

TOSHIHIKO KIMURA

VĪTA AND A-/ĀVĪTA DIALECTICS OF THE SĀNKHYAS

Introduction

Two modes of reasoning, *vītaḥ* and *a-/āvītaḥ* used by the Sāṅkhyas, were discovered at first by A. Bürk (1901) from the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*, according to E. Franco (1999). Then H. Jacobi reported the Nyāya-style usage of *avīta* reasoning of Psykhe (*ātmā*) in the *Nyāyavārttikam* of Uddyotakara and, moreover, the criticism by Dharmakīrti (1927).

New researches were carried out by H. Hadano (1944) and E. Frauwallner (1958), and its sources were enlarged to Buddhist and Jaina texts. Moreover recently G. Oberhammer used the *Yuktiḍīpikā* as well as the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* for the interpretation of “*āvītaḥ*” (Terminologie Bd.1, 1991, p. 123 f.).

But the illustration in the *Yuktiḍīpikā* cited by him does not agree with the function of reductional way. The author of the *Yuktiḍīpikā* says that the world (*jagat*) didn't occur from atoms (*paramāṇavaḥ*) etc., therefore the world is proved to occur from the First Cause (*pradhānam*). But the negation of opponent philosophies is not argued logically (not “*ad absurdum*”). Furthermore the major premise is not absolute choice: $p \cup \sim p$. Anyway we must read the *Yuktiḍīpikā* also as well as Buddhist comments which were appointed by Hadano and the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* cited by Frauwallner. We have to enjoy their achievements of fundamental researches and to develop them more logically.

In that case the difference between *avīta* and *āvīta* traditions is not problem.

Vīta Argumentation

“*vītāvītavīṣāṇasya pakṣatāvanasevinaḥ / pravādāḥ Sāṅkhyakarīṇaḥ Sallakīṣaṇḍabhaṅgurāḥ II*” (For the Sāṅkhya elephant which has tusks of direct and indirect logic, which dwells in the forest of topics, the other dogmas are transient so as Sallakī woods eaten by elephants).

This opening verse of the *Yuktidīpikā* shows that *vītāvīta* reasonings play an important role for the dialectics of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. The topics argued by *vītāvīta* reasonings were introduced by several Buddhist philosophers according to Hadano’s paper (1944).

Bhāviveka quoted the *vīta* proof of the First Cause (*pradhānam*) by the reason of individual’s (1) homogeneousness, (2) finiteness, (3) distinction of cause and effect, (4) occurrence by energy and (5) various dissimilarities in his *Tarkajvālā* (Derge, dsa 232a~). These argumentations fall under the 15th *kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with slight variants.

“*bhedānām parimāṇāt samanvayācchaktitaḥ pravṛtteś ca / kāraṇakāryavibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya II*” (By the reason of individual’s finiteness, homogeneousness, occurrence by energy, distinction of cause and effect and one union of universe). The topic (*pratijñā*) is the final clause of the 14th *kārikā*, “*avyaktam api siddham*” (Concealed One is also proved).

Dignāga introduced the *vīta* dialectics (*parārthānumānam*) of the Sāṅkhyas (Kāpilāḥ) in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛttiḥ* (Derge, ce 54a~), and gave the illustration on the reason, “*samanvayāt*” in the 15th *kārikā*. (We must emend “*bsalba-rnams dan̄ rjes-su ḥgro-ba*” of Derge ed., 54a.4 to “*khyad-par-rnams-pa rjes-su ḥgro-ba*” according to Pekin ed., 141b.4).

It is very noteworthy that Dignāga criticized (1) the lack of common property with the mediate term on the subject term. Namely the Sāṅkhya dialectics shows a propositional logic, not the terminal logic. He pointed out that the 15th *kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa cannot be the *anumāna* because of the lack of *pakṣadharmatā* which is the first discipline of mediate term (*hetuḥ*).

Successively he abused (2) the absence of example for showing the universal concomitance between probans and probandum. That is, Dignāga found only two parts of argumentation, *pratijñā* and *hetuḥ*, as we see on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. We need not conceive five parts (*avayavāḥ*) of Nyāya-style argumentation in the unseen text, the *Ṣaṣṭitantram*. Actually Maitreya cited the two parts of argumentations by Vārṣagaṇya in his *Yogācārabhūmiḥ*. See the below mentioned portion. Hadano and Frauwallner related the five parts of Sāṅkhya dialectics, but Siṃhasūri it as secondary, and optional interpretation as follows: “*vītasya vā bhavaḥ pañcapradeśaḥ* / p. 314”. (The *vīta* argumentation has five places).

