṃ nirāśrayā /
gambhīras tair nirālambaḥ pratīyārtho vibhāvyaṭe //*

- (iv) The Mādhyamika is then charged of being in conflict with *āgama*. But this charge is merely due to the failure of Srāvakas and Yogācāras to recognize that their own *āgama* should be taken *neyārtha*; whereas that of Madhyamaka should be taken *nītārtha*. Hence the alleged *bādhā* is only apparent.
- (v-viii) Finally Bhavya is accused of being in conflict with *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *prasiddha* and *abhyupagata*. But, as already pointed out in I, the fault lies with those who believe in the reality of *saṃvṛti*: From the ultimate point of view there is no empirical world with which the Mādhyamika is in conflict.

From the above we may conclude that Madhyamaka is consistent with *yukti* as well as *āgama*, as the theory of *satyadvaya* saves it from being in conflict with anything.

Chapter VI merely consists of five verses purporting to describe *paramārthaprajñā* of which there are two kinds: one with conceptual constructions (cf. V as a whole) and one without *vikalpa*. At the level of *dharmadhātu*, however, both kinds are extinguished:

*savikalpāvikalpā ca yadā buddhir nivartate /
dhiyām aviṣaye tasmin prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ //*⁴⁹

These two kinds of *paramārthaprajñā*, we may recall, were already adumbrated in MHK, III, 10-11, and in TJ *ad* MHK, III, 26 a distinction was made between *paramārtha* without *abhisaṃskāra*, i.e. *niṣprapañca*, and *paramārtha* with *abhisaṃskāra*, or *saprapañca*. In the nomenclature of MAS we may speak of *aparyāya*- and *saparyāyaparamārthasatya*. The sole distinguishing factor is *prapañca*. At the level of *dharmadhātu* (cf. I, V, *initio*) there is none⁵⁰.

In retrospect this brief chapter clearly shows the fundamental philosophical agreement between MRP and Bhavya's earlier works.

The following chapter, on the other hand, is more explicitly developed on the aspect of *bhāvanā* than any of his previous works.

Chapter VII. Now that the « theoretical » aspects of *paramārthasatya* have been discussed the « practical » question arises: What kind of person is able to enter such a profound and great *mārga* as described above? In answer to this the following authorities may be quoted:

49. The source is MHK, VIII, 96. The first two verses are from MHK, III, 10-11. The final verse is related to *Yuktiśaṣṭikā*, 36, q.v. All the verses are translated (but their sources not identified) by S. Schayer in RO, 11 (1936), pp. 206-13.

50. Cf. my table in the paper referred to in note 3, *supra*.

*kṛtādhikārā buddheṣu teṣūptaśubhamūlakāḥ /
mitraiḥ sanāthāḥ kalyāṇair asyāḥ śravaṇabhājanam //
gandharvanagarākāraṃ satyadvitayalāñchitam /
ameyānantyakalpaughabhāvanāsuddhabuddhaye //
mahāprajñāmahopāyamahākṛpādhimokṣataḥ /
mahāyānaṃ samuddiṣṭaṃ mahāsattvasya gocarāḥ //*⁵¹

At the level of *saṃvṛtisatya* a bodhisattva must first, in general, practise the five *pāramitās*, the four *saṃgrahavastus*, the seven *ārya-dhanas*, etc., and then exert *bhāvanā* at the level of *pāramārtha*.

But no matter how much merit one may gain by worshipping all the Buddhas it is all of no avail unless one generates the *bodhicitta*. This happens, in the words of Candrakīrti, when one listens to the doctrine of *sūnyatā* with enthusiasm:

*prthagjanatve 'pi niśamya sūnyatāṃ pramodam antar labhate
muhur muhuḥ /
pramodajāsrāvinayātalocanaḥ tanūruhotphullatanuś ca jāyate //
yat tasya saṃbuddhadhiyo 'sti bījaṃ tattvopadeśasya ca
bhājanaṃ saḥ /
ākhyeyam asmaī paramārthasatyaṃ tadanvayās tasya guṇā
bhavanti //*⁵²

Then one should go in search of a teacher in the lineage of Nāgārjuna. Thus motivated one should seek *triratnaśaraṇa*, generate the *anuttarasamyaksambodhicitta* and accept the *bodhisattvādhiśīlaśikṣās*. (For an *ādikarmika* numerous additional moral rules are prescribed in the works of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, etc.).

