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CAUSALITY AND THE METHOD
OF CONNECTING CONCEPTS IN THE UPANIṢADS

Every philosophical approach implies some method of arranging and evaluating those concepts by means of which the universe is comprehended. When a philosophical question concerning the mutual relations of individual matters is to be asked, this question seems, sooner or later, to be formulated in terms of causality, viz. as the question: « What is the cause of this? ». Causality is one of the inevitable thought patterns that outline the reality, and this causality may be analysed in many ways. In the minds of western thinkers, however, causality mostly implies a genetic relation and also a time relation between the concepts involved.

What about the idea of causality held by the Indian philosophers? Is their basic understanding of causal relations really similar to that of the occidental scholars? My intention here is simply to remind the reader of the danger of presupposing such a similarity, especially since causality forms a fundamental and, at the same time, a complex notion.

The general importance of the idea of causality to Indian thinkers appears already from the great variety of words for « cause ». Furthermore, it is evident that the Buddhist logicians are constantly aware of causality, that likewise the Hindu philosophers in general are concerned with *sat-* or *asatkārya*¹, and that causality plays an important role in Nyāya epistemology². I would venture the statement, however, that, at least in the older philosophical texts of India, questions are asked not so much about the cause of things as about their location. Instead of

1. In the classical, philosophical discussions of India, these issues are closely connected with the idea of causality, as described by R. V. JOSHI, *The role of Indian logic in the doctrine of causality*, in « Mélanges d'Indianisme à la mémoire de L. Renou », Paris, 1968, pp. 403-13.

2. To Nyāya, causality is basic in the inferential process, cf. D. H. H. INGALLS, *Materials for the Study of Navyanyāya Logic*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 30 ff.

the relation of time between cause and effect, it is primarily the relation of their positions that is observed. Nor can genesis be particularly fundamental in a universe in which everything has in itself an existence, although not continuously manifest, and in which everything is reborn over and over again. Furthermore, I wish to suggest that to the Indian mind the items of any relation, including the causal one, are basically not perceived as discrete and isolated entities.

Now, if we assume that causality is an inevitable thought pattern whenever the human mind tries to organize the universe, we may, perhaps, also admit that, when, in old texts, we cannot find an expressed idea of causality³, something else may be present that makes up for it or even foreshadows a developed notion of it. It is, of course, a very difficult and dangerous matter to trace abstract notions back to the stage in which they appear only *in nuce*, but in the Indian philosophy the position of the oldest Upaniṣads may allow of this adventure.

In giving prominence to the Upaniṣadic texts when discussing causality, I shall here concentrate on the causal relations between nominally expressed concepts and leave aside the results due to acts. In the original Indian texts on grammar and ontology, the effect of an act seems to be apprehended in its pragmatic particularity rather than as a product of any general law of causality. Furthermore, when the act is expressed in an individual sentence, the idea of *karṣ* predominates over all other *kāraṅas*; thus, other causes of an act are regarded as secondary. Of course, such verbs as $\sqrt{\text{jan}}$ and $\sqrt{\text{kr}}$ ⁴ must necessarily be considered in an extended discussion about causality; these verbs can be referred to an original connection with the idea of causality in the Vedic myth about how Prajāpati begot the world and to the Vedic ideas about sacrificial results (*phala*), respectively, and they lead directly to such fundamental concepts of Indian religion as *utpatti* and *karman*⁵.

At this point, I must dwell for a moment on the basic patterns of the Upaniṣadic teaching. The interpreters of the word *upaniṣad* (and also of the parallel word *upāsana*) have always laid stress on the meaning of putting together two concepts in order to identify them or, more cautiously, in order to equate them with each other. To these equations, authors have ascribed either a ritual (Oldenberg)⁶, a secret (Deussen)⁷,

3. Such words as *kāraṅa*, *karāṅa* and *nimitta* are not to be found in the oldest Upaniṣads; like many other philosophical terms, they first occur in the SvetU.

4. $\sqrt{\text{kr}}$ has its special importance in this case, since it is the source of the classically established terms for instrument (*karāṅa*), cause (*kāraṅa*) and effect (*kārya*).

