ON D.D. KOSAMBI'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ *

Kosambi's writings on the Bhg. are few but important 1. They represent one of the few attempts by scholars or others to understand this text from other than a religious perspective. The majority of the Gītā's interpreters, both ancient and modern, have regarded the text as a timeless classic. They have appreciated its contents independently of the text's historical context and have tended to interpret them solely in terms of a religious framework. Kosambi, however, was interested in the Gītā as a kind of mirror image of the period in which it was composed and first recited. For him this period comprised the few centuries just prior to the rise of the Gupta empire in 320 A.D. Above all he wanted to discover the social and economic conditions current in a society which could produce a text which attempts to assimilate or at least smooth over the differences between religious and philosophical ideas coming from diverse origins and apparently making irreconcilable claims. The conclusions to be drawn from this only interested him insofar as they threw light on economics and sociology, not on the religious currents underlying and shaping the Gītā itself.

My purpose in this paper is to give an exposition of Kosambi's views about the Gītā and a criticism of his method of interpreting it. The paper is not intended to be exhaustive and concentrates only on those issues raised by him which best illustrate his approach to the study of the Gītā. One general point concerning his approach can be made imme-

^{*} The following abbreviations have been used in this paper. $Bhg. = Bhagavadgīt\bar{a}$; BdP. = Brahmāṇdapurāṇa; $KP. = K\bar{u}rmapurāṇa$; Mbh. = Mahābhārata; $MKP. = M\bar{a}rkaṇdeyapurāṇa$; $MU. = Muṇḍaka\ Upaniṣad$; $SvetU. = Svetāsvatara\ Upaniṣad$; ViP. = Viṣṇupurāṇa.

^{1.} It is well known that Kosambi studied Indian history from a Marxist perspective. Another Indologist who is an avowed Marxist and has written on the Gita is W. Ruben. See his, Die Gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im Alten Indien 111: Die Entwicklung der Religion, Berlin, 1971, pp. 121-25; D.D. Kosambi, Social and Economic Aspects of the Bhagavadgītā, in «Myth and Reality» (Bombay, 1962), pp. 12-41. The section on the Gitā in his The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India in Historical Outline, London, 1965, pp. 206-9, is just a summary of this article.

diately, a point which shall be developed progressively throughout the paper. Though Kosambi's studies of the Gītā throw up interesting results for Indian social and economic history, his method fails to adequately acknowledge that the text is primarily religious in character. Whatever the merits of reducing religion to social and economic factors, the overtly religious nature of the Gītā and the inspiration it has given to so many Indian religious movements means that it has been perceived by many to be fundamentally a religious text. Because of this it is crucial that it be studied from the perspective of the history of Indian religions as well as from a purely socio-economic perspective.

1

Kosambi believed that the Gītā would be virtually useless as a guide to any warrior faced with an imminent battle ². Nevertheless, « the ostensible moral [of the Gītā] is: "Kill your brother, if duty calls, without passion; as long as you have faith in Me, all sins are forgiven"»³. This moral, he says, is consistent with the Arthaśāstra tradition where a warrior is enjoined to kill his father or uncle without the slightest hesitation if there is political gain in it ⁴. The figure in the Gītā who is the epitome of this kind of behaviour is none other than Kṛṣṇa. It is at his behest that Droṇa, Bhīṣma, Karṇa and Śalya, all « field-marshalls » of the Kaurava army are killed in « unethical » ways. Bhīṣma, for example, was killed by Arjuna who made use of Śikhaṇḍin's body as a shield ⁵. Bhīṣma would not strike Śikhaṇḍin because of his doubts about the latter's sex; Sikhaṇḍin had been a woman in one of his previous births and Bhīṣma would never strike a woman. In fact, Kosambi contrasts Kṛṣṇa with Bhīṣma, whose conduct was exemplary in Hindu terms.

There is much justification for seeing Kṛṣṇa as the type of treacherous figure who the *Arthaśāstra* holds up as most successful in time of war. Because of this, Kosambi asks whether Kṛṣṇa is an appropriate figure to recite the Gītā with its religious and philosophical teachings. Is there not a conflict between the character of the reciter and the nature of the teachings that he recites?