If a bodhisattva is of inferior intellect he should then confess his sins in the words of the *Caturdharmakasūtra*, the *Triskandhaka*, the *Karmāvaraṇapratiprasābdhisūtra* and the *Upālipariṣṭhā*. If his intellect is sound sins must be confessed in the words of the *Ākāśagarbhasūtra*, the *Bhaiṣajyaguruvaiddūryaprabharājasūtra* and the *Dhāraṇīsūtrānta*. If his intellect is superior he should do so in the words of such sūtras as the *Mahāyānopadeśa*, the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa*, the *Sāgaranāgarājapariṣṭhā*, the *Tathāgataguhyā*, the *Karmāvaraṇaviśuddhi*, etc.⁵³

Having thus purified the three *bhūmis* of *adhimukticyā* he is prepared to engender the *lokottaramārga* by *śamatha*- and *vipaśyanāyoga* (-*rna*l 'byor gyis). As the activities of *vikalpa* are based on one's breath it must be controlled. There are six ways to do so:

51. The first verse is from Maitreyanātha's *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, IV, 6; the second from an unidentified work of Mahāsukhanātha (= Padmavajra); the third from « Āryadeva's » *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa*, 84 (with v.l.).

52. *Madhyamakāvātāra*, VI, 45. Sanskrit quoted in *Subhāṣitasamgraha*, p. 387.

53. For these most interesting sources for *pāpadeśana* (a part of the *bodhicittot-pāda*vidhi, cf. *Nagarjuniana*, p. 233 with ref.) compare the corresponding passages in *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and *Bodhimārgadīpapañjikā*.

*gaṇanānugamaḥ sthānaṃ lakṣaṇārthavivartanā /
parisuddhiś ca śoḍheyam ānāpānasmṛtir matā //*⁵⁴

One should then sit cross-legged on a comfortable mat and generate a compassionate *bodhicitta* according to Nāgārjuna's instruction: ... *atīr-
ṇān tārayemāmuktān mocayemāśvastān āśvāsayemāparinirvṛtān parinir-
vāpayema...*⁵⁵.

Having thus attained *śamatha* one should (by means of *vipaśanā*) recognize that all material and immaterial dharmas are incorporated in mind, and that mind is incorporated in one's body, and that the body may thus, being merely mind, be analysed away into *dharmadhātu* where nothing remains⁵⁶. This form of *yoga* is termed *sthūla*. There is, however, also a so-called *sūkṣmayoga*, a procedure which derives its authority from a celebrated passage in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*:

*cittamātraṃ samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet /
tathatālabane sthitvā cittamātraṃ atikramet //
cittamātraṃ atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet /
nirābhāsasthito yogī mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati //*⁵⁷

This, then, implies that on the level of *saṃvṛtisatya* there are two ways a Mādhyamika may consider the dharmas, namely either as existing (as the Śrāvakas do), or as consisting of *svacittamātra* (as the Yogācāras do) (cf. III-IV on *neyārthatathyasaṃvṛtiprajñā*). The former, or *sthūla-saṃvṛtisatya* corresponds to what Bhavya calls **bāhyamadhyamaka*, the latter, or *sūkṣmasaṃvṛtisatya*, to the so-called **adhyātmamadhyamaka*. The numerous works composed by Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti and Bhavya himself convey **bāhyamadhyamaka* and are merely concerned with *yukti* (~*cintāmayī prajñā*) thus serving a purely eristic purpose. When one pursues *tattvārtha* one should cultivate *sūkṣmayogabhāvanā*⁵⁸.

To sum up: At the level of *saṃvṛtisatya* mind falsely assumes the illusory appearances of the various dharmas, but at the level of *paramārthasatya*, as shown by *yukti*, mind is just as unoriginated and empty as any other *dharma*.

Having thus armed himself with *prajñā* and *upāya* the bodhisattva arises from his mat. He should observe the rituals by reciting such texts

54. This is a *saṃgrahaśloka* from *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, p. 340.

55. This passage (originally from *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*) is found in the proemium to *Bodhicittavivarāṇa* (see *Nagarjuniana*, pp. 183-85).

56. Here Bhavya refers to Candrakīrti's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (cf. AO, 40 [1979], p. 113) and to Nāgārjuna's *Bhavaśaṅkrānti* (cf. *Nagarjuniana*, p. 13, n. 19).

57. These verses from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (X, 256-217) were to play an important role in subsequent Madhyamaka *bhāvanā*, cf. SEYFORTH RUEGG, *op. cit.*, pp. 90, 97, 122. They also already occur in the *Bhāvanākrama*, an extract of verses from the *Laṅkāvatāra*, ascribed to Nāgārjuna.