5. Renou even claims that the developed, causal thinking of Buddhism is due to the acceptance of the idea of *karman*; cf. p. 55 in L. RENOÜ, «*Connexion*» en védique, «*cause*» en bouddhique, in «*Kunhan Raja Presentation Volume*», Madras, 1946, pp. 55-60.

6. H. OLDENBERG, *Vedische Untersuchungen*, 6. *Upaniṣad*, in ZDMG, 50 (1896), pp. 457-62, and *Vedische Untersuchungen*, 9. *Upaniṣad*, in ZDMG, 54 (1900), pp. 70-8.

7. P. DEUSSEN, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Bd 1, Abt. 2, *Die Philosophie der Upaniṣad's*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 14 ff.

a magic (Schayer)⁸, a meditative (Strauss)⁹ or a cognitional (Senart)¹⁰ nature. Alternatively, these equations may be considered in the light of the fundamentally Indian *ādeśa* method (Thieme)¹¹; this seems in fact rather to provide for the act of *upāsana*, in which there is not only an emphasis on the two concepts as one and the same but also some kind of ranking of them. There is, anyhow, another aspect of equal importance that should not be forgotten, and this aspect is hinted at by the word « système » in the description by Renou¹² of the Upaniṣadic thought as « un système d'équations ». An individual equation practically always forms part of a chain of several, other, similar equations. These chains are formally of various structures, since they may be, for example, parallel, symmetric or just serial (*kramataḥ*). But my contention is that, in addition, an original and common factor is observable in the relations between the concepts of the Upaniṣadic series of equations or substitutions, a factor which may, among other things, be apt to serve the same purpose as do the expressed, causal relations in later texts.

The serial ranging of equated concepts is directly inherited in the methods of Vedānta as series of identifications, all heading for the great, final one, the identification with *ātman*. The impact of the Upaniṣadic pattern of serial thinking is also apparent in the methods of Sāṃkhya and Buddhism; the general idea of serial arrangement appears in their methods in what Renou calls « la génétique » of Sāṃkhya and « les combinaisons causales » of Buddhism¹³. In his article of 1946¹⁴, Renou has drawn some very convincing conclusions from the semantic shifts of some key-words (such as *upaniṣad*, Pāli *upaniṣā*; *nidāna*), in order to associate what he calls « connexion en védique » with « cause en bouddhique ».

Now, in order to get hold of the factor, mentioned above, which may replace causality and, so to speak, plays a vicarious role in relation to causality in the old Upaniṣads, we may take a closer look at the suggestive seventh prapāṭhaka of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. The intention of the following arrangement of the main concepts of this section is to delineate the main line of thought in the passage.

8. S. SCHAYER, *Die Struktur der magischen Weltanschauung nach dem Atharva-veda und den Brāhmaṇa-Texten*, München, 1925.

9. O. STRAUSS, *Udgīthavidyā*, in « SB der preuss. Akad. der Wiss., Philos.-hist. Klasse », 1931, pp. 243-310. See p. 249 f.; according to Strauss, *upaniṣad* is the *vidyā* and *upāsana* is the meditation by Śaṅkara. Cf. also J. PRZYLUŚKI & E. LAMOTTE, *Bouddhisme et upaniṣad*, in BEFEO, 1932, pp. 141-69.

10. E. SENART, *Upās-upaniṣad*, in « Florilegium... à... Melchior de Vogüé », Paris, 1909, pp. 575-87. Senart is followed by M. FALK, *Upāsana et upaniṣad*, in RO, 13 (1937), pp. 129-58.

11. P. THIEME, *Ādeśa*, in « Mélanges d'Indianisme à la mémoire de L. Renou », Paris, 1968, pp. 715-23.

12. L. RENOUE, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 55. Renou, however, stresses the contrast between the Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya methods.