The fact that Kosambi raises this question shows that he does not take sufficient account of Kṛṣṇa's religious significance in the *Mbh*. and the Ḡtā in assessing his character and his actions. It is true that the

5. Mbh. (ed. V. S. Sukthankar, Poona, 1933-69) 6, 103 ff., gives details of Bhīşma's killing.

^{2.} Kosambi, Social and Economic..., p. 18.

^{3.} Loc. cit.

^{4.} Ruben, op. cit., pp. 123 and 125, notes several points of convergence between the Arthasāstra and the Gītā. This is a point worth exploring in more detail.

propensity of Kṛṣṇa to assist in the killing of the four « field-marshalls » by using apparently foul means has long been a problem for scholars of the Mbh. However, a recent study of Kṛṣṇa in the Mbh. has shown that their killing was necessary if Kṛṣṇa was to complete his role as avatāra 6. Each of the four had violated the ordered hierarchy of varṇa, thus threatening a confusion of varṇas, which is equivalent to a diminution of dharma. The task of the avatāra is to re-establish dharma when it has declined 7. A symptom of such decline is the confusion of varṇas, and the Gītā itself is adamant about the dangers to society from this type of confusion. What from a purely moral point of view appears to be an immoral (I do not intend to confuse dharma with morality: the two concepts are quite different) act is quite dharmic when it is seen from a religious point of view. In disposing of the four marshalls Kṛṣṇa is preserving dharma, a role consistent with the types of doctrines he recites in the Gītā.

This reluctance to explore the religious dimensions of the Ḡtā runs right through Kosambi's studies of the text. It is no more apparent than in his views on the Ḡtā's apparent contradictions, what he calls its « dexterity in seeming to reconcile the irreconcilable » 8. In the Ḡtā several doctrinal conflicts (or contradictions) come out, but they do not appear to be resolved. Kṛṣṇa emphasizes ahimsā when the real purpose of the Ḡtā is to persuade Arjuna to fight. Kṛṣṇa makes the claim that the soul cannot be destroyed, but in the theophany, Arjuna sees warriors from both sides rushing into Kṛṣṇa's mouths. Finally, the yajña is condemned, but the symbiotic set of relationships centred on the ritual is exhorted 9. Kosambi sees the lack of final resolution of these concepts as « slippery opportunism [which] characterizes the whole book » 10.

These conflicts are seen in a different light to that suggested by their literal meaning if they are viewed within the general framework of religious ideas in the Gītā, as well as those occurring in the epics and Purāṇas to which the Gītā owes so much. An analysis of the latter two conflicts suggested by Kosambi will be sufficient to make this point. Though Kṛṣṇa is really the avatāra of Viṣṇu, he is portrayed in the Gītā as the highest god of the pantheon, as the one god, of whom all other gods are merely aspects. Just as in the theistic parts of the Mbh. and the Purāṇas the one god (who is considered to be the highest god) is said to be the creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe, so too is

^{6.} A. HILTEBEITEL, The Ritual of Battle: Krishna in the Mahābhārata, Ithaca and London, 1976, chapter 10.

^{7.} The classic statement of the avatāra doctrine is Bhg. 4, 7-8.

^{8.} Kosambi, Social and Economic..., p. 17.

^{9.} Loc. cit.

^{10.} Loc. cit.

Kṛṣṇa accredited with all these roles in the Bhg ¹¹. The triple world is created at the beginning of a kalpa and destroyed at the end of the same kalpa. Though ātmans are indestructible, anything material like human bodies is not, and in the part of the theophany that resembles the pralaya, Kṛṣṇa swallows up the ātmans in their jīva forms, preparatory to their rebirth at the beginning of the next kalpa ¹². If seen in this light, Kṛṣṇa's affirmation of the indestructability of the ātman and his role during the pralaya, where he destroys beings, are not contradictory.