58. This terminological distinction between « exoteric » and « esoteric » Madhyamaka seems unknown to later sources, but cf. SEYFORTH RUEGG, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

as the *Triskandhaka*, the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Bhadracaryāpranidhāna*, the *Pranidhānaviṃśaka* and the *Pranidhānasaptati* at regular intervals⁵⁹.

Then follows a brief survey of the nine aspects of the three *adhimuk-ticaryābhūmis*. Upon further subdivision the number of *anulomikī kṣāntis* amounts to twenty-four. The *anutpādaḥkṣānti*, however, which belongs to the *śuddhādhyāśayabhūmi*, only occurs at the *lokottaramārga*.

Bhavya, accordingly, discusses the ten *bhūmis* stressing that after the attainment of *vajropamasamādhi* there is no more any kind of *jñāna*, be it *prṣṭhalabdha*-, *viśuddhataukika*-, or *nirvikalpañāna*.

Finally (corresponding to MHK, III, 267 seqq.) there is a long account of the three bodies of Buddha, especially *dharmakāya* (with numerous quotations from « Nāgārjuna's » *Dharmadhātustava*). It is summarized in the following words: « The *dharmakāya* comprises the *buddhagaṇas*, viz. the *balas*, the *vaiśaradyas*, the *āvenikas*, etc. It is *prajñāpāramitā*, *advaya* and *abhinna*. The *saṃbhogakāya* is based upon its *adhiṣṭhāna*. The *nirmāṇakāya* is determined by the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the *saṃbhogakāya* so as to comply with the desires of the *vaineyas* ».

Chapter VIII emphasizes that there is only one authority upon whose exegesis we can rely for a correct understanding of *āgama*. This is, of course, Nāgārjuna, for he was predicted by the Buddha himself e.g. in *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, *Mahāmañjuśrīmūlatantra* and, above all, in the *Mahā-meghasūtra* (from which a long and most interesting extract is given)⁶⁰.

Nevertheless there is no reason to make a secret of the fact that extraordinary moral and intellectual achievements are required before the final attainment of Buddhahood:

*bālāḥ sajjanti rūpeṣu vairāgyaṃ yānti madhyamāḥ /
svabhāvavajñā vimucyante rūpasyottamabuddhayaḥ //
suyuddhaṃ vācared vijñāḥ supālāyanam eva vā /
āntarālikabhāvas tu vyartha vai patanaṃ bhavet //*⁶¹

Chapter IX. Still there is no reason for despair. By following these instructions one is relieved of *saṃsārabhaya* and finally overcomes all kinds of *duḥkha*, even death.

4. On the basis of this account of the fundamental themes and ideas of Bhavya's extant works we find ourselves in a position from which we may attempt not only to outline his place within the development of Indian philosophy in general, but also assess the unique historical significance of MRP in particular.

59. Cf. my *Mātrceṭa's Pranidhānasaptati* (to appear in EA, 38 [1984]).

60. These sources are also referred to by Candrakīrti and Avalokitavrata, *passim*.

61. *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, 55 and *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa*, 128.

Bhavya first of all emerges as a staunch protagonist of the *satyad-vaya* system of Madhyamaka, though not in the rather simple and primitive form it reached in the works of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the school, but in a considerably developed one.

To understand the reasons leading to this we must cast a brief glance at Bhavya's historical background. Let us first recall the purpose of the basic works of Madhyamaka. Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and *Sūnyatāsaptati* were levelled against the *svabhavavāda* of Buddhist Abhidharma, while his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and *Vaidalyaparakaraṇa* criticized Buddhist and non-Buddhist logicians⁶². Aryadeva's *Catuhśataka*, *Sataka*, etc. had the doctrines of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, etc. as their main targets of criticism. Since those texts had been composed in the second and third century profound developments had taken place within all departments of Buddhist thought. This was not only the case within the systems of Abhidharma (mainly Vaibhāṣika) but also within the logico-epistemological school (headed by Vasubandhu, Dignāga, etc.) and above all within the rival school of Madhyamaka, viz. Yogācāra (Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, etc.). These vital trends of Buddhist thought threatened either to eclipse or absorb the achievements of early Madhyamaka in their own systems. But, as if this were not serious enough, the emergence of an almost infinite number of non-Buddhist *darśanas* and the Madhyamaka school's general failure for centuries to keep up with these external competitors afforded yet another threat to its survival.

