

ON ANYONYĀBHĀVA

« According to Vātsyāyana, Gautama accepted two types of absence: prior absence (*prāg-abhāva*), and posterior absence or destruction (*dhvaṃsa*). Much later, Vācaspati Miśra I (so also Daṇḍin) presented a division of absence that was accepted by the later school. According to him, absence is of two types: mutual absence or difference (*anyonyābhāva*), and relational absence (*samsargābhāva*); and the latter is of three subtypes: prior absence, destruction, and constant absence (*atyantābhāva*). Jayanta, on the other hand, followed Gautama and Vātsyāyana strictly and described mutual absence and constant absence as mere varieties of *prāg-abhāva* (prior absence). He also mentioned two further varieties of absence: *apekṣābhāva* and *sāmarthyābhāva*, of which the former, he said, was a variety of prior absence, and the latter might be subsumed sometimes under prior absence and sometimes under destruction »¹.

The « mutual absence » or « difference » (*anyonyābhāva = bheda*) has sometimes puzzled scholars. Here I propose to discuss the question in the light of some passages in Navya-nyāya literature to which, so far as I am aware, sufficient attention has not been given by scholars.

Vācaspatimiśra² only enumerates the different kinds of absence; he does not define them. They are defined later on, by Udayana and by Śrīdhara. Śrīdhara « raised the interesting question of how to distinguish a mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*) from a constant absence (*atyantābhāva*) in spite of the fact that both are not temporal, i.e. are ever-

1. B. MATILAL, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation: The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-nyāya Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968: Harvard Oriental Series 46), p. 108.

2. Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṅkā, p. 587 (in *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyāṅkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, ed. by Tārānātha Nyāya-Tarkaṭīrtha and Amarendramoḥana Tarkaṭīrtha, Calcutta, 1936: Calcutta Sanskrit Series XVIII).

present (*nitya* or *sadātana*). In a constant absence what we deny is in some way imaginary (*asat*), because it never occurs in the locus of denial but is imagined to do so, whereas a mutual absence is a denial of the identity of two real objects »³.

From Udayana onwards, *anyonyābhāva* is defined as that absence the counterpositive-ness to which is delimited by the relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*)⁴.

Matilal⁵ writes: « But identity as a relation becomes more important to Nyāya when it tries to explain what it calls mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*) or difference (*bheda*). Difference or otherness is exemplified in denials such as "A pot is not a cloth". Nyāya explains that in such expressions a cloth, called the counterpositive (*pratiyogin*), is declared not to be related to a pot by identity (cf. " *tādātmya-sambandhāvachinna-pratiyogitākābhāvaḥ anyonyābhāvaḥ* "). This comes from the commonsense notion that otherness is but a denial of identity. Nyāya explains this as denial that an entity is related by identity to something ».

This point was made sufficiently clear by the old writers. Thus Śaṅkaramiśra, in his *Upaskāra* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* IX, 1, 4, writes: *yatra sad eva ghaṭādi asad iti vyavahriyate tatra tādātmyābhāvaḥ pratiyate. bhavati hi asann aśvo gavātmanā, asan gaur aśvātmanā, asan paṭo ghaṭātmanā, aghaṭaḥ paṭaḥ, anaśvo gauḥ, agaur aśva ityādi pratītiḥ. tad asyām aśvānyonyābhāvavān gauḥ paṭānyonyābhāvavān ghaṭa ity anyonyābhāva eva tādātmyābhāvāparanāmā bhāsate. tad atra tādātmyaṅ pratiyogitāvachchedakam*⁶. « Where a pot etc., being existent, is spoken of as non-existent, there we have the cognition of an absence of identity. We have, indeed, the cognitions: "a horse is non-existent as a cow", "a cow is non-existent as a horse", "a cloth is non-existent as a pot", "a cloth is a non-pot", "a cow is a non-horse", "a horse is a non-cow", and so on. Now what appears in these cognitions is mutual absence, whose other name is absence of identity (*tādātmyābhāva*), and

3. MATILAL, *op. cit.*, p. 101 - *itaretarābhāva evātyantābhāva iti ced aho rājamārga eva bhramaḥ, itaretarābhāvo hi svarūpasiddhāyor eva gavāśvayor itaretarātmatāpratiṣedhaḥ, atyantābhāve tu sarvthā asadbhūtasyaiva buddhāv āropitasya deśakālānavacchinnaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ, yathā saṭpadārthebhyo nānyat prameyam astīti, yadi cātyantābhāvo neṣyate saḍ eva padārthā ity ayaṅ niyamo durghaṭaḥ syāt, Nyāyakandālī, p. 230 (The Bhāṣya of Praśastapādabhaṣyam together with the Nyāyakandālī of Śrīdhara, ed. by Vindhyeśvarīprasāda Dvivedin, Benares, 1895: Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 6).*