14. L. RENOUE, *op. cit.*; cf. above, footnote 5.

nāman
vāc
manas
saṅkalpa
citta
dhyāna
vijñāna

bala
anna
āpas
tejas
ākāśa

(cf. ChU 6)

smara
āśā
prāṇa

bhūyas
upa√ās
yathākāmacāro bhavati

ativādin

satya
vijñāna
matī
śraddhā
ni(h)ṣṭhā
kṛti
sukha =

yadā... atha
vi√jñā

bhūman
| |
aham ātman

In this section, Nārada is learning from Sanatkumāra that one concept in turn is in some sense greater (*bhūyas*) than another in a chain of 15 concepts, which finally end in *prāṇa*. These concepts, however, are surpassed by seven additional concepts, which have been arranged, not by means of the expression of *bhūyas*, but by means of a temporal or rather conditional *yadā* (for example, 7, 17 *yadā vai vijñānāti atha satyaṃ vadati*, « when somebody knows, he speaks *satyaṃ* »). The final end, *bhūman*, leads us to *aham* and *ātman*.

The word *bhūman*, of course, formally reproduces the word *bhūyas*, which was repeated in 14 cases in the former part of the series. The initial 15 concepts are connected also by the act of *upa√ās* (for example, 7, 1, 5 *yo nāma brahmety upāste*, « he who makes the *upāsana*: " *nāman*

is brahman" »), and each one of them yields a result, viz. *yathākāmacāra*, freedom to do as you wish in the realm of the actual concept (for example, 7, 1, 5 *yāvan nāmno gataṃ tatrāsya yathākāmacāro bhavati*, « as far as concerns *nāman*, there his wish will be fulfilled »). This notion of freedom ends in the final description of an *ātma* as *tasya sarveṣu lokeṣu kāmacāro bhavati* (7, 25, 2 « his wish will be fulfilled in all the worlds »). The formula of *kāmacāra* has also given A. Kunst occasion to discuss this whole *prapāṭhaka* in the light of determinism v. indeterminism¹⁵. In this paper, Kunst does not so much recognize the idea of causality in the picture given of the structure of the universe in this seventh *prapāṭhaka* as in the relation between the « creational phenomena »¹⁶ and the human acting, viz. the *upāsana*. As I pointed out above, this is a causality in terms of individuals; as in any possible, morally satisfactory, religious situation, the phenomena are postulates rather than causes of action and their importance is anyhow abolished in the final, optimal, religious idea, in this case, in *bhūman*.

In the former part of the chain discussed here, the individual concepts are not arranged in a cosmic (*adhīdevatam*) and a psychic (*adhyātmanam*) order, the common distribution used elsewhere in the Upaniṣads. The procedure of successive inclusion, however, is here logically satisfactory only if we regard each concept of the chain — both the usually psychic and the cosmic ones — as general, collective and logically objective¹⁷, not as individual and logically subjective concepts, no matter how exclusively personal or psychic such phenomena as, for example, *dhyāna* (Senart « réflexion ») or *smara* (Senart « mémoire ») may seem to us. There is probably an *indriyaviṣayābheda* and, in fact, all the matters in the former part of the chain are objects of the act of *upāsana* and of the recognition, but they are not qualities or means of the *upāsaka*. If it is possible to interpret also the psychic functions as objects of independent existence — in the same way as Senart actually does when he translates *vijñāna* as « la science » — this would facilitate the understanding of certain difficult concepts in this context, for example, the concept of *saṅkalpa*, as well as the original combination of *smara/āśā/prāṇa*¹⁸.

The second part of the chain is formally of a different character. The last seven concepts are not connected by the act of *upa√ās* but by another act, expressed by the verb *vi√jñā* (for example, 7, 16, 1

15. A. KUNST, *Indeterminism versus determinism: the seventh prapāṭhaka of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, in JRS, 1976, pp. 67-72.

16. A. KUNST, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

17. Cf., for example, how *bhaya* originally signified both « the fear » and « the danger ».

18. This first part of the chain is repeated in 7, 26, 1; the only real difference there is an odd interpolation between *anna* and *āpas*, viz. *āvīrbhāvatirobhāvau*. The most probable explanation is that this is meant to gloss *āpas*, in good agreement with *mūrtās* in 7, 10, 1.

satyaṃ tv eva vijñāsitavyam, « *satyam* ought to be known »). There is also the shift from *bhūyas* to *yadā*, mentioned above, which in fact implies a shift from purely nominal entities connected in *upa√ās* to entities that are expressed verbally as well as nominally. In 7, 18, for example, is found the verbal form *manute*, together with the noun *mati*. Thus, this latter part of the chain differs by bringing out virtually individual and psychic concepts, a difference from the former part, by the way, which may explain the two occurrences of the concept of *vijñāna* in the chain.