These, then, were the main challenges a Mādhyamika wishing to be up-to-date had to face in the sixth century should his school have any prospect, so to speak, of playing any serious academic role. To cope with these tasks and restore the ancient *naya* of Nāgārjuna Bhavya chose to adopt the following measures.

In order to vindicate the Madhyamaka in the court-rooms of philosophical debate he introduced a new mode of « independent reasoning » (*svatantrānumāna*) so as to prove the validity of his own thesis of *niḥsvabhāvatā* and rebuke any *vipakṣa* opposed to this. Accordingly a large part of his work is concerned with refuting the principles of Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, etc., and defending himself against charges of violating the logical rules generally accepted in debate. While he was thus forced, sometimes perhaps even with certain personal misgivings⁶³, to *exclude* the heretical schools from the group of faithful adherents of Buddhist *āgama*, he had to deal otherwise with his Buddhist *svayūthyas*. Like the Mādhyamikas themselves they also acknowledged the authority of Buddhist *āgama*. Therefore they had to be *included* within the orthodox fold, but, of course, not at the same level as those strictly following Nāgārjuna's *naya*. So Bhavya has to avail himself of

62. Cf. my *Nagarjuniana*, *passim*, and *Nāgārjunas filosofiske vaerker*, pp. 9-39.

63. Cf. V. V. Gokhale in *IJ*, 14 (1972), p. 45.

hermeneutic devices to prove that they only possess a superficial and inadequate understanding of the scriptures. Thus he is obliged — but, again, not without support in *āgama* itself⁶⁴ — to distinguish between three levels of orthodox Buddhism represented by Śrāvakas, Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas respectively. Thus they are all assigned to a place below Mādhyamikas within the frames of the *satyadvaya* system.

That this debate with coreligionists, especially the Yogācāras, could not be conducted without occasional outbursts of *odium theologicum* in both camps is naturally not surprising. On the other hand the fierce rivalries between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are also responsible for the existence of some of the most subtle philosophical documents that have survived from the sixth century.

In thus dealing with his Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents Bhavya manages, with a remarkable tour de force, to cope with the challenges presenting themselves and still save the *satyadvaya* system, either by excluding them from Madhyamaka by refutation or by including them by means of interpretation.

With this sketch of the many-sided ubiquity and inherent unity of Bhavya's philosophical system as a whole we may now consider the historically important features of MRP itself.

In comparison with his other works MRP proves, as we have seen, to be what it claims to be, namely an elucidation of the truth about the essentials of all the Buddhist and non-Buddhist doctrines. All the themes treated in MRP are already dealt with in MKH (TJ), etc. Sometimes a simple summary is given, sometimes minor additions and new details are given. The manner of arranging old themes is, however, much more systematic in MRP. Here, for the first time, the basic unity of thought lends coherence to a well-balanced presentation of Madhyamaka as a whole and its relationship to other trends of thought. MHK (TJ) afforded an account of the ethical and theoretical aspects of Madhyamaka (I-III), and a critique of Buddhists and non-Buddhists (IV-X) with such an abundance of details, arguments and digressions that the need for a brief reshuffled summary of the entire work was soon felt. KTR succeeded in meeting this need to some extent. In writing PP Bhavya was forced to adhere closely to the scheme of the *mūla* he was commenting upon, but nevertheless added two independent essays by way of appendix. In MAS he epitomized, all too briefly taken in itself, the *satyadvaya* system underlying all his other works. Here MRP fills in a lacuna by giving a comprehensive introduction to all philosophical systems seen in the perspective of Madhyamaka.

When these circumstances are kept in mind we are enabled to see to what extent MRP marks a continuity and development in Bhavya's works. MRP I and V supply the full discussion of the theory of *satyadvaya*, the fundamental theme of his philosophy, yet only dealt with in

64. Cf. note 38, *supra*.

a brief or incidental manner in MHK (TJ), MAS and PP. Similarly MRP VII provides a systematic exposition of *bhāvanākrama* (~ *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*), again a most fundamental concept yet only treated insufficiently in MHK (TJ) and KTR. Finally MRP VIII explicitly emphasizes that Bhavya's main authority for the exegesis of *āgama* is Nāgārjuna. This was certainly also the case when Bhavya composed all his other works, but only MRP devotes an independent chapter to its substantiation. In these respects then MRP may be seen as a necessary supplement to Bhavya's earlier writings.