4. *anyonyābhāvatvaṅ tādātmyasambandhāvachhinna-pratiyogitākābhāvatvam, Viśvanātha, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī on Bhāṣāpariccheda (= Kārikāvalī) 12. - Cf. UDAYANA, Kiraṇāvalī, p. 220 (Praśastapādabhaṣyam with the Commentary Kiraṇāvalī, ed. by Jtendrarā S. Jetly, Baroda, 1971: Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 154), and Lakṣaṇāvalī, § 105 (ibid., p. 283).*

5. *Op. cit.*, pp. 46-47.

6. *The Vaiśeṣika Darśana with the Commentaries of Śaṅkara Miśra and Jayanā-rāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana*, ed. by Paṇḍita Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, Calcutta, 1861 (Bibliotheca Indica), pp. 376-377.

which assumes the forms: "a cow has the mutual absence of a horse", "a pot has the mutual absence of a cloth". Therefore, identity (*tādātmya*) is here the delimitor of the counterpositive-ness ».

But the word *tādātmya* « identity » raises an interesting problem⁷. Since the « identity » (*tādātmya*) of an « object having contact » (*saṃyogin*) is nothing but « contact » (*saṃyoga*), this definition of mutual absence includes also the « constant absence » (*atyantābhāva*) of an « object having contact », the counterpositive-ness to which absence is delimited by the contact relation. The definition thus suffers from the technical defect of « overpervasion » (*ativyāpti*). This problem was raised and solved by the *Dinakarī* commentary on the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* passage quoted above, but a full discussion of it is found only in the *Rāmarudrī* commentar on the *Dinakarī*⁸. Here is what the *Dinakarī* states: *tādātmyatvena tādātmyāvachchinnatvaṃ pratiyogitāyāṃ vivakṣitam. tena saṃyogāvachchinnapratiyogitāke saṃyogyatyantābhāve nātivyāptiḥ* « What is meant is that the counterpositive-ness is delimited by identity as identity. Thus there is no overpervasion [of the definition of mutual absence] to include the constant absence of an object having contact, the counterpositive-ness to which absence is delimited by contact ». This terse expression of the problem and its solution have been made fully explicit by the *Rāmarudrī* commentary as follows⁹: *tādātmyaṃ tadgato 'sādhāranadharmāḥ. tādātmyatvena tādātmyāvachchinnatvavivakṣyāḥ phalam āha: teneti, saṃyogyatyantābhāva iti. saṃyogitādātmyasya saṃyogarūpatayā saṃyogasaṃbandhāvachchinnapratiyogitākātyantābhāve yathāsrute 'tivyāptiḥ. idānīm tu tādātmyatvāvachchinnā tādātmyaniṣṭhā yā saṃsargavidhayāvachchedakatā tannirūpakapratiyogitākatvalābhena atyantābhāvīyasamyoganiṣṭhapratiyogitāvachchedakatāyāḥ saṃyogatvenaivāvachchinnatvāt nātivyāptir iti bhāvaḥ. yady api saṃyogitādātmyasya saṃyogarūpatvena tattādātmyatvam api saṃyogatvam evetyativyāptinirāso durghaṭa eva, tathāpi saṃsargatāvachchedakaṃ tādātmyatvam na saṃyogatvādirūpaṃ kiṃ tu saṃyogadvīrṭtyasādhāranadharmatvam eva. ato 'tyantābhāvīyapratiyogitāyāṃ saṃyogasya saṃyogatvenaivāvachchedakatvāt asādhāranadharmatvenāvachchedakatvavirahāna tatrātivyāptiḥ. bhedapratiyogitāvachchedakasaṃsargasyaiva asādhāranadharmatvena bhānābhuyupagamāt; anyathātyantābhāvānyonyābhāvayor bhedāsaṃbhavād iti bhāvaḥ* « " Identity " means the uncommon property

7. KARL H. POTTER, *The Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957: *Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies XVII*), p. 41, and n. 24.