Certain, different groups of concepts are inserted in both the main parts of the chain. Ruben¹⁹ calls the author « ein Kompilator »; Morgenroth²⁰ shows that the series consisting of *bala/anna/āpas/tejas/ākāśa* is an interpolation. There is, in fact, a close connection between the concept of *vijñāna*, which is located before this group, and the concept of *smara*, which follows it. I would also like to point out that, of these five concepts, the three middle ones — *tejas/āpas/anna* — form the special theme of the preceding prapāthaka (no. 6). Furthermore, the ending of the first series in *prāṇa* is one of several traces of an important, independent pre-Upaniṣadic *prāṇavidyā*²¹, such as can be seen in the older Upaniṣads.

In the second main part of the chain, the one connected with *vi√jñā*, there has also been incorporated a set of terms associated with ritual action, viz. *śraddhā/ni(h)ṣṭhā/kr̥ti*. Perhaps even the preceding word *mati* may have its Vedic sense of « devotional thought ». In this context, which suggests the preparation and performance of sacrifice, the final *sukham* in the phrase *sukhaṃ labhate* may actually hint at the result of the ritual act, i.e. a *phala*. But the essential sense given to *sukham* in this passage is likely to have been a metaphysical one. When wordly things which may be gained through the Vedic sacrifice are mentioned explicitly in the following khaṇḍa 24 (*gośvam iha mahimety ācakṣate hastihiraṇyaṃ dāsabhāryaṃ kṣetrāṇy āyatanānīti*), this mention of them may be an extension of the association with sacrificial rites in this second part of the chain. The main point here, however, is that the ritual procedure is finally reflected, and *sukham*, although still something desirable, can no longer be identified with a ritual *phala*. For the time being, I shall not further discuss the compositional nature of this series, because it is true that the chain of concepts is built up of certain, various pieces, but it is also true that they have been combined smoothly and in a very coherent way. As it stands, the whole is « nur eine Lehre »²², as Morgenroth puts it. Ultimately, the homogeneity is clear from the final

19. W. RUBEN, *Beginn der Philosophie in Indien*, Berlin, 1961³, p. 311 f.

20. W. MORGENROTH, *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (Duplicated diss.), Jena, 1958, p. 423 ff.

21. E. FRAUWALLNER, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, I, Salzburg, 1953, p. 55 ff.

22. W. MORGENROTH, *op. cit.*, p. 423.

identifications of *bhūman* with the two aspects of *aḥam/ātman*, which Śaṅkara, of course, interprets in terms of *jīva/paramātman*²³.

The two main parts of the chain are linked together by the crucial expression *ativādin*. This word seems to give a clear indication of the basic relation between all the concepts involved. It is also this idea which leads us from the picture of a universe in the former part of the chain to the presentation of methods of knowledge in the latter part. It is said that, if it is asked whether in your observation of *prāṇa* you are an *ativādin*, you should recognize this, because *eṣa tu vātivadati yaḥ satyenātivadatīti*. This word *ativādin* (in 7, 15, 4, formed on *ativāda*) in this passage has, without exception, been interpreted by western translators as referring to somebody who talks too much or to somebody who wins in a sophistical dispute. The interpretation of the verb *ativadati* (following in 7, 16, 1) has also been adapted to these points of view. However, here it seems necessary to avoid any pejorative nuance of the word. The idea should be compared with its use in MuṇḍU 3, 1, 4²⁴ and with the interpretation given by Śaṅkara to this passage²⁵. My suggestion is that the *ativādin* is the person who proceeds and goes on talking, each time about still greater things²⁶. And even if *prāṇa* is in some respect the final point to be reached (in the setting of Śaṅkara *sarveśvara*)²⁷ in the search for *ātman*, you may go on talking about things beyond the *prāṇa* (such things as, according to Śaṅkara, belong to *paramārtha*). The method of *ativadati* is not closed by *prāṇa*, since this method of including one thing in another is also the method of *satyam*.