But the coherence of MRP with MHK (TJ), etc., is also indicated by further new features which, though foreshadowed in the earlier works, were mainly provoked in the course of time by imposing external influences. As we have seen the perhaps most characteristic feature of Bhavya as a religious personality is his staunch adherence to *āgama*, a fact which obliged him — not without a good deal of *upāyakaśalya*, as it were — to include all « Buddhists (or would-be Buddhists) » acknowledging *āgama* within his *satyadvaya* system. This motive largely accounts for the wealth and variety of the quotations from authoritative *ācāryas*, such as Candrakīrti, etc., found in MRP.

We have seen that Candrakīrti's « Introduction to Madhyamaka » (*Madhyamakāvatāra*) was known to Bhavya (but only in MRP) and, as is well known, its author could be regarded as (and indeed later was regarded as) a rival to Bhavya⁶⁵. Hence it was natural that Bhavya should also compose his introduction to Madhyamaka. While certainly neither MHK (TJ), KTR, PP or MAS (all probably written *before Madhyamakāvatāra*) could be said to fulfil that purpose, MRP, on the other hand, could with its clear, systematic and comprehensive exposition of Madhyamaka, definitely be regarded as a worthy competitor to Candrakīrti's « Introduction ». This, we may assume, was one motive among others for Bhavya to compose his *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*.

When we compare the sources of the quotations found in MRP with those given in *Madhyamakāvatāra* one very conspicuous fact emerges: In contradistinction to Candrakīrti Bhavya adduces various « Vajrayānist » authorities. These quotations (like those from Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti) are of the greatest historical significance at the present state of Buddhist studies⁶⁶. They not only induce us to revise the generally proposed dates of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti (as I have argued elsewhere)⁶⁷ but, quite as important, they must serve as a *terminus ante quem* when we have to decide the dates, authorships, etc., of « Vajrayānist » works such as *Pañcakrama*, *Guhyasiddhi*, etc. This is, needless to stress, an urgent task for future research.

65. See recently H. TAUSCHER, *Candrakīrti, Madhyamakāvatārah und Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣyam*, Wien, 1981.

66. See WZKS, 26 (1982), pp. 175-76.

67. References in note 3, *supra*.

Here the important thing to notice is, as said, the place assigned to these authorities within the framework of Bhavya's own philosophical system. They represent that branch of Madhyamaka which, at the level of *tathyaśamvṛtisatya*, claims, as a device for *bhāvanā*, that everything is pure mind. At this level (as already stated in TJ) the application of *mantras*, *dhāraṇīs*, etc., should not be neglected by a Mādhyamika⁶⁸.

As far as the «*Nachleben*» of MRP is concerned we are almost exclusively referred to draw our conclusions from indirect evidence. If I am not mistaken our text is never mentioned in later Indian sources but was, of course, accepted as Bhavya's work by Atiśa *et al.* who translated it into Tibetan in the eleventh century. On the other hand it would seem that it exerted considerable influence on later Mādhyamikas such as Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. As known these authors adopted the *svatantrānumāna* introduced by Bhavya in their own polemical works (*Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, *Mādhyamakālamkāra*, *Mādhyamakāloka*, etc.). No one could study Kamalaśīla's three *Bhāvanākramas* without noticing their indebtedness to the chapter of that title in Bhavya's MRP (VII). Moreover some of their works show that the tendency to incorporate certain trends of Yogācāra and Vajrayāna⁶⁹ into Madhyamaka had already gained currency in the seventh and eighth centuries. To judge from the sources still accessible to us today the earliest authority for these confluences is in fact Bhavya's MRP. So it seems fair to assume that these later authors not only depended on Bhavya's works for their *svatantrānumānas* but also for other trends of thought.

Finally we may notice that many quotations not known (if I am not mistaken) from earlier sources than MRP are found in many later works (*Tattvasārasaṅgraha*, *Subhāṣitasāṅgraha*, etc.) in a form which renders it highly plausible that there were *borrowed* from MRP, i.e. they are not quoted from the original sources (as they are in MRP), but they are quotations of quotations (namely as given in MRP)⁷⁰.

To conclude: MRP is not only a document which forms an integral part to be taken into consideration when we wish to assess the development of Bhavya's own thought, but also a historical source of well-nigh revolutionary importance for the dating of several authors whose works are for the first time quoted in it. Moreover it is a text which forms a part of the background of numerous later authors whose own contributions to the development of Madhyamaka philosophy still remain to be assessed.

68. See note 13, *supra*.

69. Here Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasiddhi* is very significant, cf. AO, 41 (1980), pp. 33-6.

70. For further details see the forthcoming edition of MRP.