Nor is there really a conflict over the $yaj\bar{n}a$. The Ḡtā is naturally critical of the Vedic notion of $yaj\bar{n}a$ because in accordance with this notion the sacrifice was performed for fulfillment of desires $(k\bar{a}ma)$, that is, for selfish ends ¹³. The Ḡtā presents a range of views on the sacrifice, but stresses the renunciation of the fruits of action, whether this action be social or ritual (karma). The renunciation of the fruits of action is the renunciation of desire. The selfishness implicit in the Vedic $yaj\bar{n}a$ leaves no room for a relationship with divinity such as that characterized by bhakti. However, since the various groups of beings in the triple world derive their nourishment from the sacrifice, the Ḡtā supports it, but only with the proviso that the fruits of the sacrifice are renounced ¹⁴.

2

The most contentious of Kosambi's views about the Gītā are those he expresses about its purpose. He says, « Practically anything can be read into the Gītā by a determined person without denying the validity of a class system. THE GĪTĀ FURNISHED THE ONE SCRIPTURAL SOURCE WHICH COULD BE USED WITHOUT VIOLENCE TO ACCEPTED BRAHMIN METHODOLOGY, TO DRAW INSPIRATION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR SOCIAL ACTIONS IN SOME WAY DISAGREABLE TO A BRANCH OF THE RULING CLASS upon whose mercy the brahmins depended at the moment » ¹⁵. He finds justification for this view in the tendency of lower class religious thinkers such as Jñāneśvar,

^{11.} For some examples of this portrayal of the one god, see *SvetU*. 3, 2; 4, 1; *KP*. 1, 4, 9; *BdP*. 1, 1, 3, 11; *MkP*. 45, 34; *ViP*. 1, 2, 21. The relevant passages in the *Bhg*. are 8, 18-19; 9, 7-8. The latter verses read:

sarvabhūtāni kaunteya prakṛtim yānti māmikām / kalpakṣaye punastāni kalpādau visrjāmyaham //

^{12.} The imagery used in that section (Bhg. 11, 19-30) of the theophany where Kṛṣṇa's destructive role is described is very similary to that occurring in the Purāṇic pralaya, upon which it is probably based. For details of this see Hiltebeitel, op. cit., pp. 114-20.

^{13.} This notion of sacrifice is attacked in Bhg. 2, 42-46; 9, 20-21.

^{14.} See Bhg. 3, 10-14.

^{15.} Kosambi, Social and Economic..., p. 15. The capitals are Kosambi's.

Tukārām and Kabīr, all of whom wrote in the vernacular and knew the Gītā, not to make much use of it. However, great *brāhmanas* such as Sankara, Rāmānuja, and in modern times, Tilak and Ghose, have all used the Gītā's popularity and teachings against their opponents, whoever they have been.

Directly relevant to the above statement is his estimate of the time when the Gītā was composed and in what kind of society. He says, « To sum up, writing the Gītā was possible only in a period when it was not absolutely necessary. Saṅkara could not do without the intense polemic of theological controversy. To treat all views tolerantly and to merge them into one implies that the crisis in the means of production is not too acute. FUSION AND TOLERANCE BECOME IMPOSSIBLE WHEN THE CRISIS DEEPENS, WHEN THERE IS NOT ENOUGH OF THE SURPLUS PRODUCT TO GO AROUND, AND THE SYNTHETIC METHOD DOES NOT LEAD TO INCREASED PRODUCTION » ¹⁶. His general view about fusion and tolerance usually only occurring in times of economic prosperity is probably true. But is it true to say that the Gītā could only have been composed at a time when it was not absolutely necessary?

There is sufficient evidence in the Gītā of strong support for Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy based on observance of varṇāśramadharma and the superiority of brāhmaṇas over the other varṇas. This is in line with Kosambi's first point concerning the utility of the Gītā in communicating Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy to the powered classes. However, his second point about the time of composition of the Gītā seems to ignore the possibility that it might have been composed in order to heal a major rift in the religious thinking of the period preceding its composition. It is necessary to deal with both of these points as the first has a strong bearing on the second.