The central concept of the entire passage, is *bhūman*, and this provides the final point of any knowledge, as well as of any object of knowledge. From a formal point of view, it forms, so to speak, the goal of every preceding *bhūyas*. In order to understand this very important concept, we must consider khaṇḍas 23-24 of the prapāthaka:

*yo vai bhūmā tat sukham /
nālpe sukham asti bhūmaiva sukham /*

23. ChUBh 7, 25, 1-2.

24. MuṇḍU 3, 1, 4, *prāṇo hy eṣa yaḥ sarvabhūtair vibhātī vijānan vidvān bhavate nātivādī*. This instance is quite compatible with the present passage from ChU in the sense of « he who talks about things beyond this ».

25. ChUBh and BSBh 1, 3, 8-9. The main discussion in BSBh concerns the questions whether *bhūman* is *prāṇa* or *paramātman* and whether through *ativāda* one passes beyond *prāṇa*. In fact, there seems to be an interesting relation to be investigated between *prāṇa* and *ativādin*.

26. Śaṅkara MuṇḍUBh 3, 1, 4, *atītya sarvān anyān vaditum śīlam asya ity ativādi*. Cf. also *ativāpṛch*, BĀU 3, 6, 1. This parallel was pointed out to me by Prof. A. Wezler, who also reminded me of the possible connection of these verbs with the procedure of *brahmodya*.

27. ChUBh 7, 15, 4, *yat prāṇaṃ sarveśvaram ayam aḥam asmīty ātmatvenopagataḥ*. On 7, 15, 1, he talks about *prāṇa*: *yaś ca maharājasyeva sarvādhikāriśvarasya and yas tu cchāyevānugata īśvaram*.

bhūmā tv eva vijijñāsītavya iti /
bhūmānaṃ bhagavo vijijñāsa iti // 23 //
yatra nānyat paśyati nānyac chr̥ṇoti nānyad vijānāti sa bhūmā /
atha yatrānyat paśyaty anyac chr̥ṇoty anyad vijānāti tad alpam /
yo vai bhūmā tad amṛtam atha yad alpam tan martyam iti /
sa bhagavaḥ kasmīn pratiṣṭhita iti sve mahimnī yadi vā nā
mahimnīti //
goaśvam iha mahimety ācakṣate hastihiraṇyaṃ dāsabhāryaṃ
kṣetrāṇy āyatanānīti /
nāham evaṃ bravīmīti hovācānyo hy anyasmin pratiṣṭhita iti // 24 //

The word *bhūmán* in its oxytone form with masculine gender is of rare occurrence; at the most, it appears four times in the RV²⁸, but two of these passages are held to be disputable²⁹. In the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads, *bhūmán* seems to be a more or less artificially used word. In the Upaniṣads, apart from the present passage, it occurs twice, i.e. in the ChU once more³⁰ and in the late MuktiKāU³¹; the latter passage, however, is an obvious reference to the present passage from the ChU. It is virtually this passage from the ChU 7, 23, which promotes and codifies the word³².

This word, *bhūmán*, demonstrates very convincingly how essential it is for the interpreters to make use of two possible approaches to the central vocabulary of early Sanskrit texts. We may use as one instrument the comparative, etymological procedure and refer the word *bhūmán* to the root $\sqrt{bhū}$ with the oxytone variant of the suffix *-mán*, by which process we arrive at the conclusion that the word represents an early, abstract formation and probably signifies the world in its totality. From this point of view, the word *bhūmán* may correspond to the Vedic concept of *sat* and, in the course of development, to *satyam*, according to the analysis of these concepts made by van Buitenen³³. When such a *bhūmán* is said not to reside in anything else, this idea may even be a reflection of the *nāsādīya* debate, originating from RV 10, 129. In Uddā-laka's instruction, as it is rendered in ChU 6, 2, it is expressly said that *sat* is the only primary and cannot arise from *asat*. Now, the present

28. RV 1, 110, 2; 10, 82, 4; 10, 98, 12; 10, 149, 3.

29. C. WENNERBERG, *Die altindischen Nominalsuffixe -man- und -iman- in historisch-komparativer Beleuchtung*, I, Göteborg, 1981, p. 144, footnote 1.