The problems are *vīta* and *a- / āvīta* hetū. Siṃhasūri’s exposition is as follows: “*yadā hetuḥ parapakṣam avyapekṣya svenaiva rūpeṇa kāryasiddhāv apadiśyate tadā vītākhyo bhavati*”. (When a reason informs its conclusion through self-character, not contrary character, the reason is called “*vītaḥ*”). This interpretation is constituted together with the mode of *āvīta-hetuḥ* which we will see on the next chapter.

Thus the 15th *kārikā* reveals a specimen of the mode of *vīta* reasoning as Kamalaśīla described in his *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (p. 26). For the thesis, “*asti pradhānam*” (First Cause exists) the above mentioned reasons were declared. On the contrary to the new, that is, nominal logic of Nyāyasoma introduced by Aśaṅga in his *Madhyamakārtihānūsāriṇī* (Taisho ed. p. 42a), this statement reveals a propositional logic: $p < q$. Because the subjects of thesis and reason are not consistent, and the three disciplines of mediate term insisted by Nyāyasoma (a Pāśupata Naiyāyika according to Aśaṅga and Harivarman) and Buddhist logicians cannot be applied to these argumentations.

Vācaspatimīśra altered the argumentation of the 15th *kārikā* to nominal logic of Nyāya-style in his *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* as runs: “*vivādādhyāsītā mahadādibhedā avyaktakāraṇavantaḥ parimitatvād ghaṭādivat* / p. 74”. (The individuals in question, Great One etc., have Concealed One as their causes, because they are finite, e.g. a jar.) But this argumentation is composed by new logic. The *vīta* argumentations were composed with two propositions, *pratijñā* and *hetuḥ*, and reveal it in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 9, 15, 17 and 18. The logical formula is as follows: $p < q$. To be true or to be false about the contents is not question.

The author of the *Yuktiḍīpikā* divided two sorts of *vīta* reasoning, similar one and dissimilar one. Similar reason exists in *probandum* (*sādhyasahabhāvī*). For instance, the distinction of cause and effect means simultaneously the existence of Cause (*pradhānam* = source, not motive cause). As for dissimilar one, he pointed out the reason “*saṅghātaparārthatvāt*” and others (p. 40, 26~27). The specimen is related in the 17th *kārikā* for the proof of Psykhe (*puruṣaḥ*). That is, corporeal gathering serves another. (p) Therefore Psykhe exists. (q). Both cases are expressed as: $p < q$.

A- / *āvīta* Argumentation

Siṃhasūri defined the *āvīta* reasoning in his *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* as runs: “*parīśeṣād āvītasiddhir yadā nedam ato ’nyathā sambhavaty asti cedam tasmāt parīśeṣato hetur evāyam* / p. 314, 1~2” (The *āvīta* argumentation is realized by way of reduction. That is: this is not right, so that, contrary one occurs and this is right. Therefore this reason occurs by way of reduction). The major premise of this propositional logic is: $pU \sim p$. The minor premise is: $\sim p=0$. The conclusion is: $p=1$. Siṃhasūri didn’t mention the case of it in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, but apparently it is “*asadakaraṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt* / Sk.9” (Effect exists in Cause, because unreal effect cannot be produced. If Effect does not exist in Cause, all effects might occur from all causes. But that is absurd). If there were not Effect in Cause, the contradiction of all occurrences from all things makes us trouble ($\sim p=0$). So that, Effect exists in Cause ($p=1$).

Maitreya cited four *vīta* reasonings and four *avīta* reasonings by Vārṣaṅgaṇya in his *Yogācārabhūmiḥ* (p. 119), although he didn’t call them “*vītāvītahetū*”. These reasonings are primitive in comparison with that of Īśvaraḥṣṇa, but the last one was accepted by him as “*sarvasambhavābhāvāt* / Sk.9”. The last reasoning is as runs: “*anyathā hi sarvaṃ sarvasya kāraṇatvena vyavasthāpyatesarvataḥ sarvam utpadyeta*” (Otherwise, all the things become causes of all the effects, and all the effects must occur from all the causes). That is absurd. Then a specific effect occurs from a specific cause, Vārṣaṅgaṇya said. The latter argumentation forms a *vīta hetu* of similarity. This is yet a

regressus ad absurdum to *hetu*, not to *pratijñā*. Complete *vīta* and *avīta hetus* were realized later. I owe this information on the *Yogācārabhūmiḥ* to Prof. Furusaka, Kōichi.

A- / *āvīta* reasoning is thus *regressus ad absurdum*: $p \sim p$, $\sim p = 0$ (false), therefore $p = 1$ (true). This reductional way is composed with propositional logic, and the Nyāya school also acknowledged it as “*tarkaf*” in the *Nyāyasūtram*, 1.1.40, which G. Jhā translated as “hypothetical reasoning”. In that case the *tarka* reasoning was used for a subsidiary proof of Psykhe (*ātmā*). If cognizer (*jñāta*) began to exist (*utpannaḥ*), then metempsychosis and release might not be seen on him. But we really experience them. Therefore Psykhe is proved, so Vātsyāyana says in his *Nyāyabhāṣyam* (p. 157).