I would see the Gītā as the product of a major cleavage in religious thinking and of the social behaviour associated with this thinking, a cleavage which might well have threatened the viability of Brāhmanical orthodoxy. The composer of the Gītā was certainly aware of the great diversity of religious thinking in ancient India. Sāmkhya and Yoga are both mentioned by name, some Buddhist terminology is used and a variety of views on the nature of the sacrifice is presented in the text ¹⁷. To further complicate matters the Gītā is pervaded with the doctrine of bhakti and the idea of Kṛṣṇa as a personal god. Thus the Gītā is potentially, if not actually, a synthesis of religious and philosophical ideas, a synthesis which must have reflected the religious and philosophical milieu in North at the time it was composed. I will attempt to show that

^{17.} Sārikhya and Yoga are both mentioned at *Bhg.* 2, 39; 3, 3; and 5, 4. The terminology occurring in the second half of chapter 2 of the Gītā shows distinct Buddhist influence.

the Ḡtā does not intend to reconcile all of the diverse and often opposed ideas it draws into the synthesis. Rather it attempts to reconcile two fundamentally opposed world-views which underlie this diversity. It does this by modifying each of them with elements of the other and then by subsuming them to a third world-view, based on the doctrine of bhakti.

The two opposed world-views are basically religious and are described in a variety of ways in the Gītā. The first one, which is equivalent to Brāhmanical orthodoxy, is centred on the role of the brāhmana householder 18. He performs specific rituals — the pancayajña — which embody the sum of the symbiotic relationships which govern the actions of all beings in the triple world except for renouncers. The householder lives in a world dominated by hierarchy and the necessity of the performance of actions (karma). The second view of the world is centred on renunciation and asceticism. It is virtually the reverse of the former. The renouncer lives in isolation or in an asrama, well beyond the limits of the village, in the forest which in India is a symbol of chaos and disorder 19. Since the renouncer performs no external sacrifice, he does not participate in the set of relationships upon which existence in the three worlds is based. Above all he ceases to engage in intentional actions, attempting to quell desire in order to obtain moksa, a state beyond categories of time and space.

Buddhist and Hindu texts from the Upanisads onwards give ample evidence of the tensions between these two world-views and the sets of values implied by them ²⁰. These tensions certainly existed on the religious and sociological level. On the religious level, the renouncers attacked Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy on the grounds that it was based on action. Action led to rebirth and continuation in samsāra. On the level of society the existence of a large body of ascetics with their stress on renunciation of society and social values was a threat to those at the top of the social hierarchy, that is, the brāhmaṇas, in whom the whole values of society were embodied. Whether the tensions also existed on the political level is difficult to say. Politics in this context means patronage and it is well known that many Indian kings from the time of Aśoka onwards patronised both Brāhmaṇical and ascetic groups, or one and not the other. Perhaps jealousies did arise from political patronage,

^{18.} This world-view is often designated by the term pravṛtti. This word occurs with this meaning in the Gītā at 16, 7 and 18, 30. Sankara's commentary on 18, 30, gives an excellent brief definition of this term and of its opposite, nivṛtti: pravṛttiḥ pravartanaṃ bandhuhetuḥ karmamārgaḥ śāstravihitaviṣayaḥ / nivṛttiḥ mokṣahetuḥ saṃnyāsamārgaḥ //.

^{19.} On the distinction between village and forest in the *Brāhamaṇas*, see C. Ma-LAMOUD, Village et forêt dans l'idéologie de L'Inde brāhmaṇique, in « Archives Européen de Sociologie », 17 (1976), pp. 3-20.

^{20.} A small selection of texts illustrating these tensions is given by P. S. Jaini, Srāmaṇas: Their Conflict with Brahmanical Society, in J. W. Elder, ed., Chapters in Indian Civilization, 2 vols. (Dubuque, 1970), vol. 1, pp. 41-81.

but whether the jealousies were connected with the social and religious tensions I have just mentioned is difficult to say 21.

It seems that the problem for the composer of the Gītā was to retain the popularity of Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy which guaranteed the *brāhmaṇas* a privileged position in society, and at the same time to introduce ascetic values into this ortodoxy. By doing this, the threat to Brāhmanical orthodoxy made by the renouncers would be lessened because the views of the renouncers would become part of orthodoxy. In this sense Kosambi's view that the Gītā was to be used to ensure the continuity of the status of *brāhmaṇas* in a period when social political and certainly religious conditions were in transition is true.