30. ChU 1, 5, 4, *prāṇāṃs tvam bhūmānam abhigāyatāt bahavo vai te bhaviṣyantīti*.

31. MuktiU 2, 74, *purāś tiraś corāhvam adhaś ca sarvataḥ supūrṇabhūmāhamītiha bhāvaya*.

32. The most emphatic discussion of *bhūman*, showing its importance in Vedānta, is to be found in BSBh 1, 3, 8-9; cf. P. DEUSSEN, *Das System des Vedānta*, Leipzig, 1906², pp. 216-20.

33. J. A. B. VAN BUITENEN, *The speculations on the name « satyam » in the Upaniṣads*, in « Studies in Indian Linguistics. Festschrift... M. B. Emeneau », Poona and Annamalainagar, 1968, pp. 54-61.

passage, in which nothing is pointed out beyond *bhūmán*, seems to me to have a similar status.

So much for the etymology. The use of the second instrument involves a careful consideration of the traditional, Indian interpretation of the word *bhūmán*. As early as some Vedic and Brāhmaṇa passages, the words *bhūri* and *bhūyas* are brought together with *bahu*³⁴, and a similar connection, as regards *bhūmán*, is also made in ChU 1, 5, 4³⁵. Probably this means that Pāṇini was relying on a well-known tradition when he devoted a special sūtra (no. 6, 4, 158)³⁶ to *bhūyīṣṭha*, *bhūyas* and *bhūmán* and constructed these words from *bahu* and taddhita suffixes. Furthermore, it is precisely this tradition³⁷ that justifies in an obvious way the contrasting of *bhūman* and *alpa* under discussion. This example shows how indispensable is a profound knowledge of Indian methods of interpretation.

The 24th khaṇḍa of the seventh prapāṭhaka also contains accurate definitions of *bhūman* and *alpam* (cf. the quotation given above). *bhūman* is here defined by means of *na anyat* and *amṛtam*, and *alpam* by means of *anyat* and *martyam*³⁸. I am not so much concerned with the very easy transition to *ātman* made possible by these definitions. Instead, I shall discuss the final phrase of this khaṇḍa, which runs: *anyo hy anyasmīn pratiṣṭhita iti*. These words deny the possibility of even asking where *bhūman* resides; as a matter of fact, nothing bigger than *bhūman* exists, nothing else with its own distinct features which could enclose the *bhūman*. There is no *mahimān* — « expansion », as Kunst translates it³⁹ — of *bhūman*. This idea seems finally to establish the nature of the universe. In fact, every single concept seems to be defined by some *pratiṣṭhā* and, in connection with this, the importance of the *loka* concept must be emphasized. This is a concept which recurs at nearly every stage in the whole chain, as, for example, in 7, 1, 5 *yāvan nāmno gatam*; in some other khaṇḍas (7, 4; 7, 5, etc.), it is expressed by the phrase *lokān... abhisidhyati*, « he obtains such and such worlds ». Every single

34. J. WACKERNAGEL & A. DEBRUNNER, *Altindische Grammatik*, II: 2, Göttingen, 1954, pp. 450, 754 ff. and 859.

35. Cf. above, footnote 30.

36. *bahor lopo bhū ca bahoh*. The sūtra gives this procedure: (a) *-iṣṭha*, *-iman*, *-iyas* after *bahu* > *-ṣṭha*, *-man*, *-yas*, (b) *bahu* > *bhū*. Cf. also P. 5, 1, 122, on *-imān* after, *inter alia*, *bahu* in the sense of *tasya bhāvas* (5, 1, 119); P. hereby puts such words in the same group as the developed, abstract, *taddhita* formations of nominal words made by means of *-tva* and *-tā*.

37. In view of this tradition, Pāṇini could obviously not have made any other « derivation » of the word, such as C. Wennerberg hints at (*op. cit.*, p. 144, footnote 3).

38. This passage may reflect one of the more dubious occurrences of *bhūmán* in the RV, viz. 10, 149, 3, and thus this instance of the word is perhaps not so dubious after all, at least not to the Indian interpreters. The stanza in the RV runs: *paścédām anyād abhavad yājatram amartyasya bhūvanasya bhūnā / suparṇo aṅgā savitūr garūtmān pārvo jātāḥ sā u asyānu dhārma* /|. Sāyaṇa here gives the gloss *bhūtena* on *bhūnā*, without any reference to *bahu*.