8. *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya with Dinakarī (Prakāśa) Commentary by Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa & Dinakara Bhaṭṭa and Rāmarudrī (Taraṅgiṇī) Commentary by Rāmarudra Bhaṭṭācārya & Pt. Rājeśvara Sāstrī*, ed. by Pt. Harīrāma Śukla Sāstrī, Varanasi, 1972 (*Kaśhī Sanskrit Series 6*), pp. 71-72. See also Śrīkaṇṭha Dikṣita on Jānakīnātha, *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, ed. by Gaurīnātha Sāstrī, Bnares, Saṃvat 1941, p. 54.

9. Similarly Śrīkaṇṭha Dikṣita, *loc. cit.*

residing in a certain object. [The author of the *Dinakarī*] explains with what end in view it is meant that [the counterpositive-ness] is delimited by identity as identity... Since the identity of an object having contact is identical with contact, there follows an overpervasion [of the definition of mutual absence] to include the constant absence the counterpositive-ness to which is delimited by the contact relation — if we adopt the usual meaning of the word. But now is obtained the property of having a counterpositive-ness describing¹⁰ the property of being a delimitor as a relation, which resides in identity and is delimited by identity-ness. There is, therefore, no overpervasion, because the property of being the delimitor of the counterpositive-ness to the constant absence, which resides in contact, is delimited only by contact-ness. That is the idea. Although the overpervasion is hard to avoid because the identity of an object having contact being identical with contact, its identity-ness also is nothing but contact-ness, still the identity-ness which is the delimitor of the property of being a relation is not identical with contact-ness etc., but is only the property of being an uncommon property residing in an object having contact etc. Thus it is as contact that contact is the delimitor of the counterpositive-ness to the constant absence, it is not its delimitor as an uncommon property. There is therefore no overpervasion there. It is indeed only of the relation delimiting the counterpositive-ness to a difference that is admitted the appearance as an uncommon property; otherwise, there would be no difference between a constant absence and a mutual absence. That is the idea ».

To avoid all ambiguity, the Navya-naiyāyikas, while talking about mutual absence or difference, express themselves as follows: A mutual absence or difference is an absence the counterpositive-ness to which is delimited, as a relation, by identity¹¹. But this definition, too, is not always adhered to. Jagadīśa records two alternative definitions of *bhedatva*: as *anuyogitāvīśeṣa* « a particular kind of subjunctness », and as *akhaṇḍopādhi* « an unanalysable imposed property »¹². Jagadīśa also informs us that according to Raghunātha, in the *Bauddhādhikāraṭippaṇī*, i.e. commentary on the *Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayanācārya, there is no proof (*mānābhāva*) in favour of the view that the counterpositive-ness to a mutual absence is delimited by the identity relation¹³. The argu-

10. *nirūpaka*: cf. DANIEL H. H. INGALLS, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951: Harvard Oriental Series 40), p. 46.

11. *bhedatvaṃ ca saṃsargavidhayā tādātmyāvachchinnaṃpratiyogitākābhāvatvam*, *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-Jāgadiśī*, p. 108 (*The Siddhāntalakṣaṇa of M. M. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya with the Commentaries Dīdhī, Jāgadiśī, Vivṛti, Dīpikā and Kālīśaṅkari by Raghunātha Siromaṇi, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Vāmācāraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, Guruprasāda Sāstrī and Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya*, ed. by Guruprasāda Sāstrī, Benares, 1933).

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.

13. *nanu tādātmyena gavādeḥ sādhyatāyūṣṇ sāsṇādāv avyūptis tatra sādhanavan- niṣṭhānyonyābhāvapratiyogitāyāḥ sādhyatāvachchedakatādātmyasaṃbandhāvachchinatve mānābhāvasya svayam eva Bauddhādhikāraṭippaṇyām uktatvāt*, *ibid.*, pp. 156-157.

ments on which Raghunātha bases his opinion are not known to any of the pandits I have been able to consult. They give their own arguments (which vary from one pandit to another) saying that these must also be the arguments of Raghunātha ¹⁴! A final decision on this question must, evidently, depend on a thorough examination of the *Bauddhādhikāraṭippanī* itself. But that I have to reserve for another occasion.