Almost the entirety of the third chapter of the $G\bar{\imath}t\bar{a}$ is a statement of Brāhmanical orthodoxy. The verses 3, 10-14, contain in a nutshell the theory of the sacrifice which is at the heart of Brāhmanical orthodoxy 22 . Men perform sacrifices to the gods, the sacrificial offerings being the food of the gods. In return for such offering the gods will fertilize the earth with rain. The sacrifice itself is karma, « ritual action ». Thus the call given in this chapter of the $G\bar{\imath}t\bar{a}$ is indeed a call for action. Several other arguments as to why people should act are also given in this chapter.

The Gītā's support for Brāhmanical orthodoxy is apparent for reasons other than its call for action. The nature of society it condones is that considered normative by the Dharmaśāstras and the didactic portions of the epics and Purāṇas. In this society, the *brāhmaṇas*, at least in theory, are accorded the top position. The Gītā echoes this supremacy in a few of its verses and is certainly in favour of it. This is obvious from the following passage:

« For, O Pārtha, [anyone] who has had recourse to me, even those who might be born from evil, and women, vaisyas and śūdras; even they go the highest refuge. How much more meritorious brāhmaṇas and devoted royal seers! Having come to this world which is impermanent and devoid of happiness, you should be devoted to me » ²³.

Cf. 17, 14.

^{21.} There are many examples in India of religious intolerance meted out by kings. For some examples see L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Dynasties et Histoire de L'Inde depuis Kanishka jusqu'aux invasions Musulmanes, Paris, 1935, pp. 333-37. It would be interesting to see if any of these bouts of intolerance reflect the tension between brāhmaṇa and ascetic. More research is needed on the general topic of political patronage for religious groups in India. The best primary source is epigraphy.

^{22.} Čf. the passages from the Brāhmaņas cited by S. Lévi, La doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brāhmaṇas, Paris, 1898; reprint, 1966, p. 81.

^{23.} Bhg. 9, 32-33.
mām hi pārtha vyapāśritya ye 'pi syuh pāpayonayah / striyo vaiśyāstathā śūdrāste 'pi yānti parām gatim // kim punarbrāhmanāh punyā bhaktā rājarşayastathā / anityamasukham lokamimam prāpya bhajasva mām // cc.

Also relevant in this connection is the standard description of the varnas and their functions given in the eighteenth chapter of the Ḡtā ²⁴. This description occurs verbatim in most of the Dharmasāstras and the fact that the Ḡtā contains it shows the importance with which it regards the varna organization of society.

The notion of Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy depicted in the Gītā is not the same as that found in the epics and Dharmasāstras. The Gītā modified it in order to bring it closer to the ascetic world-view. This modification is most striking and destructive in those passages where Vedic learning — so symbolic of Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy — comes under attack. Such a passage is the following:

« O Pārtha, those undiscerning ones who delight in the Vedas say that, "There is nothing else". Their selves are desire and their goal is heaven. They speak that flowery speech about obtaining lordly power with many excellent rites which give rebirth as the fruit of actions » ²⁵.

This might appear to be an attack on the Vedas, but it is really an attack on desire $(k\bar{a}m\bar{a})$ as the factor which motivates men to act. The only other place in the Ḡtā where those who follow the Vedas are attacked also contains a reference to desire ²⁶. Here, desire is directly linked to *karma* and rebirth on earth following a rebirth in heaven. In general the Ḡtā takes a very negative view of desire, because ultimately it is desire that is the cause of rebirth.

This view of desire stands in contrast with many passages in the epics and Purāṇas where fulfillment of desire is held to be a legitimate activity and where $k\bar{a}m\bar{a}$, together with dharma and artha, is considered one of the legitimate aims of life for the twice-born. The Ḡtā stance against $k\bar{a}m\bar{a}$ is inherited from Buddhism and Jainism, as well as from the speculative (non-ritualistic portions of the Upaniṣads, where the sacrifice is attacked on the grounds that its performance is impelled by desire. All the ascetic traditions held that desire was the chief cause of action, and, therefore, of rebirth. In condemning desire, the composer of the Ḡtā is attempting to assimilate aspects of the ascetic world-view into Brāhmanical orthodoxy.