39. A. KUNST, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

concept, except the final one, is defined by having a location, i.e. it is included in the following concept in the chain. Every concept is made up of things which are many, *bahu*, and differing, *anya*, which would signify that they are perceptible to a subject⁴⁰. At the same time, the more comprehensive concepts are never regarded as in any way discrete from the smaller ones. Accordingly, the hierarchy is, so to speak, an inclusive one.

Now, how do the scholars interpret this chain? Deussen⁴¹ only defines the whole as a « stufenweise fortschreitende Erkenntnis ». Foucher⁴², in his introduction to Senart's edition of the ChU, argues that the concepts « ne sont pas entre eux dans la relation de cause à effet » but that each of them « suppose l'existence du précédent ». He compares the chain directly with the twelve Buddhist *nidānas*. Ruben⁴³, followed by Morgenroth⁴⁴, has termed the whole chain « Kausalreihe » without any discussion whatsoever of its logical state. Kunst⁴⁵ claims that the causality in the actual chain is, as he puts it, « rather underplayed ». Saṅkara, in dealing with certain transitions in the chain, every now and then talks about causality. However, he does so in Indian terms, since he constantly repeats that the cause is something greater than the effect, *kāryād dhi kāraṇaṃ bhūyo dṛṣṭaṃ loke*⁴⁶.

I would prefer to modify the view of the scholars and to define the entire passage in the following way. By means of an inclusive hierarchy, it depicts a universe, which is continuously being widened. This picture is certainly not specific to the present passage, since there are other chains in the older Upaniṣads which exhibit, more or less openly, the same idea. I have, for example, traced it behind the discussion in the ChU, in which concepts are defined as *ūrdhva* (ChU 2, 2) or *parovariyas*⁴⁷ (ChU 2, 7). As a matter of fact, I suspect that the pattern of the inclusive hierarchy may be found in several other passages, although it is probably not observable in every Upaniṣadic method of bringing concepts together. Considering further the nature of the inclusive hierarchy, I would like to emphasize that this relation, as it has been observed in the present passage, does not presuppose that *a* necessarily produces *b*

40. This is the Vedāntic tradition of these concepts, an idea of *advaita*, directly inherited from Yājñavalkya (cf. BĀU 4, 3, 23-32 and 4, 5, 15).

41. P. DEUSSEN, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, Leipzig, 1921³, p. 170.

42. A. FOUCHER, *Analyse [de ChU]*, in *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, trad. et annotée par E. Senart, Paris, 1930, pp. vii-xxxii. See p. xxviii.

43. W. RUBEN, *Die Philosophen der Upanishaden*, Berne, 1947, p. 258.

44. W. MORGENROTH, *op. cit.* (cf. above, footnote 20), p. 424.

45. A. KUNST, *op. cit.* (cf. above, footnote 15), p. 69.

46. This example is taken from ChUBh 7, 2, 1; cf. also, for example, 7, 15, 1, *nāmopakramam āśāntaṃ kāryakāraṇatvena nimittanaimittikatvena ca uttarottara-bhūyastayā avasthitam*.

47. Perhaps *-variya*s should be derived from *uru* and not from *vara*, as is commonly done; cf. G. GREN-EKLUND, *A Study of Nominal Sentences in the Oldest Upaniṣads*, Uppsala, 1978, p. 94 f.

or that *b* necessarily arises from *a*, since it is by no means a genetic relation. Furthermore, there is no reference whatsoever to any time relation⁴⁸, since each concept of the chain must be understood in its bare existence. Yet one may perhaps be permitted to argue that this description of the world, which locates each concept inside another concept, is in some way similar to a description that makes each concept arise from another concept. Nevertheless, it does not seem advisable just to re-interpret the inclusive hierarchy as merely a relation of cause and effect. The inclusive hierarchy, based on location⁴⁹, as described above, expresses something more pragmatically bound and originally different from the causality of a developed logic. This specific type of hierarchy, which is traceable back to the old Upaniṣads and is reflected in the Hindu philosophy of later centuries⁵⁰, has also given to the concept of causality, as it was later developed in the minds of Hindu and Buddhist thinkers, its special nuances, and the concept is, for that reason, not quite compatible with causality in terms of Aristotelian logic.