Gautama defined the *tarka* as follows: “*avijñātatattve ’rthe kāraṇopapattitas tattvajñānārtham ūhas tarkaḥ / Ns.1.1.40*” (When the real character of an object is not well known, then a reason for cognition of real character occurs and the contemplation of it is called “*tarka*”). *Ūha* and *apoha* consist of a pair, and *apoha* rather consists with the Nyāya-style *ūha*. Both words are translated as “reasoning”, of course positive and negative meanings respectively, by V.S. Apte.

These two words are used in the *Mahābhāratam*, 12.118.17, 13.133.43 and 13.134.27 as a *dvandva* compound, and then a *tatpuruṣa* compound: “*ūhāpohaviśārādāḥ*” (well conversant men with reasonable and hypothetical inference). The usage of it don’t play an important role together with “*jñānavijñāna-sampannāḥ*”.

The Nyāyakośa introduces the definition of Hemaçandra seen in his *Abhidhānacintāmaṇikośaḥ* as runs: “*aparatarakanirāsāya kṛto viparītatarkaḥ / ūho ’poho ’rthavijñānaṃ tattvajñānaṃ ca dhigunāḥ //*” (The contrary reasoning is made to rejecting other reasonings. Reasoning, rejecting reasoning, objective understanding and the knowledge of truth are characters of wisdom).

These four terms refer to the above mentioned compound-words in the epic.

Siṃhasūri suggests that *āvīta* reasoning corresponds with *śeṣavat*, and *vīta* reasoning with *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam*. The former reason consists with similarity of a premise and a conclusion, and the latter consists with dissimilarity (p. 313). The latter should be used at first, then the former must be used for the cognition of Sāṅkhya metaphysics, he

says; and in succession declares that the metaphysics in the text of Vārṣagaṇya (*Vārṣagaṇe tantrē*) has been rejected. The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* suggests that the *vīta* reasoning can go back to the archaic ten parts argumentation (*sūktam daśāvayavo vītaḥ* / p. 44, 5).

Thus we can understand that the historical understanding of the Nyāya-style *vīta* and *a-/āvīta* reasoning is very erroneous.

Bibliography

1. Sanskrit Texts and Classical Translations.

Tattvasaṅgrahaḥ of Śāntarakṣita and *Ts.-Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla (Bauddha Bharati Series, Varanasi 1968), ed. by Dwarikadas Shastri.

Tarkajvālā of Bhāviveka, Tibetan translation, Derge-ed. 3856.

Nyāyavārttikam of Uddyotakara (Kashi Skt. Ser., Benares 1916), ed. by V.P. Dvivedi.

Nyāyasūtram of Gautama and *Nyāyabhāṣyam* of Vātsyāyana (Chowkhambā Skt. Ser., Benares 1925), ed. by G. Jhā and Dhundhirāja Śāstri.

Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Siṃhasūri (Ātmanand Jain Granthamālā, Bhavnagar 1996), ed. by Jambuvijaya.

Pramāṇasamuccayavṛttiḥ of Dignāga, Tibetan translation, Derge-ed.4204.

Madhyamakārthānusāriṇī of Asaṅga, Tibetan translation., Derge-ed.3856.

Mahābhāratam, published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 1975.

Yuktidīpikā, ed. by R.C. Pandeya, Delhi 1967.

Yogācārabhūmiḥ of Maitreya, ed. by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Calcutta 1957.

Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspatimiśra, ed. and tr. by G. Jhā (Poona 1965).

2. New Translations, Papers etc.

Apte, V.S.: *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Poona 1957.

Franco, Eli: *vīta and Avīta* (Asiatische Studien, Bd.53), Zürich 1999.

Frauwallner, Erich: *Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṅkhya-Systems* (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, Bd.2), Wien 1958.

Hadano, Hakuyū: *Surongakuha no Ronrisetsu, vīta Avīta ni Tsuite* (On the Sāṅkhya Logic, *Vīta and Avīta*), (Bunka, Vol.11-3; 4), Sendai 1944.

Jacobi, Hermann: *Vīta and Avīta* (Festgabe für R.Garbe), Erlangen 1927.

Jhā, Gaṅganātha: *Nyāyasūtras of Gautama with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya and Uddyotakara's Vārttika*, Allahabad 1915.

Jhalakīkar and Abhyankar: *Nyāyakośaḥ* (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Ser.), Pune 1996.

Oberhammer, Gerhard: *Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien*, Bd.1, Wien 1991.

Ui, Kanakura, Suzuki and Tada: *Catalog of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka in the Library of Tōhoku University*, Sendai 1934.