The Gītā attempts to reconcile the conflict between Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy and the ascetic world views only on the theoretical level. It does this by bringing certain ascetic doctrines into the interior of Brāh-

^{24.} Bhg. 18, 41-44.

^{25.} Bhg. 2, 42-43. yāmimām puṣpitām vācam pravadantyavipaścitaḥ / vedavādaratāḥ pārtha nānyadastīti vādinaḥ // kāmātmānāḥ svargaparā janmakarmaphalapradām / kriyāviśeṣabahulām bhogaiśvaryagatim prati // 26. Bhg. 9, 20-21. Cf. 3, 37, where kāmā itself is attacked.

manical orthodoxy. The product of this reconciliation is the doctrine of karmayoga. This term could be said to have replaced pravrtti dharma as the term used to designate Brāhmanical orthodoxy and the values associated with it. However, there is one fundamental difference between the assumptions lying beneath the two terms ²⁷. This difference is expressed in the notion of karmaphalatyāga, « abandonment (or - giving up) of the fruits of action », a notion which is central to the doctrine of karmayoga, but which is absent from pravrttidharma ²⁸. The most important consequence of acting and at the same time of abandoning the fruits or results of those actions, is that the motivation for action is not desire. It is svadharma, the functions expected to be performed by someone by virtue of belonging to a particular varna. In effect, desire is negated. The negation of desire was one of the cardinal doctrine of all the ascetic traditions.

The notion of karmaphalatyāga as it is developed in the Gītā has implications wider than those arising from its association with ascetic values. When this notion was brought into conjunction with the doctrine of bhakti, it was simultaneously able to express ritualist as well as ascetic values. The concept of « abandonment, renunciation, giving up », designated by derivatives of the root tyāj, was a central part of the ritual, as Biardeau has noted: « It remains that, to give — in a general way, and to give to a brāhmana, who alone is entitled to receive — is part of a sacrifice; that already the sacrifice is conceived of as the abandonment of something. Whilst giving the victim to be sacrificed, the sacrificer pronounces the word tyajāmi, "I abandon, I give". The classical theoreticians, the Mīmāmsakas, make of tyāga, the abandon or the gift, the central act of the sacrificial rite » 29. It is not clear in the Gītā whether words deriving from tyai are used to refer to the giving or offering of the fruits of actions to God 30. Usually such words are employed only to designate the renunciation of the fruits of actions or renunciation of

^{27.} Similarly, in the Gītā, jñānayoga is really a new term for nivṛttidharma. Jñānayoga too, represents a modification of nivṛttidharma, because ultimately God is the «object» of jñāna, not the ātman.

^{28.} This compound is used at *Bhg.* 12, 11-12; 18, 2; 18, 11. Cf. 4, 20; 5, 12; 2, 51; 18, 9.

^{29.} M. BIARDEAU and C. MALAMOUD, Le Sacrifice Dans l'Inde Ancienne, Paris, 1976, p. 48.

^{30.} Perhaps derivatives of *tyaj* are used in the ritualist sense at *Bhg.* 4, 9; 8, 13. The former reads as follows: «Thus, having abandoned his body, who ever knows my divine birth and my divine [way of] action as they really are, will not come to rebirth; he will come to me, O Arjuna».

janma karma ca me divyamevam yo vetti tattvatah / tyaktvā deham punarjanma naiti māmeti so 'rjuna //

In the Soma sacrifice, the sacrificer abandons his mortal body (in the $dik s\bar{a}$ and symbolically through the victim) in order to go to heaven where he communicates with the gods and acquires an immortal body. He no longer experiences repeated death (punarmṛtyu). The terminology in this $G\bar{t}t\bar{a}$ passage is similar to that used in the $Br\bar{a}hmanas$, but the religious context here is bhakti.

attachment to the fruits of actions. It is, however, possible that the ritual sense of the word may be present even when the situation in which it is used indicates that it means « to renounce ». Frequently it is stated in the $G\bar{t}t\bar{a}$ that the fruits of action that have been renounced can be regarded as an offering to God. This would conform to the ritual sense of tyakta. It is said that one should give up (samnyasya) all actions to God, or, after having renounced $(tyaktv\bar{a})$ attachment and having given $(\bar{a}/dh\bar{a})$ actions to Brahman (i.e. God), one will attain moksa 31. What is renounced is sacrificed. Renunciation and sacrifice are identical.