One further aspect to be taken into consideration is the often-discussed meaning of the word *upaniṣad*. The method of the serial and the individual *upaniṣads* would, according to the suggestions quoted above, imply the idea that one item is included in another and the expanding thought may be gradual, as in the present chain, or alternatively it may just tell us about the inclusion of a psychic concept in a cosmic one. Renou⁵¹ expresses « le sens premier » of *upaniṣad* as « être ou mettre en regard, confronter ». Perhaps I may here select the meaning « être en regard » and claim that the root-noun *upaniṣad* denotes the fact of two things being placed in a relation to each other. *ṣad* would, in this case, refer to the location of the objects of knowledge and not to the position of the knowing subject. The semantic stress of the word must anyhow, in any interpretation, be kept on the prefixes *upa-ni*.

Yet another basic notion of Indian methodological thinking may be considered in trying to identify the original nature of the causality

48. The consideration of time in causality is mainly mentioned in the discussion of *satkārya v. asatkārya*, though the interest there is not in the time relation itself, but in the nature of what is *pūrva*. The primary definition of *kāraṇa* in Tarkasamgraha 38 reads *kāryaniyatapūrvavṛtti kāraṇam* and 39 goes on to complete it by *kāryaṃ prāgabhāvapratiyogi* (ed. Y. V. Athalye).

49. The great importance of the idea of location is also stressed by Renou in footnote 6 of his article (*op. cit.*, cf. above, footnote 5). He emphasizes this main point of philosophical and grammatical speculation and he also reminds us of such Buddhist words for « cause » as, for example, *āyatana*, *pratiṣṭhā* and *ālabana*. Cf. also M. FALK, *op. cit.* (above, footnote 10), p. 141.

50. It would be reasonable to try to identify reflections of this thought pattern in the many later manifestations of mind which ultimately go back to Upaniṣadic ideas and methods. One possible reflection was pointed out to me by Prof. Nils Simonsson, viz. the important concepts of *vistāra*, « expansion » (to what is valid generally), and *saṃkoca*, « contraction » (the restriction to the particular). These ideas are essential both in Kāśmir śivaism and in Indian aesthetic theory.

51. L. RENOUE, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

concept. The important idea of substitution was developed as a method, especially in grammar, and this method seems to indicate a pattern in Indian thinking. In the grammar, it is obvious that — as Staal⁵² puts it — no « derivation » or « construction » should ever be noted as « x becomes y » but only as « x is replaced by y ». This idea of substitution also seems to continue throughout the logic of India, as far as the notions of *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa* are valid; at the particular moment of knowledge, *lakṣya* is replaced by *lakṣaṇa*. It may be possible to recover this method of substitution in an early form in this chain of Upaniṣadic concepts: what is *bhūyas* is not, in the first place, apt to be termed *kāraṇa* but rather *sthanin*, and thus any occurrence of an *upaniṣad* is also expressible as a relation between a *sthanin* and an *ādeśa*⁵³. This is the direction which I wish to point out as that in which it may be possible to discover how the Indian thinkers perceive that aspect of causality which in western philosophy is seen as a genetic relation between cause and effect.

Finally, I wish to conclude this paper by also asking whether justice is really done to the *pratyaya* idea of the central Buddhist ontology by the western terms « cause » and « effect », with all their connotations, especially when considering the close connections of Buddhist philosophy with early Indian thought.

Uppsala.

52. J. F. STAAL, *Euclid and Pāṇini*, in « Philosophy East and West », 15 (1965), pp. 99-116. See p. 113.

53. P. Thieme (*op. cit.*; cf. above, footnote 11) keeps the terms « Substitut » and « Substitution » apart from each other. Such a distinction may, however, be due to our own languages and logic. If so, *ādeśa* may denote both the entity and the process by which something is substituted (in both cases, *ādeśa: ādiśyate anena*). Cf. the conceptually close idea of *lakṣaṇa*, which denotes both *definiens* and *definitio* (*lakṣyate anena*).