14. Cf. Śrīkaṭha Dikṣita, *loc. cit.* (cf. *Nyāyakośa*, s.v. *anyonyābhāva*: 3rd edition, pp. 44-45): *atra dhvaṃsapragābhāvayor ivānyonyābhāvāsya pratiyogitāvachedakasaṃbandhe mānābhāvāḥ. na cātyantābhāvāsyaṅpi tathāstv iti vācyam, saṃyogasaṃbandhāvachinnaghaṭātyantābhāvavattājñāne saty api samavāyādisaṃbandhena ghaṭāvattājñānodayāt saṃyogasaṃbandhāvachchinnaghaṭāniṣṭhāprakāratāśālijñānaṃ prati saṃyogasaṃbandhāvachinnapratiyogitākaghaṭābhāvaprakārajñānatvena pratibandhakatvād atyantābhāvāsya pratiyogitāvachedakasaṃbandhāvāsyaakatvāt, anyonyābhāvāsya ca nānāsaṃbandhāvachinnapratiyogitākatvābhāvena samavāyena ghaṭāvattājñānaṃ prati ghaṭānyonyābhāvavattājñānatvenaiva pratibandhakatvānyonyābhāvāsya tathānāvāsyaakatvād ity akhaṇḍopādhirūpatvam eva tasya samyak...* This was also the interpretation given to me by my *guru*, Paṇḍitarāja Badrinath Sukla of the Vārānaseya-Saṃskṛta-Viśvavidyālaya. According to this interpretation, therefore, it is simply unnecessary, in the case of a mutual absence (as also in the cases of « destruction », *dhvaṃsa*, and of « prior absence », *pragābhāva*), to assume a relation delimiting the counterpositive-ness, because it cannot be delimited by different relations; whereas it is necessary to do so in the case of a constant absence, the counterpositive-ness to which can be delimited by different relations. According to others, however, Raghunātha's point is that the identity relation, being a « non-occurrence-exacting » (*vṛtṭyanīyāmaka*) relation, cannot be the delimitor of a counterpositive-ness. This view is also echoed by such a great authority as the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Kālīpada Tarkācārya, in his lectures delivered at the Vārānaseya-Saṃskṛta-Viśvavidyālaya in 1964, lectures which have been published by the same institution under the title *Nyāyadarśanabinduḥ* (Saṃvat 2021): *anye tu Vyāptisiddhāntalakṣaṇaṅgrāthe Jagadīśasya « sādhanavanniṣṭhānyonyābhāvapratiyogitāyāḥ sādhyatāvachedakatādātmyasaṃbandhāvachchinnatve mānābhāvāsya svayam eva Bauddhādhikāraṭippanīyām uktatvāt » ityādigranthaprāmānyena tādātmyasaṃbandhasya svayam eva dhātvaṅpi na pratiyogitāvachedakasaṃbandhatvam iti vadanti. tādātmyasaṃbandhāvachchinnapratiyogitākābhāvavattvam anyonyābhāvavattvam ity anyonyābhāvalakṣaṇam upekṣamānās ca te bhēdatvarūpam akhaṇḍopādhirūpam eva tallakṣaṇam abhyupagachanti. vāyaṃ tu bahusaṃmatatvādiguṇena tādātmyasaṃbandhasya vṛtṭyanīyāmakatve 'pi tasya bhēdīyapratiyogitāvachedakasaṃsargatvam urarīkurmaḥ (p. 21). From Jagadīśa's text it is hard to decide which view is the correct one. Thus, after the sentence quoted above (and quoted by Kālīpada Tarkācārya), he adds; *evam dhanī Caitratvād ityādaṃ vṛtṭyanīyāmakasvāmītvādi-saṃbandhena dhanādeḥ sādhyatāyām api tādrśasaṃbandhāvachchinnapratiyogitāvāprasiḍdheḥ*. Vāmācāraṇa, Bhaṭṭācārya, in his *Vivṛti* (the *Gaṅgā* commentary by Śivadatta Miśra is not available to me at this moment), simply states (p. 157): *anyonyābhāvavattvāyākhaṇḍopādhirūpā ity āsyaḥ*.*

Note also that Rājanārāyaṇa Śukla, in his notes to the *Parīkṣāradarpaṇa* by his father Veṅīmādhava Śukla (Benares 1934), p. 143, speaking of the problem discussed above, writes: *bhēdatvam ca anuyogitāviśeṣadharmā eva na tu tādātmyasaṃbandhāvachchinnapratiyogitākābhāvavattvam, saṃyogasya saṃyogitādātmyābhinnatāyā saṃyogasaṃbandhāvachchinnapratiyogitākasaṃyogyatyantābhāve 'tivyāptīyāpatteḥ* - On *anuyogitā* in this context cf. *Nyāyakośa*, s.v. 2: *abhāvavātmikā: yathā ghaṭo nāstīti pratītiṅviśaye abhāve ghaṭāniṣṭhāpratiyogitānirūpitānuyogitā. iyam api svarūpasāṃbandhaviśeṣa eveti kecin naityāyikā vadanti, akhaṇḍopādhir ity anye vadanti.*