This identification could be made possible only if renunciation and sacrifice were seen to serve a common goal. Such a goal exists in the Gītā as a god, Kṛṣṇa, who demands devotion (bhakti) from his devotees, and in return allows them to participate in his being. Renunciation and sacrifice become expressions of devotion. As such they could retain their individuality as separate paths of devotion leading to God, each being considered in its own way as a form of bhakti. Or, they could be identified in the manner suggested above and still be considered as bhakti. Alternatively, along with bhaktiyoga they could be considered as three separate but overlapping pathways to God. This alternative is succintly expressed in Bhg. 9, 34:

« Let your mind be on Me ($madman\bar{a}$)! Be devoted to me (madbhakta)! Be a sacrificer for Me ($mady\bar{a}j\bar{\imath}$)! Make obeisance to Me! Be wholly intent upon Me! Thus, having harnessed your self, you will certainly come to Me » 32 .

In this śloka the ascetic world-view represented by the term $madman\bar{a}$ and Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy represented by the term $mady\bar{a}j\bar{i}$ are brought together under the doctrine of devotion (madbhakta). The reconciliation is successful because each path retains its individuality, but leads to enlightenment in the sense of participation in God's being.

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From the above analysis it can be concluded that at least one of the Gītā's important tasks was to bring about an end to a conflict between two opposed world-views and their respective value systems. The Gītā produced a modification of these world-views and an assimilation of ascetic values into Brāhmanical orthodoxy. Ultimately, both world-views and the « paths to liberation » which they advocated were

^{31.} Bhg. 12, 6; 5, 10.

^{32.} Bhg. 9, 34; 18, 65.

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subsumed under *bhakti*. The success of *bhakti* as a religious innovation, if not a religious revolution, guaranteed the success of this reconciliation.

Contrary to Kosambi's view, the intensity with which the Gītā deals with the problem does suggest that it was composed at a time when it was indeed necessary. Kosambi does not take sufficient account of the religious factors shaping the Gītā and the fact that it was perceived by so many as fundamentally a religious text. However, he is right to say that it was used by the *brāhmaṇas* to retain a dominant position in society. This was done in two ways. Firstly, by short-circuiting the attacks of the ascetic groups on Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy. Secondly, through the *brāhmaṇas* placing their ideology into the mouth of the important new non-aryan god, Kṛṣṇa, and their adoption of *bhakti*, itself probably an importation from South India and popular amongst the lower classes of society ³³.

Traditionally in India, the $br\bar{a}hmanas$ have managed to extend their cultural and intellectual hegemony in times of change by re-working what might have originally been oral literature enjoying wide currency amongst the lower classes of society and the non-aryan groups. The original versions of the Mbh. and the Purāṇas would fit this category. All of these texts were substantially re-worked to bring them into accord with Brāhmanical orthodoxy. The Bhg. was an original composition, probably not a re-worked version of an earlier work. It assimilated important new movements — both cultic and ideological — in Indian religious history into Brāhmanical orthodoxy without doing great damage to that orthodoxy. In this sense the Bhg. mirrors Indian cultural history which has long been noted for its capacity to assimilate elements foreign to it and to become considerably enriched through them.

^{33.} On the South Indian origin of *bhakti*, see A.M. ESNOUL, *Le courant affectif à l'intérieur du Brahmanism*, in « Bulletin de l'Ecole française de l'Extrême Orient », 48 (1954), pp. 155-56; G.L. HART, *The Poems of Ancient Tamil*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975, pp. 29-31.